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Preface: African Studies at Austrian 
Universities 
Ulrich Pallua & Andreas Exenberger 
The first workshop of the group of researchers called African Studies at Austrian 
Universities was organised by the African Studies Department in Vienna in 2014. It 
brought together most of the researchers in Austria working on African issues inclu-
ding linguistic, historical, literary, sociological, economic and political approaches. 
After this particularly successful workshop the follow-up “Afrikaforschung in Öster-
reich: Zugänge und Einordnungen” was held at the University of Innsbruck in March 
2015. The overall aim was to invite not only the participants from the first workshop 
to present their projects and papers, but at the same time to expand the existing 
network by also reaching out to young post-doctoral students in Austria to contribute 
to this Austrian network of scholars whose main research field is African Studies, the 
study of African societies, their history, economy, language, and literature. It featured 
topics as diverse as “The African Diaspora”, “Barbary Coast Captivity Narratives”, 
“The Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie”, “The History of Political Ideas in 
Africa”, “The Tension between Developmentalism and Democracy in Ethiopia”, 
“Climate Change, Conflicts, and Development: Problems for Africa’s ‘Limited Access 
Orders’“, “Science Under Nazism: Recent Biographical Research On Wilhelm Czer-
mak”, “The UN: Under the Guise of colonial-political Interests During the Cold War”, 
“Manpower Development: CVs and Interactions in the German-Tanzanian Triangular 
Relationship, 1970-1990“, and “Higher Education in Eastern Africa: A Comparison of 
Public and Private Universities in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda“. The workshop was 
rounded off by an exhibition entitled “Bitter Oranges: African Migrant workers in 
Calabria” showcasing the inhumane conditions African workers suffer from on the 
orange plantations in in southern Italy, a cooperation between the University of 
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Innsbruck (namely the research area “Cultural Encounters – Cultural Conflicts”) and 
the Künstlerhaus Büchsenhausen.1 
These workshops of different scholars working in African studies on a yearly 
basis are unique because they provide a forum for an interdisciplinary exchange of 
ideas and perspectives and a fruitful dialogue with possible collaborations between 
the different universities in Austria. The challenge of bringing together so many disci-
plines dealing with heterogeneous approaches consists in identifying what Stuart 
Hall calls the 
“recovery of lost histories. The histories that have never been told about our-
selves that we could not learn in schools, that were not in any books, and that 
we had to recover […]. That is how and where the margins begin to speak. The 
margins begin to contest, the locals begin to come to representation.”2 
The term representation is thus an integral part of the various approaches the 
different scholars adopt in this volume including issues such as identity, self- and 
other-representation, collective memory, the past and its effect on the present. Re-
presentation as such is inextricably linked with telling stories, stories about Africa. 
According to Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, a third-generation Nigerian writer, we have 
to be aware of the danger of the “single story” as a single story changes the way we 
see history: that is why we have to be aware of the responsibility we have as tellers of 
“stories”. Adichie claims that the single story her roommate in America had about 
her was 
“a single story of catastrophe. In this single story, there was no possibility of 
Africans being similar to her in any way, no possibility of feelings more complex 
than pity, no possibility of a connection as human equals.”3 
Telling stories about Africa is thus of particular relevance because we have to 
be aware of who tells these “stories”, how, when, and why, and of the fact that the 
perspectives we adopt to a great extent also pertain to power relations: 
                                                 
 1 In the context of this research area (respectively one of its predecessors), already in 2012 the collective volume 
Afrika: Kontinent der Extreme (with contributions in German and English) was published with innsbruck uni-
versity press. It is interdisciplinary in nature and assembling several contributions from different methodological 
and theoretical perspectives and aimed at questioning the usual narrative of African societies. See Exenberger 
(2012). 
 2 Hall (1997), 48. 
 3 Adichie (2009). 
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“Power is the ability not just to tell the story of another person, but to make it 
the definitive story of that person. The Palestinian poet Mourid Barghouti writes 
that if you want to dispossess a people, the simplest way to do it is to tell their 
story and to start with, ’secondly’. Start the story with the arrows of the Native 
Americans, and not with the arrival of the British, and you have an entirely dif-
ferent story. Start the story with the failure of the African state, and not with 
the colonial creation of the African state, and you have an entirely different 
story.“4 
What Adichie means here is that in order to tell a “different” story about Africa, 
many stories have to be told and taken into account as only then will we be able to 
gauge how the single story has been misinterpreted and misused by power-related 
discourses and to start talking about how “stories can also be used to empower and 
to humanise. Stories can break the dignity of a people, but stories can also repair 
that broken dignity.”5 The articles in this volume all tell different “stories” from 
literary, historical, sociological, and socio-political perspectives and focus on various 
aspects of African identity in order to counteract prejudices and refute stereotypical 
and biased representations – that is, a “single story” of Africa. 
 
This collection of essays starts with Arno Sonderegger’s article The Modernity of Pan-
Africanism: From History and Politics to Popular Culture. It deals with the history of 
modernity in Africa, how the concept of modern Africa is inextricably bound up with 
the colonial past, and how nineteenth-century colonial domination impacted on the 
development of the “new states” in Africa. After drawing a phenomenological sketch 
of Pan-Africanism including aspects of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and anti-
racism in the development of a “modern” Africa he introduces the different approa-
ches to Pan-Africanism of Youssou N’Dour, Kwame Nkrumah, Cheikh Anta Diop, and 
Bantu Stephen Biko. 
A similar approach in even closer connection to the arts is also adopted by 
Birgit Englert. Her article Reflections on the Role and Production of Research Films in 
African Studies analyzes the role and production of research films in African Studies, 
including not only the relevance of audio-visual work in general but also reflections 
on how to work with film in research processes. Moreover, she draws on concrete 
                                                 
 4 Adichie (2009). 
 5 Adichie (2009). 
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examples of audio-visual work projects carried out within the framework of the De-
partment of African Studies in recent years about African diasporas in Europe where 
she played different roles, ranging from facilitator and producer to that of director. 
We then turn from representations in music and film to those in literature. 
Maximilian Feldner in his article “Teach Them Our History”: Nigerian Identity For-
mation in Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s “Half of a Yellow Sun” is concerned with the 
Biafran War, a war that threatened to tear Nigeria apart, and the effect it had on the 
population. The article explores the idea of the novel constituting a literary work of 
symbolic national identity formation: Adichie uses the Biafran War to show readers 
how the construction of identity in the process of nation building has symbolically 
contributed to a collective Nigerian identity, that is the literary techniques and narra-
tive strategies employed to tell a story of the nation.  
Silvia Lercher in Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie: Storyteller and Activist rounds off 
the discussion by focussing on the dramatic events of the Biafran War in Half of a 
Yellow Sun and how she draws on the collective memory of her family and people to 
create the story. Using trauma theory as a theoretical framework the article discusses 
how a third-generation writer from Nigeria raises awareness about the traumatic 
past of Nigeria and how identity and collective memory are inextricably intertwined 
in the process of a collective consciousness of a nation.  
Eric Burton's contribution focusses on African-European contact from a more 
specific historical perspective. His article African Manpower Development during the 
Cold War: The Case of Tanzanian Students in the Two German States traces and re-
constructs biographies of different Tanzanian actors in the context of the develop-
ment cooperation or “solidarity” of the two German states. The article thus fathoms 
the room for manoeuvre in career choices and in everyday life in the context of a 
continuous lack of skilled workers in the Tanzanian developmental state and the 
two ideologically different approaches of their European counterparts. 
Thomas Lechner continues this discussion with a case study roughly from the 
same time of the formation of the Tanzanian state. In his article The Role of the 
United Nations in the Congo-Crisis: An Instrument to Enforce National Interests?, he 
investigates the Soviet interest in postcolonial Africa with a special focus on the role 
of the United Nations in the Congo disaster. With the end of the Belgian mandate in 
the Congo in 1960, Patrice Lumumba’s party “Mouvement National Congolais” won 
the elections. At the ceremony of independence in June 1960 Lumumba described 
Belgium’s relationship to the Congo as one of slavery. The author outlines Lumumba’s 
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strategy of seeking help by approaching the United States and the Soviet Union, and 
the role the United Nations played in fuelling the conflict in the Congo. 
In the last contribution, Andreas Exenberger takes a broader look at these kinds 
of conflicts in his article on African “Limited Access Orders” and Post-colonial Conflicts. 
Departing from the recently developed institutional framework of limited and open 
access orders, he engages in its application on African states and their various internal 
and external conflicts by putting particular emphasis on the international order. An 
outlook by Thomas Spielbüchler concludes the collection. 
Finally, we would like to take the opportunity to thank all the scholars for their 
contributions to this volume, also those who presented their papers as part of the 
workshop in Innsbruck, thus contributing to bringing African Studies at Austrian uni-
versities to a wider public, and – last but not least – those who supported the work-
shop and made this publication possible. 
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The Modernity of Pan-Africanism: 
From History and Politics to Popular 
Culture 
Arno Sonderegger 
Africa in the Modern World 
It should be a truism that Africa is an important part of modern history or, the history 
of modernity. Certainly, Africa has made particular experiences and produced her 
own views on the historical developments of the last 500 years. Yet to say that 
Africa is an integral and relevant part of the modern world – and that it has parti-
cipated crucially in the process of its making – sounds strange to Western ears. We 
have been used to consider Africa a very remote place: the other side of humanity. 
We often assume Africans living on the fringes of human development. Such consi-
deration is false: Africa was and has been very much interconnected and entangled 
with the rest of the world. Africans are very much part of the modern world, shaped 
by it and shaping it. 
A word or two seem appropriate to make clear what I mean by “modernity” 
and the “modern world”. I consider these terms useful in order to discuss “their” 
history and “ours” in one common frame of reference. This is not meant to be under-
stood in any Eurocentric sense, but – to the contrary – to help bypass the delusive 
“us-them-divide”. The famous American anthropologist Clifford Geertz tackled the 
categorical difficulty at issue here when writing in 1995 that 
“[m]odern is what some of us think we are, others of us wish desperately to be, 
yet others despair of being, or regret, or oppose, or fear, or, now, desire some-
how to transcend. It is our universal adjective. [...] Modernity, or its absence, 
sets economies, regimes, peoples, and moralities off from one another; fixes 
them generally in the calendar of our time. 
14 The Modernity of Pan-Africanism 
But though it is, originally, a Western word and a Western notion ([…] meaning 
[…] ‘now existing’, ‘of this time’), the idea of modernity has become the 
common property of all the world, even more prized and puzzled over in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America […] than in Europe and North America […]. Whatever 
it is, it is pervasive, as either a presence or a lack, an achievement or a failure, 
a liberation or a burden. Whatever it is.”1 
Modernity, then, is something that sets apart, that divides. The notion is re-
peatedly used by various human actors to claim not only difference but superiority. 
Such abusive use must be rejected – not so much on moral grounds, but due to the 
fact that “the idea of modernity has become the common property of all the world”, 
i.e. that we all are living in one world. Accepting modernity’s pluralised, complicated 
and “uneasy” character, the notion offers ample opportunities to look at global reali-
ties in one common frame of reference, neglecting neither differences nor sameness. 
Seen from both an African perspective and a historical angle, the modern world 
and the African variants of “modernities” were brought into being by interaction 
with Europeans with basically commercial interests, but sometimes missionary and 
political interests as well. For almost 400 years (1450-1850) the Atlantic slave trade 
was the dominant and ugly side of more general trade relations connecting Africa 
with the Americas and the Caribbean, Europe and Asia. The experience of slavery in 
the mines and on the plantations of the so-called “New World” led to the ideology 
of White racism – proclaiming both the existence of a single Black race and its inborn 
inferiority – and, along the coastlines of Africa involved in the trade, to increasingly 
unequal relationships among local populations. There emerged exploitative econo-
mies, and new and grossly hierarchical societal and political structures.2 
The 19th century witnessed a certain transformation with important long-time 
effects on Africa. At its root lies a reinvigorated imperialist drive on behalf of North-
west European powers and public activists who strove for anti-slavery and missionary 
aims. The civilizing mission became an effective ideology shared by many Europeans 
(and Americans) who took an interest in African affairs, and in the 1880s and 1890s 
the “civilization speak” lent itself to the justification of the military conquest and 
partition of Africa by European Great Powers. Imperial domination and foreign rule 
were then implemented in the whole of Africa – with the sole exceptions of Liberia 
                                                 
 1 Geertz (1995), 136-137. 
 2 Cf. Eckert et al. (2010). 
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(a former colony founded by African American repatriates and nominally independent 
since 1847) and the Ethiopian Empire that successfully repulsed the Italian advances 
in 1889 and 1896. European colonial rule of Africa came under attack on international 
levels with the end of the Second World War, and African anti-colonial movements 
in the colonial territories slowly gained momentum. The British and French had to 
give up their African empires in the 1950s and 1960s, Belgium in 1960, the Portuguese 
in the 1970s. The independence of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Eritrea came even later, 
in 1980, 1990 and 1993.3 
The independence of the “new states” of Africa – framed by, as they were, the 
boundaries arbitrarily set up by the European colonisers, and inheriting colonial insti-
tutions (militaries, bureaucracies, legislatures) – was precarious at best. The limita-
tions to acting potently and self-determined proved to be very severe. As American 
historian Frederick Cooper put it, 
“African states, like their predecessors [i.e., the colonial territories], had great 
difficulty getting beyond the limitations of a gatekeeper state. Their survival 
depended precisely on the fact that formal sovereignty was recognized from 
outside, and that resources, such as foreign aid and military assistance, came to 
governments for that reason. Like colonial regimes, they had trouble extending 
their power and their command of people’s respect, if not support, inward. They 
had trouble collecting taxes, except on imports and exports; they had trouble 
setting economic priorities and policies, except for the distribution of resources 
like oil revenues and customs receipts; they had trouble making the nation-state 
into a symbol that inspired loyalty. What they could do was to sit astride the 
interface between a territory and the rest of the world, collecting and distri-
buting resources that derived from the gate itself: custom revenue and foreign 
aid; permits to do business in the territory; entry and exit visas; and permission 
to move currency in and out. [… S]truggles for the gate – and efforts of some 
groups to get around it – bedeviled African states from the start. What indepen-
dence added was the possibility of weaving patron-client relationships within 
the state […].”4 
This, in a nutshell, specifies many of the most disturbing factors present in 
Africa today linked to a particular ongoing past of colonial domination. “The Past of 
the Present”5 is crucial to any understanding of contemporary Africa, i.e. that 
                                                 
 3 Cf. Sonderegger et al. (2011). 
 4 Cooper (2002), 156-157. 
 5 Cooper (2002). 
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“Modern Africa”6 that is intrinsically interwoven with the roles of “Africa in the 
World”7. At the root of these difficulties in post-colonial “gate-keeping” Africa, is the 
unequal integration of Africa into global capitalism and international politics. This long 
term historical process started with the slave trade in the early modern period, under-
went several transformations, but has not yet come to an end. In a famous book of 
the early 1970s the Guyana born African historian Walter Rodney described “how 
Europe underdeveloped Africa”. He argued that underdevelopment is the product of 
“[…] a particular relationship of exploitation […] a product of capitalist, imperialist 
and colonialist exploitation.” Rodney observed the simple truth that 
“African and Asian countries were developing independently [that is, along their 
own terms] until they were taken over directly or indirectly by the capitalist 
powers. When that happened, exploitation increased and the export of surplus 
ensued, depriving the societies of the benefit of their natural resources and 
labour.”8 
Seen from a somewhat less deterministic and accusatory viewpoint, it was a 
new kind of interdependence that, back then, had begun in the wake of commercial-
capitalist interests and imperialist zeal: a history of “modernity” and its “alternative 
modernities”. With regard to Africa’s development, the occurring asymmetrical (and 
violent) integration into world markets and world politics took deep roots: 
“African economies […] are [globally] integrated in a manner that is unfavour-
able to Africa and ensures that Africa is dependent on the big capitalist coun-
tries. Indeed, structural dependence is one of the characteristics of under-
development.”9 
Characterizing the importance of the colonial heritage for contemporary Africa, 
British historian Basil Davidson (1992) spoke of “the Black Man’s Burden”, in parti-
cular the disastrous effects that the Western nation-state model had on Africa’s post-
independence development. Davidson, however, reminds us that nationalism is al-
ways – and has been everywhere – a double-edged sword, capable of both pro-
gressive and regressive effects: 
                                                 
 6 Davidson (1984). 
 7 Ellis (2011). 
 8 Rodney (2009), 15-16. 
 9 Rodney (2009), 30. 
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“We have to be concerned here with the nationalism which produced the 
nation-states of newly independent Africa after the colonial period: with the 
nationalism that became nation-statism. This nation-statism looked like a libera-
tion, and really began as one. But it did not continue as a liberation. In practice, 
it was not a restoration of Africa to Africa’s own history, but the onset of a new 
period of indirect subjection to the history of Europe. The fifty or so states of the 
political partition […] became fifty or so nation-states formed and governed on 
European models, chiefly the models of Britain and France. Liberation thus 
produced its own denial. Liberation led to alienation.”10 
In the main and despite of some honest efforts to the contrary, the “new” 
postcolonial states in Africa displayed the more regressive, negative tendencies of 
nationalism. In fact it is hard to see how they could have done otherwise. But for 
the moment it is enough to remember that the African anti-colonial movements that 
have emerged in the colonial territories since the 1930s and 1940s, contributed 
significantly to the process of political decolonisation. By claiming rights to self-
determination and independence, those anti-colonial movements have made good 
use of universalistic, nationalist rhetoric in challenging the colonial masters. Re-
member that formal independence was not given voluntarily, but came only in re-
action to struggling Africans, and at a heavy price.11 
Though not a Marxist historian like Rodney, and surely a much less engaged left 
wing writer than Davidson, Frederick Cooper is equally convinced of the importance 
to “[…] explore ways to think about Africa’s place in a world once dominated by 
European colonial empires and still shaped by capitalist economic relations.”12 One 
very important point in this effort of understanding Africa’s role in the modern world 
is trying to overcome the habit of clear-cut attributions and oppositions. Accepting 
the historical complexity and entanglement of all parts of the globe is a necessary pre-
requisite for any such understanding. Accepting, for example, that “Gatekeeper 
states are thus not ‘African’ institutions, nor are they ‘European’ impositions; they 
emerged out of a peculiar Euro-African history.”13 This is part of the history of 
modernity. 
                                                 
 10 Davidson (1992), 10. 
 11 Cf. Cooper (2013); Cooper (2014). 
 12 Cooper (2014), 2. 
 13 Cooper (2002), 161. 
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A Phenomenological Sketch of Pan-Africanism 
An intriguing part of that “peculiar Euro-African history”, and intricately responding to 
its transformations and changes, is the history of Pan-Africanism. In the early 1960s 
when the idea of a Pan-African political union was part of a heated debate, Colin 
Legum defined Pan-Africanism as “essentially a movement of ideas and emotions”, 
not “a declaration of [specific political] principles.”14 His definition turns our attention 
to a very basic fact of Pan-Africanism: its extreme variety and diverseness. Perhaps 
the least common denominator shared by all Pan-Africanists is a more or less diffuse 
belief in African unity. But there are some more notions and values that can be used 
to delimit the Pan-Africanist sphere, all of them explicitly referring to “modern” ideas 
and echoing the catchwords of the French revolution: egalité, liberté, solidarité – 
equality, freedom and liberty, and solidarity.15 
Colin Legum pinned the early beginnings of this ideology down to the late 18th-
century Americas – to the hot spots of plantation slavery and the heyday of the 
transatlantic slave trade: “Pan-Africanism began not in the ‘homeland’ but in the 
diaspora. […] Pan-Africanism had its [origins] in the New World. It developed through 
[…] ‘a complicated Atlantic triangle of influences’ between the New World, Europe 
and Africa.”16 In that sense, Pan-Africanism grew from the history which has been 
roughly outlined before. 
In strictly political terms – referring to the arena of political decision making 
and execution – Pan-Africanism’s effectiveness was limited to a quite short period 
of time after 1945 when African nationalist leaders shared Pan-African sentiments 
and used Pan-Africanist networks in their struggles against colonial rule. It was at that 
time that one of the most important Pan-Africanist strategists of the 20th century, 
Trinidadian George Padmore, could be convinced that the time was ripe for a strong 
unified Africa: 
“In our struggle for national freedom, human dignity and social redemption, 
Pan-Africanism offers an ideological alternative to Communism on the one side 
and Tribalism on the other. It rejects both white racialism and black chauvinism. 
                                                 
 14 Legum (1965), 14, original emphasis. 
 15 Cf. Sonderegger (2010), 188-189. 
 16 Legum (1965), 14. 
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It stands for racial co-existence on the basis of absolute equality and respect 
for human personality.”17 
Note that Padmore did not even for a moment consider Western capitalism a 
viable option for Africa’s advancement; his book was amply called Pan-Africanism or 
Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa – with a title that mentions the only 
two alternatives that seemed theoretically viable for an improved African situation. 
In fact, Padmore argued convincingly that communism, though superficially it might 
seem reasonable in theory due to its proclaimed anti-imperialism, was not a viable 
option for Africa at all in practical terms.18 There remained, therefore, only one way 
to take – Pan-Africanism – because  
“Pan-Africanism looks above the narrow confines of class, race, tribe and reli-
gion. In other words, it wants equal opportunity for all. Talent to be rewarded 
on the basis of merit. Its vision stretches beyond the limited frontiers of the 
nation-state. Its perspective embraces the federation of regional self-governing 
countries and their ultimate amalgamation into a United States of Africa.19 
When Padmore wrote this credo in 1956, hopes for the realisation of a unified 
African state on a continental basis were still high. A few years later, with the com-
promise institution OAU (Organisation of African Unity) founded in 1963, such high 
hopes faded quite rapidly. However, Pan-Africanism cannot be reduced to its visible 
role in that short era of political decolonisation. As Colin Legum put it 50 years ago, it 
is a “movement of ideas and emotions”. And I would like to add, it is a movement of 
practices and engagements not restricted – and not restrictable – to the level of state 
politics. 
To call Pan-Africanism an ideology extremely varied, diverse and diffuse does 
not mean that it is a useless notion. However, to make it useful and sharp we must 
distinguish between different Pan-African variations. Figure 1, “Pan-Africanism in a 
nutshell”, shows a way of conceptualizing them in one single frame of reference. It 
provides several clues to crucial aspects of the Pan-African phenomenon, some of 
which will be discussed in some detail in the following pages. 
 
                                                 
 17 Padmore (1972), 355. 
 18 Cf. Sonderegger (2015), 195-201. 
 19 Padmore (1972), 355-356, original emphasis. 
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Figure 1: Pan-Africanism in a Nutshell 
 
 
1. Searching for Equality: Aspects of Anti-Racism in Pan-Africanism 
Some varieties put a strong emphasis on matters of race, racial discrimination, and 
the anti-racist struggle. These are intrinsically tied to particular socially established 
hierarchies and class differences, both (if in varying forms) in African colonial circum-
stances and in American Black diasporic settings. The Pan-African fight against racism 
goes right back to the 19th century. One citizen of Liberia, Edward Wilmot Blyden was, 
in 1865, the first West African to proclaim not only a racially distinct African type, but 
to develop elaborate ideas about what he called “the African personality”: a “race” in 
unselfish service to humankind: 
“Thus Ethiopia and Ethiopians [i.e. Africa and Africans], having always served, 
will continue to serve the world. […] 
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And in the light of the ultimate good of the universe, I do not see why the 
calling of the one should be considered the result of a curse, and the calling of 
the other the result of special favour. The one fulfills its mission by domination, 
the other, by submission. The one serves mankind by ruling; the other serves 
mankind by serving. The one wears the crown, wields the sceptre; the other 
bears the stripes and carries the cross. […] 
And if the principle laid down by Christ […] that he who would be chief must be-
come the servant of all, then we see the position which Africa and the Africans 
must ultimately occupy.”20 
Obviously, Blyden’s racial notion of the “African Personality” was deeply stuck 
in the racist discourse of his time.21 The same is true with regard to the Jamaican 
Marcus Garvey who, in the years from 1914 to the mid-20s, founded and led the first 
mass protest movement with a Pan-African outlook in Harlem, New York City: the 
Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). Garvey, who was most successful 
in infecting poor urban Blacks in the African diaspora with self-esteem and “racial 
pride”, thought of Africa primarily in terms of the “lost home” that must be colonised 
and civilised by folks of his sort. Consequently, his relationship to the continent was 
one of imagined imperialism: no wonder, Garvey declared himself President of Africa 
(evidently, he did so without any immediate effect on either continental Africans or 
on the European colonial powers there in charge). Garvey’s racism as well as his 
capitalist zeal and his plans for a Black imperialism, were in fact so profound that 
George Padmore, Pan-Africanism’s first historian, refused to include Garvey in the 
realm of Pan-Africanism proper, calling it “Black Zionism or Garveyism” instead.22 
Racial attitudes did not vanish among Pan-Africanists in the 20th century. In 
particular among African artists and literary scholars from the Black diaspora, such 
attitudes are still manifest today. This is in part due to the ongoing influence and 
attraction of ideas that first gained momentum in France in the 1930s and 1940s: a 
group of young students and poets, Léopold Sédar Senghor from Senegal, Aimé Cé-
saire from Martinique and Léon Damas from French-Guiana, founded an influential 
cultural movement – négritude.23 Its basic idea resembles Blyden’s “African perso-
nality”, Africans being defined as Black, emotional and sensitive, distinctively set apart 
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from European Whiteness, rationality and callousness. Senghor’s understanding of 
the relationship between Europe and Africa was, however (in sharp contrast to 
Garvey’s views), not one of aggressive opposition but of complimentary values.24 As 
long-standing head of government in independent Senegal, Senghor consequently 
went for a close alliance between Senegal and France. 
The perpetuation of racial attitudes – and sometimes outspoken racism – 
amongst “the wretched of the earth”25 struggling against racist discrimination by 
White Western people, comes as no surprise. And it was no surprise to the leading 
man of the Pan-African Congress Movement, W.E.B. DuBois, who addressing an 
African American readership declared in 1903: “the problem of the Twentieth Century 
is the problem of the color-line.”26 The Harvard educated historian DuBois who 
attended the first (and only) Pan-African Conference in London in 1900 and organised 
a series of four Pan-African Congresses from 1919 to 1927, believed “[…] that the 
Negro people, as a race, have a contribution to make to civilization and humanity, 
which no other race can make”,27 but he believed too that “their ‘race identity’” could 
and would “disappear without harm” in course of time.28 DuBois, in other words, was 
not a racist. He did not believe in everlasting fixed racial traits. Although he used 
“race” as a means to forge alliances in his efforts to overcome White and colonial 
racism, he was not a racist at all. 
2. Claiming Freedom and Liberty: Aspects of Anti-Colonialism and Anti-
Imperialism in Pan-Africanism 
What prevails in other cases of Pan-Africanism is the struggle against foreign rule, 
against colonial and imperial domination. This has been the dominant issue in Pan-
African struggles from the mid-1930s onwards, lasting as long as independence from 
the colonial yoke was finally achieved. As this goal was achieved in various colonial 
territories at different times, there is no single African date of independence, and no 
general sudden end of anti-colonial activity, but various waves of anti-colonial and 
anti-imperialist activities flowing through different African countries at different 
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times.29 DuBois’s congress movement had its share in the early history of Pan-African 
anti-colonialism. In the 1920s, this elitist circle of Western educated Africans of 
mostly diasporic origin carried many petitions before the newly found international 
institutions – such as the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) – as well as imperial governments, attacking both the general injustice and 
concrete malpractices in colonial territories. They did so but unfortunately, to no 
immediate effect. 
The much more radical approach of the Third Communist International, the 
Comintern founded in 1919, was more successful in establishing connections to the 
broader population in the African colonies. Among African workers at the docks in 
the port cities, and along the railway lines, the socialist spirit of solidarity fell on fertile 
ground.30 This was especially the case in already industrialised South Africa where a 
Communist party had been founded as early as 1921, but left-wing thought had 
profound influence in other parts of Africa as well, in particular among the younger 
generation.31 George Padmore who was a leading figure in the Comintern in the late 
1920s and early 1930s, focused on his Pan-Africanist practice of extending and 
deepening those connections.32 After his break with the Soviet-led Comintern in 
1933/34 and his permanent settlement in London in 1935, Padmore was paramount 
in assembling a great number of future African leaders and organising their joint 
efforts to get rid of colonial domination. With the end of the Second World War in 
sight, Padmore began to revive the old Pan-African Congress movement – prompting 
the 77-year-old DuBois to cross the Atlantic and host the Fifth Pan-African Congress 
at Manchester in October 1945. 
That event expressed a self-conscious and radical “challenge to the colonial 
powers”. Utilizing the outcome of the Second World War, the new alliance of old and 
young Pan-Africanists wanted to seize the opportunities that emerged from the ruins 
of the old world order: 
“We are determined to be free. We want education. We want the right to earn a 
decent living; the right to express our thoughts and emotions, to adopt and 
create forms of beauty. We demand for Black Africa autonomy and indepen-
dence […]. 
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[…W]e are unwilling to starve any longer while doing the world’s drudgery, in 
order to support by our poverty and ignorance a false aristocracy and a dis-
credited Imperialism. 
We condemn the monopoly of capital and the rule of private wealth and in-
dustry for private profit alone. We welcome economic democracy as the only 
real democracy. Therefore, we shall complain, appeal and arraign. We will make 
the world listen to the facts of our condition. We will fight in every way we can 
for freedom, democracy and social betterment.”33 
At least formal political independence became real within the next few decades 
and a so-called “post-colonial era” began. This had, of course, profound effects on 
how international dependences and anti-colonialism were henceforth conceived. In 
“post-colonial” times, anti-colonialism translates either into a global critique of the 
international world order (similar to the critique with which I introduced my paper) or 
into efforts of strengthening the African Union idea in political spheres of influence. 
The latter strategy played a certain vital role in the transition times from late colonial 
rule to early independence, but came to a halt sometimes in the mid-1960s. However, 
following the euphoria after the termination of South Africa’s Apartheid regime, the 
second option was pursued by South African president Thabo Mbeki and Libya’s 
Muammar al-Gaddafi in the second half of the 1990s. They called for an “African Re-
naissance” and pressed (and paid) for the reorganisation of the defunct Organi-
sation of African Unity (OAU) into a politically more integrated African Union (AU). In 
2002 the AU replaced the older institution, but so far it was hardly more successful 
in unifying the African state governments than its predecessor. 
3. Being or Becoming? Unity as a Matter of Fact and a Matter of Debate  
The Pan-African varieties differ in another important respect as well. Especially among 
African and African American writers, questions of identity, of being or becoming uni-
fied, are part of an ongoing and unresolved debate. Ngugi wa Thiongo’s reflections on 
“An African Renaissance” give good evidence of both the nature and the limits of 
those debates that are, to a certain degree, preoccupied with memory and remem-
bering, trying to restore self-esteem and urging for a collective consciousness.34 
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In fact, the ways in which African unity can be understood are very diverse. 
Some like to see unity as something already existent, but they disagree among 
themselves whether such “given unity” is due to racial (including the diaspora) or 
continental “singularity”. Others reflect much more deeply on historical grounds, 
referring to “formative” common experiences of Africans in the past, such as the slave 
trade, slavery, and colonialism. Often this leads them to stress negative impacts on 
Africans and emphasise victimhood, sometimes to the degree of paralyzing their own 
efforts of facilitating African empowerment. But to a certain degree the active me-
morisation of certain aspects of the past – leading to a collective memory of some 
shared views – might lead to a forceful collective consciousness informing activist 
political struggles. In the end, all depends on the goals and visions of the future. In 
this respect, again, Pan-Africanists differ enormously as soon as it gets concrete. 
The Diversity of Pan-Africanism and Its Popular Appeal: Some 
Points and Persons 
Establishing when – and under what circumstances – particular varieties of Pan-
Africanism had an effect on the thoughts and practices of wider communities (and 
when and where not) is crucial for any historical understanding of the Pan-African 
phenomenon. As may be guessed by looking at figure 1 above, this is no task that 
can be done all at once. It would take up much time and space to discuss all the 
elements mentioned in the figure in detail. Therefore I am not going to try to give a 
summary account, but rather concentrate instead on a few points and persons with 
a high reputation in Pan-African circles.  
In selecting whom and what, I let myself be guided by one African artist who 
has rightly been called “Le griot planétaire” by his biographer.35 A gifted musician 
from Senegal, the internationally acclaimed singer Youssou N’Dour, released several 
versions of a song called “New Africa” in the course of the past quarter century36 
and performed it live on numerous occasions all over the world. Mixing Wolof and 
English, this song is a hymn of rare elegance and, in some circles, considered the 
African anthem of Pan-Africanism. Calling for a “new Africa” – a Africa that is proud 
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of its past, strong and determined to overcome all obstacles, present and future, hard 
and honestly working for its development and a better life – Youssou N’Dour ex-
presses basic Pan-African sentiments and ideas. Playing artfully with words, empha-
sizing slightly different aspects and issues from performance to performance (see 
appendix for the varied song lyrics of 1992, 2000 and 2008), he ceaselessly asks for 
unity among Africans and unification of their efforts: 
− Let’s get together (1992), Let’s […] work as a group (2000), Let’s come together 
(2008); 
− develop a consensus (1992), develop the same views and wishes (2000), a meeting of 
minds (2008);  
− let nothing come between us (1992), let nothing pull us apart (2008), Together, no 
one can come between us (2000); 
− Three people can’t wrestle / And two are stronger than one (1992), United we are 
stronger (2008). 
Youssou N’Dour hints at the colonial past as well, when singing “When I think 
of what our grandfathers went through, it’s sad” (1992) or “When one thinks of what 
our ancestors went through / We are heartbroken and revenge is all we can think of” 
(2000). But he is quick to argue for an optimistic turn. This is most clearly visible in 
the lyrical variation of 2008. At that time, Youssou N’Dour does not stop with his re-
gretful look at the colonial past, nor does he express feelings of depressing grief or 
helpless wishes for revenge, but continues his grief with an uplifting verse leading, 
almost immediately, to the Pan-African vision: 
“When I think about how our grandparents suffered, I cry / But our past must 
not stop us from moving forward / I dream to see Africa unified by a common 
vision” (2008) 
In order to get there, Youssou N’Dour claims for leadership and responsibility, 
as well as for cooperation and diligent activity on behalf of everyone. He calls for 
democracy and development. He criticises exploitive or self-righteous African leaders, 
but people’s laziness and passivity as well: “A long road lies ahead / We have much 
to do / So let’s get ready” (2008). 
To put that vision of African unity into practice it requires, first and foremost, 
a change of consciousness and awareness – not only on behalf of Africans but of the 
whole world. Therefore, it makes perfectly sense that this musician from francophone 
Senegal phrases that paramount requirement in English, which effectively works as 
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a “world language” that is almost universally understood. Accordingly, Youssou 
N’Dour ends all performances of this song, with only minor variations of words, in 
what he and most of us conceive of as a universal tongue: “Change your thinking / 
Come together / Work together / Keep on working / […] All you people / Africa / 
Africa united.” 
In short, Youssou N’Dour is calling for a united Africa that is proud of its past, 
strong and determined, working for its development and a better life. Towards the 
end of the song, in the English/universal section, he mentions three famous Pan-
Africanists by name: Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumah who died in exile in 1972; Senegalese 
Cheikh Anta Diop who died in Dakar in 1986; and Stephen Bantu Biko who was 
tortured and murdered by South African policemen in 1977. By passionately singing 
their names, Youssou N’Dour is calling his listeners to actively remember those (and 
other) Africans of the recent (and not so recent) past who fought, in their very own 
and special ways, for African liberation, equal rights and solidarity. It is a contempo-
rary and popular Pan-Africanist statement. Invoking Nkrumah, Diop and Biko builds 
a vocal link between the present efforts for Africa’s progressive development and 
the Pan-African tradition. 
Though all of them are definitely important protagonists of Pan-Africanism, the 
three men represent quite different strands and shades of this ideology. Kwame 
Nkrumah, the “Black Star of Africa” as he was called in the 1950s and 1960s,37 has 
been – without a doubt – the most proficient politician trying to set up a politically 
united Africa on the continental base so far. On the other hand, Youssou N’Dour’s 
fellow-countryman Cheikh Anta Diop had a Pan-Africanist agenda that did not deal 
with current realities so much (or, at least, did not look at them in realistic terms), 
but claimed a pre-historical and genetic Pan-African unity binding together all Blacks 
that must only be recovered and awakened. Publishing his ideas since the late 
1950s,38 Diop perpetuated the racist tradition of Pan-Africanist thought and négritude 
at a time when many others had already overcome the racist bias. Wole Soyinka’s 
quip of “tigritude” – published with a profound impact in Time Magazine on 17 No-
vember 1967: “A tiger does not proclaim his tigritude – he pounces.” – is perhaps 
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the most famous early critique of négritude by an African intellectual, but by no 
means the only one.39 
The English translations of Diop’s work that appeared in the U.S. since circa 
1970 – at the heyday of Black radicalism – and never went out-of-print since, ensured 
its enduring international impact. According to Chinua Achebe, 
“[i]t is important not to view Négritude in isolation but in the full context of 
the black consciousness movement of the first half of the twentieth century […]. 
[…W]hat these intellectuals were trying to achieve – the reclamation of the 
power of self-definition to recast Africa’s, and therefore their own, image 
through the written word – [was] incredibly attractive and influential. Here were 
highly sophisticated individuals who believed in the need for blacks who had 
been victims of historical dispossession to appreciate and elevate their culture 
– literature, art, music, dance, etc. They encouraged Africans […] to celebrate 
and espouse their culture as not only not inferior to European culture and civili-
zation but equally acceptable even if fundamentally different.”40 
Even though Achebe’s balanced view on négritude has some merit, especially 
with regard to his hints at the necessity of historicizing the phenomenon, it avoids to 
confront the basically racist premises on which Cheikh Anta Diop built his claims. He 
overlooked too that Diop’s attractiveness to an international audience rests, to a 
great extent, on his simplifications and straightforward pairs of opposition. In Senegal 
itself, that kind of racism and racist heritage does not play a dominant role. Here Diop 
is positively remembered for his stubborn opposition to Senegal’s postcolonial politi-
cal elites. 
Still another Pan-African approach was developed in the early 1970s by South 
African student representative Stephen Biko. His agitation for “Black Consciousness” 
in the Apartheid state resulted in heavy state repression and, ultimately, led to his 
killing. The single most interesting point about his political work – carried out on a civil 
society basis – seems to me his profound non-racialist approach. In the following and 
concluding pages I am going to sketch these three variants of Pan-Africanism along 
selected lines. 
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1. Kwame Nkrumah: The Struggle for Political Power and Erasure of the 
Ruling World Order 
Born in a small fishing village in the south-western Gold Coast, Kwame Nkrumah 
attended a Catholic school where teachers became aware of his outstanding gift for 
learning. Nkrumah acquired a solid education, and served as teacher at Achimota 
College in the late 1920s and early 30s. Inspired by Nigerian journalist and activist 
Nnamdi Azikiwe who had just returned from studies abroad and now recommended 
young Africans not to go to the British metropole but to the U.S., Nkrumah decided 
to set sail in 1935. In the next ten years which he described as hard but worthwhile, 
he earned academic qualifications in the United States of America. And he became 
much more politically conscious there as well. According to his autobiography, 
“[a]t this time I devoted much energy to the study of revolutionaries and their 
methods. Those who interested me most were Hannibal, Cromwell, Napoleon, 
Lenin, Mazzini, Gandhi, Mussolini and Hitler. I found much of value to be 
gleaned and many ideas that were useful to me later in my own campaign 
against imperialism.”41 
In 1945, Nkrumah left the U.S. for London. There he became close friend to 
George Padmore, and they organised the Fifth Pan-African Congress together. While 
Padmore brought into their relationship the firm socialist brains, Nkrumah possessed 
that great charismatic oratory skill and popular appeal that would soon turn him 
into a successful politician and shining figure.42 Returning to his native Gold Coast 
colony in 1947, Nkrumah’s political star and influence rose as fast as can be. His sup-
porters successfully agitated among the young urban townspeople as well as among 
rural people making good use of market networks and the media, both print and 
radio. Being detained twice by the colonial government, the influence of Nkrumah 
and his CPP party could not be stopped. The first elections that were held in the 
Gold Coast in 1951 were won by the CPP, and Nkrumah – still in jail at the time – 
was inaugurated “Leader of Government Business”, soon called “Premier Minister”. 
With Nkrumah in the lead, the Gold Coast was on its way to self-government and in-
dependence. In 1957 the Gold Coast colony eventually achieved formal indepen-
dence. Nkrumah chose the name “Ghana” for the “new” state. He headed Ghana until 
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February 1966 when his regime was overthrown by a military (and very pro-Western) 
coup d’état. Nkrumah had been on a trip to China and Vietnam. He returned im-
mediately to neighboring Guinea but was forced to live in exile for the rest of his life. 
After achieving Ghanaian independence, Nkrumah organised a series of con-
ferences to support African nationalist movements in the colonial territories and to 
coordinate the newly independent states, both in Africa and Asia. He became a pro-
minent proponent of non-alignment. Henceforth Nkrumah acted as the mastermind 
and the main symbol of the Pan-African efforts of establishing a strong and united 
African state. Nkrumah considered indispensable “[…] a common political basis for 
the integration of our [African] policies in economic planning, defence, foreign and 
diplomatic relations.”43 
“[… A] united Africa – that is, the political and economic unification of the 
African continent – should seek three objectives: Firstly, we should have an 
over-all economic planning on a continental basis. […] Secondly, we should aim 
at the establishment of a unified military and defence strategy. […] The third 
objective […] [is] to adopt a unified foreign policy and diplomacy to give political 
direction to our joint efforts for the protection and economic development of 
our continent.”44 
As stated earlier, this goal was not to be realised. In course of the early 1960s 
the chance of creating such a continental macro-state had given way to the tiny 
“nation-statisms” that Basil Davidson (1992) spoke of. From 1945 onwards, Nkrumah 
had clearly seen the problem and worked hard to convince other African leaders to 
make the right choice; but he practically failed. This practical failure of bringing about 
the United States of Africa does not mean that Nkrumah’s analysis of the colonial 
past and, as he called it, the “neo-colonial” present, is wrong. For example, with 
regard to European colonial rule, his analysis went like this: 
“The aim of all colonial governments in Africa and elsewhere has been the 
struggle for raw materials; and not only this, but the colonies have become the 
dumping ground, and colonial peoples the false recipients, of manufactured 
goods of the industrialists and capitalists […] of colonial powers who turn to the 
dependent territories which feed their industrial plants. This is colonialism in a 
nutshell.”45 
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With regard to the transition from this old and formal colonialism to a new 
form of exclusive domination, he argued along very reasonable lines, 
“[t]he neo-colonialism of today represents imperialism in its final and perhaps 
its most dangerous stage. In the past it was possible to convert a country […] 
into a colonial territory. Today this process is no longer feasible. Old-fashioned 
colonialism is by no means entirely abolished. It still constitutes an African 
problem, but it is everywhere on the retreat. Once a territory has become 
nominally independent it is no longer possible, as it was in the last century, to 
reverse the process. Existing colonies may linger on, but no new colonies will be 
created. In place of colonialism as the main instrument of imperialism we have 
today neo-colonialism. The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is 
subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of 
international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political 
policy is directed from outside. […] The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign 
capital is used for the exploittation rather than for the development of the less 
developed parts of the world. Investment under neo-colonialism increases 
rather than decreases the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the 
world.”46 
It is important to see that Nkrumah’s analysis of global inequality and depen-
dencies has nothing xenophobic about it. It was not directed against foreigners or 
foreign investments, but pointed toward a particular systemic problematic – to “the 
extreme asymmetry in global economic relations”47 as well as to the “extraversion”48 
of African ruling elites who look to the outside for support instead of turning inside, 
practicing “gate keeping” of the state instead of working for the recovery of their 
countries. 
Nkrumah was very critical towards many of his compatriots, and he welcomed 
support from outside, as long as it corresponded to his developmental and political 
ideals. Foreign influence marks therefore only one side in Nkrumah’s understanding 
of neo-colonialism; the other side rested with Africa herself. That is the reason why 
the struggle against neo-colonial structures had to be fought at the home front as 
well, for they rest on the existence of nominally independent African states run by 
Africans willing to co-operate. Nkrumah was quite frank about this point: 
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“[T]he rulers of neo-colonial States derive their authority to govern, not from 
the will of the people, but from the support which they obtain from their neo-
colonialist masters. […] ‘Aid’, therefore, to a neo-colonial State is merely a re-
volving credit, paid by the neo-colonial master, passing through the neo-colonial 
State and returning to the neo-colonial master in the form of increased 
profits.”49 
In sum, Nkrumah cautioned against the pitfall of Africa’s new and precarious 
“independence”, and against the perpetual threat of “imperial” domination by the 
world’s global powers: 
“Neocolonialism is more insidious, complex and dangerous than the old co-
lonialism. It not only prevents its victims from developing their economic po-
tential for their own use, but it controls the political life of the country, and 
supports the indigenous bourgeoisie in perpetuating the oppression and exploi-
tation of the masses. Under neocolonialism, the economic systems and political 
policies of independent territories are managed and manipulated from outside, 
by international monopoly finance capital in league with the indigenous bour-
geoisie. 
The policy of balkanization pursued by the imperialist powers when forced to 
concede political independence in Asia, Africa and Latin America, reflects the 
strategy of neocolonialism – the intention being to ensure their continued ex-
ploitation and oppression. 
In Africa, most of the independent states are economically unviable, and still 
have the artificial frontiers of colonialism. They are easy prey for the voracious 
appetites of neocolonial empire builders.”50 
Reading Nkrumah is a permanent reminder of the simple truth that the struggle 
for freedom from domination by others is inevitably a constant task, at all times under 
threat from forces that want to keep their predominance – be they the “empire 
builders” proper or the wannabes. 
2. Cheikh Anta Diop: The Dead Ends of a Racialised Past 
Empire and imperialism played a role in Cheikh Anta Diop’s thinking too. But Diop 
looked into the oldest empire in human history, Pharaonic Egypt, first unified 5,000 
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years ago. He was a politically engaged person in his home country of Senegal where 
he sided with the opposition to the ruling party of Léopold Sédar Senghor (Parti 
socialiste sénégalais), but essentially he was an academic working in his own research 
laboratory in Dakar in an interdisciplinary and amateurish way on the origins of 
humankind.51 In his view Africa appears as the cradle of everything that is or ever 
has been of worth to humankind. Evidently, such an extreme Afrocentric view ex-
cludes much of known global history and is therefore basically and empirically wrong. 
Diop’s line of argument is, to put it politely, absurd: you cannot – as he does through-
out – infer from original beginnings the ultimate outcome without taking into account 
the intermediate steps and developments of history. 
Basically Diop is heir to a problematic strand of Pan-Africanism. He combines 
the francophone négritude-ethos with the racial segregationist approach developed 
most prominently by Marcus Garvey in the early 20th century. In all his books he 
draws a sharp cutting line between Black and White, Africa and Europe, Good and Bad 
– and he asks his readers to choose: either “Civilization or Barbarism”.52 It is clear 
then that Diop stuck to the simplistic racist formula of biologically based opposition 
inherent in both Garveyism and négritude until his death in 1986. 
Youssou N’Dour’s invocation of Diop in his “New Africa” does not reflect on this 
racist heritage that is part of these traditions, but is informed by two much more 
contemporary influences that are shaping his understanding. One has to do with 
Youssou N’Dour’s acquaintance with African American (and Western) readings of 
Diop that came about only a few years before he created that song. They tend to 
ignore and turn a blind eye to Diop’s racism. Most probably, Youssou N’Dour was 
introduced to the American reception of Diop by the famous African American film 
director Spike Lee who co-produced the album Eyes Open of which “New Africa” 
was part. In “Youssou’s notes” to the international CD-release, he repeats the sugar-
coated image dominant in Afrocentric circles: “Cheikh Anta Diop was a Senegalese 
scholar whose research on early African civilization has had a seminal effect not 
only on African historiography but also in the realms of politics and culture.”53 This 
is true enough, if slightly exaggerated, but it is only half the truth. 
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The second influence on Youssou N’Dour’s positive image of Diop has to do 
with his native Senegal, in particular the positive way in which Diop is remembered 
there and revered by the young – most of whom have no recollection of the living 
Diop at all. With some pride, Youssou N’Dour (1992) explains in his liner notes that 
“Senegal’s national university in Dakar was renamed Cheikh Anta Diop University 
upon Diop’s death in 1987.” However, he invokes Diop in “New Africa” first and 
foremost because he was impressed by his call for a political union of Africa. As he 
explains, “[a]mong his many works, The Economic and Cultural Foundations of a 
Federal African State (1960) provided a cogent argument for the very kind of African 
political integration which this song talks about.”54 In essence, then, what makes Diop 
attractive to Youssou N’Dour and a younger Pan-African generation is this call for 
political and social unity. 
3. Bantu Stephen Biko: The Struggle for Awareness Continues 
Though Stephen Biko grew up in a barbarous, segregationist, race-based society – in 
Apartheid South Africa – that cut short his young life, he developed a completely dif-
ferent attitude – an attitude of a “Black consciousness” that is basically non-racialist. 
One quote expresses its essence clearly: “Being black is not a matter of pigmentation 
– being black is a reflection of a mental attitude.”55 The “Black” consciousness that 
Biko spoke for conforms to an attitude that, according to him, is shared by all those 
oppressed, exploited and deprived of their rights – basically regardless of color. Asked 
about his vision for the future, Biko declared, 
“[w]e see a completely non-racial society. […] We believe that in our country 
there shall be no minority, there shall be no majority, just the people. And 
those people will have the same status before the law. So in a sense it will be a 
completely non-racial society.”56 
The way to achieve this non-racial society was to raise and spread awareness 
of the South African social situation among the masses, so as to change it radically 
and transform it into a new and better society. This was what “Black consciousness” 
according to Biko’s understanding was all about. Raising awareness would lead to 
people’s self-empowerment and this, in consequence, to actions by the people 
                                                 
 54 Youssou N’Dour (1992). 
 55 Biko (1987), 48. 
 56 Biko, quoted in Mangcu (2012), 282. 
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against their oppression and exploitation. The collection of his writings and talks that 
appeared soon after his premature death entitled I Write What I Like, bears testimony 
to the eloquence and sophistication with which Biko approached the intricacies of 
South African reality.57 
Why then, you may ask, call this state of consciousness “Black Consciousness” 
in the first place? Biko calls attention to the economic, political and social realities in 
Apartheid South Africa, saying you cannot act color-blind in a society that is not. You 
must change the society first, by changing both living realities and mentalities. In the 
process of doing this, racism will vanish too. He reasoned that 
“Blacks have had enough experiences as objects of racism not to wish to turn 
the tables. While it may be relevant now to speak of black in relation to white, 
we must not make this our preoccupation, for it can be a negative exercise. As 
we proceed further towards the achievements of our goals, let us talk more 
about ourselves and less about whites.”58 
Thinking of the problematic developments in post-Apartheid South Africa 
where “race” is still playing a vital role on both levels – that of real social inequalities 
and of its ideological justification –, Biko’s optimism seems somewhat ill-considered 
in retrospect. But his guess that the solution to Africa’s problems must be searched 
for by those living in Africa is still utterly convincing. 
From being a student leader Biko rapidly became a prominent figure in the 
non-violent anti-Apartheid struggle. His ideas of Black Consciousness evolved into a 
broad movement in several South African townships. He was thus under constant 
close surveillance of the South African state. Later he was put on trial, banned from 
leaving his home area, and eventually imprisoned, tortured and killed.59 But his ideas 
and his influence survived his physical death. Indeed, they grew in prominence, at 
least among educated internationalists with access to contents mediated either by 
academic or mass media channels. “Many South Africans, and most foreigners, had 
never heard of Stephen Biko until his death,” writes Ingrid Byerly: “While the story 
[of his violent death] became prominent news to politically involved South Africans 
[…], and to the select segment of the international community […], the wider popu-
                                                 
 57 Cf. Biko (1987). 
 58 Biko, quoted in Mangcu (2012), 284-285. 
 59 Cf. Mangcu (2012). 
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lace, both within and outside South Africa, were largely unaware of Biko’s struggle 
and death.”60 This changed rapidly in the fall of 1977. 
Biko even became a hero in a Hollywood movie, directed by the late Richard 
Attenborough, starring a young Denzel Washington (Cry Freedom, 1987). He attracted 
a series of political protest songs. One of the first songs dedicated to his memory 
and message, and probably the single most famous one, was written in the late 
1970s and simply titled after the man: Peter Gabriel’s “Biko”.61 Laconically, the first 
verse of that song tells the story of Biko’s killing leading to a chorus expressing both 
grief and strength, invoking, in Xhosa, the “Descending Spirit” of the dead man and 
humanity: 
“September '77 / Port Elizabeth weather fine / It was business as usual / In 
police room 619 
[Chorus:] 
Oh Biko, Biko, because Biko / Oh Biko, Biko, because Biko / 
Yihla Moja, Yihla Moja / The man is dead” 
The lesson of non-racialism that Biko taught is reflected in the second verse, 
followed by the chorus again, while the ultimate success is evoked in the third and 
last proper verse of the song: 
“When I try to sleep at night / I can only dream in red /  
The outside world is black and white / With only one colour dead 
[…] 
You can blow out a candle / But you can't blow out a fire / 
Once the flame begins to catch / The wind will blow it higher” 
According to the British artist who wrote this song, the struggle for awareness 
and improvement of human life – as paradigmatically personified in the life and mind 
of Stephen Biko – was something worthwhile to fight for. And its success seemed in 
the cards. He considered it a down-to-earth guess, because the masses have started 
to awake from their slumber. It is not by chance that the song ending sounds both 
declaratory and missionary: “And the eyes of the world are / watching now / watching 
now”. 
                                                 
 60 Byerly (2010), 114-115. 
 61 Peter Gabriel (1980); cf. Drewett (2010) on its reception within South Africa and abroad, and Byerly (2010), 
125-128 for an analysis of its musical power reinforcing the song’s lyrical strength. 
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Gabriel’s “Biko” refers, in subtle and more or less implicit ways, to the three 
modern ideas that are at the base of Pan-Africanism, criticizing racism in vivid terms 
and by invoking keen images. It calls for equality (“only one colour dead”), liberty 
and freedom from domination by outside forces, be they of an institutional (“police 
room 619”) or socio-historical structural kind (“the outside world is black and white”). 
Eventually, the song points to unity and international solidarity. The modernism and 
progressiveness that informs and shines through this lyric has his parallel in the mo-
dernity of the Pan-African ideology. 
Its message and “consciousness”, like Biko’s, shines bright. It attracted many 
listeners formerly ignorant of the darker sides of modernity to start facing them. 
Certainly this popular protest song, along with many other activities that followed, 
boosted the memory of not just the man, but his ideas of non-racialist “Black con-
sciousness”. Along the way, such expressions of critical popular culture revitalised 
classic Pan-African ideas to a certain degree, and to some effect. 
Is, then, all well with Pan-Africanism today? – Perhaps not. As mentioned 
earlier, the racist tradition unfortunately looms large in certain particularistic corners 
of Pan-African activities even today, which weakens its broader attractiveness and, 
consequently, its political effectiveness to a considerable extent. “Race” is an unsound 
ground on which to base unity. 
But there are other ideas, much more solid and definitely progressive, as well – 
ideas that lie at the heart of Pan-Africanism as it developed in course of the 20th 
century, and stood the test of time. The establishment of the African Union is only 
one of the many contemporary signs hinting at the fact that, at the beginning of the 
new millennium, Pan-Africanism is by no means a dead ideology. If you have doubts, 
listen to Youssou N’Dour’s rendering of what’s on the agenda in order to build a 
“New Africa”, in 2008: 
“When the sun comes up / Be on your feet / Ready with the tools of your 
trade / The day passes quickly /  
Let’s confront our problems one at a time / United we are stronger 
[…] 
All you people / Africa” 
For sure, Pan-Africanist thought, emotion, and mood are well alive. Africa’s 
modernity is on the move. 
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Lyrical Variations of Youssou N’Dour’s song “New Africa”, 1992, 2000, 2008 
NEW AFRICA (1992) 
 
This is Youssou N’Dour /  
Calling all Africans / 
Asking you to share ideas and develop a 
consensus / 
To pool your resources and work 
together / 
Without regard for borders 
 
Let’s get together and let nothing come 
between us / 
Or pull us apart 
 
You heads of state /  
Just because you lead a nation doesn’t 
mean / 
You own everything in it / 
True leaders love their countries 
 
And yes, it’s alright to ask for help / 
But let’s depend on ourselves first 
 
Drummer, play your drum / 
Call everyone to the council tree so we 
can discuss matters / 
Oh Africa 
 
When the sun comes up /  
Be on your feet / 
Ready with the tools of your trade / 
The day passes quickly / 
Three people can’t wrestle / 
And two are stronger than one 
 
Let’s make sure we’re prepared for all 
our challenges / 
Let’s get together /  
Put our visions together / 
As sons and daughters of Africa / 
Put our thinking together / 
Put our energies together / 
Put together what we own 
 
Chorus: 
When I think of what our grandfathers 
went through, it’s sad / 
If it were up to me / 
I’d like to see all Africa led by one 
person / 
Someone to whom we’d gladly lend our 
ideas, our energies / 
Let’s open the borders / 
Let’s be tolerant of one another 
 
Change your thinking / 
Come together, New Africa / 
Work together / 
Keep on working, for Africa 
 
Cheikh Anta Diop, Kwame Nkrumah, 
Stephen Biko 
 
All you people… Africa 
 
NEW AFRICA (2000) 
 
I’m calling all sons of Africa / 
To come together in spirit / 
To develop the same views and wishes / 
Regardless of any geographical 
boundaries / 
Let’s put together our resources and 
work as a group / 
Together, no one can come between us / 
 
As a leader, it’s important to realize that / 
The country’s natural resources belong 
to all / 
A strong leader should love his country / 
And help starts within / 
 
When one thinks of what our ancestors 
went through / 
We are heartbroken and revenge is all 
we can think of / 
 
If it were up to me, Africa would be 
united under one leader / 
Then we’d put our strength and ideas 
together / 
Under that leadership / 
Let’s break the boundaries, make 
communication easier for all / 
 
Change your thinking / 
Work together / 
Keep on working / 
 
Cheikh Anta Diop, Kwame Nkrumah, 




NEW AFRICA (2008) 
 
I am Youssou N’Dour / 
Calling all Africans / 
Asking you to share ideas and come to a 
meeting of minds / 
Without borders, let’s pool our 
resources and work together / 
Let’s come together and let nothing pull 
us apart / 
 
You heads of state / 
You may lead a country, but you don’t 
own it / 
True leaders love their countries / 
 
Although we can ask for help / 
Let’s depend on ourselves first / 
We are Africa / 
 
When the sun comes up / 
Be on your feet /  
Ready with the tools of your trade / 
The day passes quickly /  
Let’s confront our problems one at a 
time / 
United we are stronger / 
A long road lies ahead / 
We have much to do /  
So let’s get ready / 
 
When I think of how our grandparents 
suffered, I cry / 
But our past must not stop us from 
moving forward / 
I dream to see Africa unified by a 
common vision / 
Let’s marshal our ideas, our energies / 
Open the borders, and come together / 
 
Change your thinking / 
Work together / 
Keep on working / 
 
Cheikh Anta Diop / 
Kwame Nkrumah / 
Stephen Biko / 
 
All you people / 
Africa 
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The song is sung in Youssou N’Dour’s mother tongue, Wolof, except for the ending section when he 
switches to English. The originally English parts are expressed in italics. In general the translations are 
taken from CD booklets (Youssou N’Dour 1992, 2000) and from the subtitles of an official DVD release 
(Youssou N’Dour 2008). The variations in the song lyrics are striking. For once they give ample 
evidence of the dynamic tradition in African story and song telling, but they reflect the individual 
development of the singer-songwriter’s consciousness quite as much. Finally they point to profound 
changes in the African political landscape that happened during the past quarter century. It would be a 
good idea to investigate these differences in a systematic way. 
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Reflections on the Role and Production 
of Research Films in African Studies 
Birgit Englert 
“Video instead of letters. Shooting script instead of draft manuscript. Looking instead of 
reading.” (Haring 2011: 3, translation B.E.) 
Introduction 
In this article, I wish to reflect on the role and production of research films in African 
Studies, which is – just as any area study – in itself highly diverse.1 In the first part of 
the paper, I start with some thoughts on the relevance of audiovisual work in African 
Studies in general, and continue with some reflections on how to work with film in re-
search processes. In the second part of the paper, I will draw on concrete examples 
of audiovisual work that has been carried out within the framework of the Depart-
ment of African Studies at the University of Vienna in recent years. I have been in-
volved in most of the projects that I will discuss, albeit in different roles, ranging from 
facilitator and producer to that of director.  
These projects share a common thematic focus on issues of translocality and 
diaspora. On the one hand, this is due to my own interest in working with audiovisual 
means coinciding with my growing interest in such issues, however on the other, it is 
no mere coincidence, as research that is situated in postcolonial contexts in particular 
demands a critical examination of research practices, which includes reflections on 
                                                 
 1 At the University of Vienna, the curriculum in African Studies encompasses the study of African languages, 
linguistics, literatures, histories and societies. My reflections in this text thus refer to African Studies as under-
stood at the Department of African Studies in Vienna, bearing in mind that African Studies has slightly different 
identities elsewhere. 
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how to open up the academic world and how to reduce dichotomies between re-
searcher and “researched”.2  
Within African Studies, the analysis of images and films relating to Africa is a 
topic on which there has been, and there continues to be, a great deal of research. 
The dominant images of Africa in the mainstream media are generally perceived to 
homogenise and reproduce stereotypical images.3 A lot of academic work within 
African Studies thus aims to contribute to “different” images of Africa. In this article, 
I argue that given the dramatic changes in technology, more attention needs to be 
given to the option of engaging in the production of filmic images, or more precisely 
to the consideration of film as a potential output of research processes. I summarise 
thoughts and experiences from the previous five years, and the second part of the 
article in particular, where I draw on concrete examples of film projects in which I 
have been involved, is a very personal account. Other people who were involved in 
the same projects are likely to hold different perspectives. My aim is therefore for this 
article to be understood as an attempt to engage in a discussion on the “Why?” and 
“How?” of working with film in research processes within African Studies. 
Why work with film/audiovisual means in research? 
Film and/or audiovisual products are gaining more and more importance in public 
discourse. The last ten years have seen the rise of online audiovisual portals such as 
YouTube (www.youtube.com) and – somewhat less popular – Vimeo (www.vimeo.com). 
With the popularisation of smartphones, the spread of WLAN and relatively cheap 
broadband Internet access, the consumption of audiovisual products has increased 
enormously. This is not only true for countries that are commonly perceived as part of 
the “West”, but also for African countries, whereby class may play an even greater 
role in terms of who actually has access to such technologies. 
Furthermore, as most smartphones have cameras with a video function that 
enables high-quality film footage to be shot, as well as the availability of (more or less) 
affordable digital camera equipment, it has become easier and more popular than 
ever before to produce audiovisual data. As a result of this, audiovisual products are 
                                                 
 2 For an introduction to postcolonial theories, see Castro Varela/Dhawan (2015). 
 3 See e.g. Pichlhöfer (1999); Sturmer (2013). 
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increasingly being generated in research processes, also when the aim as such is not 
to produce audiovisual output.4  
Audiovisual data obviously offers additional layers of information, though in 
many cases these additional layers may not be required, as there may be a lack of 
capacity to take them into account in the analysis. Furthermore, some interview 
partners may be more reluctant to be filmed than to have their voices recorded – 
although the opposite reaction might also be the case. The point I wish to make 
here is that in many cases, it only makes sense to generate audiovisual data when 
the intention also exists to produce an audiovisual output. 
As the sociologists Miko and Sardavar (2008) emphasise, the audiovisual pre-
sentation of research outputs certainly provides additional benefits when compared 
to written texts. Besides the main elements of image and sound, other items such as 
music, voice-overs, text inserts and/or subtitles, which offer additional layers of infor-
mation, can also be added. For example, the option of working with subtitles means 
that the original language in which an interview was conducted can be maintained. 
However, the film medium obviously offers less opportunity for the insertion of re-
ferences, which is a key strategy for ensuring “traceability” in academic texts. This 
thus raises many questions about how to produce research films that fulfil the quality 
criteria of academic texts – a question that will be dealt with in more depth below.5 
Besides the possibility of conveying more layers of information, film also has 
the potential to produce a result that has more “meaning” or “relevance” for the 
people who are the focus of the research, in comparison to (academic) texts. The 
challenges relating to this aspect will be discussed in the second part of this article. 
Firstly, I wish to discuss another quite obvious advantage of producing audio-
visual output in academic contexts: the potential to reach a broader audience beyond 
academia. However, simply choosing the medium of film does not mean that you will 
automatically reach more people. This rather depends on the chosen format, on 
                                                 
 4 Just as written notes came to be complemented by audio recordings, the option is now available to make audio-
visual recordings. In many cases this is done simply because it is possible to do so at no extra cost. However, it 
should be kept in mind that the production of audiovisual data does in fact generate extra costs as this type 
of data requires a lot of storage space. Furthermore, the files are more difficult to handle than audio files and 
may not be accessible without specific software. 
 5 As Katharina Fritsch (personal communication, 1 March 2016) noted, it is problematic to judge film by the same 
criteria applied to texts because they are different media. Whilst I agree with this observation, I argue that in 
order to discuss the potential of film in communicating research outputs, a comparative perspective is helpful.  
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how the audiovisual product is made accessible and potentially even more on how it 
is then promoted. The dissemination of audiovisual products essentially presents the 
same challenges as faced in the dissemination of written research. Open access is 
increasingly being mainstreamed and is strongly promoted by major funding insti-
tutions such as the Austrian Science Fund, which requires all research results to also 
be published in open access formats.6 In terms of making research films available 
without restrictions, portals such as YouTube or Vimeo certainly play a crucial role.  
While film is broadly recognised as a tool to reach a broader audience outside 
of academia, there is reluctance within the academic world to recognise audiovisual 
products as scientific. Sol Haring argues for the recognition of video productions as 
scientific products: 
“In the humanities and social sciences film and text are put in opposition to 
each other as theory and practice. The integration of digital videos in the (daily) 
research practices/routine is made more difficult by the fact that videos are 
either seen as artistic or as media products. Further, are artistic processes for 
data collection and for the analysis of video data being “tolerated” as “supple-
ments” to knowledge production; but they are not (yet) acknowledged as stand-
alone form of knowledge presentation, not even within qualitative research.”7 
Haring notes a reluctance of people to watch films for academic purposes, to 
use them as a source or to even to cite them in written texts.8 This lack of recognition 
of audiovisual products as valid sources is also reflected in the lack of guidelines on 
how to cite them, even by major academic publishing houses9. In my opinion, a posi-
tive step towards increasing the recognition of such sources is to encourage students 
to use audiovisual material in their classwork, so that the consideration of such 
sources becomes part of a research routine.10 
There are, of course, huge differences between academic disciplines with re-
gards to the acceptance of film as a research output, which is obviously related to the 
different histories of working with audiovisual means. For over 100 years, researchers 
have worked with film (and photography) in Africa-related anthropological research, 
                                                 
 6 See https://www.fwf.ac.at/en/research-funding/open-access-policy (accessed 27 February 2016). 
 7 Haring (2011), 1 (translation B.E.). 
 8 Haring (2011), 2. 
 9 See, for example, the Style Guide of the publishing house “Intellect” at http://www.intellectbooks.co.uk/ 
MediaManager/ File/style%20guide(journals)-1.pdf (accessed 27 February 2016). 
 10 An interesting question that will not be addressed here is also how to cite a film within a film. 
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which was obviously shaped by the colonial and postcolonial context in which it was 
carried out. Since the 1950s, the use of audiovisual material has increased, as has the 
production of documentaries.11 Thus Visual Anthropology has become established as 
a sub-discipline of Cultural and Social Anthropology.12 Over the last two decades at 
the University of Vienna, related disciplines have also established research units 
dedicated to working on and with film; first and foremost “Visual Sociology”13 and 
“Visual Contemporary History”14. The experiences of these research units are of great 
relevance to an area study such as African Studies, where the increase in working with 
film is relatively recent – at least in the Department of African Studies at the University 
of Vienna, as will be discussed in more depth in the second part of this article. 
What is a “research film” and how should one be made? 
“Research film” certainly belongs to the category of non-fictional film – a category 
that is in itself highly diverse.15 Lipp (2012), for example, makes a distinction between 
documentaries based on a plot, non-verbal documentaries, documentaries, as well as 
direct cinema and cinema verité. These are prototypes, as he asserts, and other 
authors have proposed other forms of differentiating between the various approa-
ches to non-fictional film-making.16 Miko and Sardavar (2008) make a distinction 
between “documentary” and “ethnographic film”17, whereas Sol Haring talks more 
                                                 
 11 Denzin (2000), 418. 
 12 Cf. Lipp (2010, 2012); Pink (2013). 
 13 Cf. Miko/Sardavar (2008); Flicker/Miko (2010). Miko and Sardavar describe their own experiences working with 
what they term “ethnographic film in sociology” in the teaching of research methodology and methods in a 
working paper published in 2008. As they discuss many similar aspects, I engage in a discussion with many of 
their arguments throughout this article.  
 14 The full title in German is “Visuelle Zeit- und Kulturgeschichte, Film und andere Medien”. The research unit has 
been dismantled again with the retirement of Professor Frank Stern. Only some of the activities are still ongoing, 
see http://www.univie.ac.at/zeitgeschichte/institut/schwerpunkte/visuelle-zeit-und-kulturgeschichte-film-und-andere-medien.  
 15 Obviously research is part of any film-making process, whether fictional or non-fictional. However, my interest 
here is explicitly in films that are made for the purpose of conveying research processes and results. 
 16 There are also, of course, fictional elements in every non-fictional film and the distinction is thus an artificial one.  
 17 In a more narrow sense, “documentaries” start from a script that determines what is of relevance and what 
will be shot (including when and where). The script also usually develops and determines the argument the 
film will follow (cf. Lipp 2012, 73ff; Glynne 2008). “Ethnographic films”, on the other hand, usually start from 
a research question and follow a more open process. However, the boundaries of these definitions are not 
fixed, there may also be documentaries that start from the collection of film material without a specific script, 
just as there may also be ethnographic films that follow a script.  
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broadly of “research-led digital video productions” – a term that I would like to em-
brace as it is not tied to a specific academic discipline and it also has the advantage 
of not telling us anything about the methodological approach behind the film or the 
specific research methods employed. However, for reasons of brevity, I will use the 
term “research film”. 
I would argue that the research process remains essentially the same, regard-
less of whether the aim is to produce a film, a text or both. The production of re-
search films can be seen as part of the qualitative spectrum of research methods.18 
Therefore, as with any qualitative research, it is characterised by an open process that 
is usually shaped by previous knowledge, random encounters and the dynamics gene-
rated by the manifold interests of all subjects involved in the research.  
As is more generally the case in qualitative research, qualitative interviews, 
(participatory) observation and archival material (which can either already be in film 
format or can be filmed in the case of artefacts) are among the most commonly used 
methods.19 Audiovisual material that is generated in that way is first viewed, tran-
scribed and coded.20 A first structure is then developed, sub-chapters are formulated 
and the material is assembled, usually starting with the introduction to the main part 
and a concluding part, ideally following a storyline that makes sense. I wish to cite Sol 
Haring again, who states:  
“In artistic production there are conditions similar to those in qualitative re-
search processes: the process of gaining knowledge is subjective but can be re-
traced intersubjectively; the process of cognition is documented, described and 
thereby theory is produced.”21 
Therefore, while the process of data collection and interpretation is essentially 
the same as that for a written text, there are more differences when it comes to the 
editing process. 
With film, the film-maker has the option to leave any explicit verbal or written 
comments out and to make his or her “voice” visible only in the cut.22 This does not 
                                                 
 18 See e.g. Flick et al. (2003); Dannecker/Englert (2014). 
 19 See e.g. Dannecker/Englert (2014). 
 20 Cf. Haring (2011), 2. 
 21 Haring (2011), 2 (translation B.E.). 
 22 As one of the editors of this volume pointed out in a comment on the draft version of this text, it would also be 
possible to do this in a written text – albeit only in theory, as in practice it is very uncommon and would most 
likely generate accusations of plagiarism. 
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mean however, that film is more “objective” than text. The process of data gene-
ration and interpretation is shaped by the same subjective criteria, and the same is 
true for the selection process during editing. However, the position of the film-
maker(s) is often more indirect, which carries the danger that his/her/their subjective 
position might be overlooked in the absence of voices or images that point to his/ 
her/their presence. It is therefore important to consider strategies to ensure that this 
does not happen. 
Certain elements of film have generated more discussion than others, espe-
cially music, which is perceived to emotionalise the viewer and thus to be unsuitable 
in research output.23 My point of view is that specific images and words used in 
written or spoken form might equally serve to emotionalise. Furthermore, emotions 
should not be a taboo in research. The decision to work with film in the research 
process is precisely because of the desire to provide a more complete picture, thus 
using the multiple layers that film offers in order to add more information. I therefore 
do not think that it makes sense to exclude certain elements of film, and if we take 
the example of music, it goes without saying that it is a crucial aspect of film.  
Miko and Sardavar (2008) argue that in their opinion, “aesthetic criteria need 
to be secondary to the necessity of ‘intersubjective traceability’”. It is certainly true 
that compliance with the quality standards of qualitative research must take priority. 
The need to ensure the quality criteria of any qualitative research process is the basis 
upon which a research film must be judged. This requirement also differentiates such 
films from documentary films, whereby it is acceptable to prioritise the aesthetic 
depiction of social phenomena.  
While images that are generated throughout the research process form the 
basis of the film, it is also common to look for specific images that complement the 
film visually during the editing process. Such images might be found in archives (con-
ventional ones or digital ones such as YouTube) to enhance the images that have 
been filmed as part of the data generation. Additional elements that can be used in 
film include drawings or other alternatives to the reproduction of “real” images (see 
the inspiring chapters in the volume Experimental film and Anthropology edited by 
Arnd Schneider and Caterina Pasqualino24). 
                                                 
 23 Cf. Miko/Sardavar (2008). 
 24 Cf. Schneider/Pasqualino (2014). 
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Using a camera in research generally requires a greater level of intimacy. 
Images are more revealing and therefore a greater level of trust is needed in order 
for someone to allow themselves to be filmed. This is even more the case if not just 
staged interviews are used, but if the camera follows the protagonists in their daily 
activities. The increased level of vulnerability experienced by the protagonists thus 
requires more extensive ethical considerations than for research that results in the 
production of a written text.  
Miko and Sardavar (2008), for example, caution against considering everything 
to be acceptable as long as a person gives their consent to be filmed. This problem 
is amplified if the film includes images that have not been self-generated but are, 
for example, taken from platforms such as YouTube. In comparison to other archives, 
which usually make their material accessible only after a period of several decades, 
YouTube is a contemporary archive whose material can be accessed as soon as it has 
been uploaded.25 While people are generally aware that everyone can access their 
material if access has not been limited by specific privacy settings, not all will be 
aware that their images (or quotes in the case of blogs, for example) could be used 
in other contexts. As it depends on what type of material is being used for what type 
of research, I think it is difficult to set any fixed guidelines besides the need to be 
aware of such issues, and to ensure in each individual case that the use of certain 
images or quotes is compatible with good research ethics in a broader sense.  
Miko and Sardavar (2008) further demand that decisions forming the basis of 
the film be carefully reflected and substantiated. I think it is crucial for such decisions 
relating to the film to be visible in the film itself, so that the film can stand alone. 
However, film is also always presented in a context, i.e., it is at least accompanied by 
a synopsis and information on the roles of all involved. 
So while there is a need to prioritise ethical criteria as well as quality criteria, I 
wish to emphasise that I deem it highly important to also consider aesthetic aspects, 
for the simple reason that audiovisual products that do not meet a certain standard 
in terms of aesthetics will hardly be watched – just as badly written texts are less 
likely to be read. There is therefore a clear need for researchers working with film to 
invest time in acquiring knowledge of the technical and creative aspects of using a 
camera and editing.  
                                                 
 25 See e.g. Gehl (2009). 
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The challenges of the required skills and infrastructure 
Working with film obviously requires a certain infrastructure and the teaching of basic 
skills in film-making, including technical as well as theoretical aspects. Both a suitable 
camera and adequate computer hardware and software must be available for the 
purpose of conducting film projects. However, for a small department such as African 
Studies, it makes sense to use the infrastructure of other departments that have a 
more established tradition of working with film, such as the Department of Theatre, 
Film and Media Studies or the Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology. 
It is certainly a more complicated issue to incorporate the teaching of the skills 
required for filming and editing into the study curriculum of African Studies, which 
already struggles to design courses on methodology that give justice to the various 
subfields of linguistics, literature, history and society.26 My proposal is to include a 
brief introduction to audiovisual means in research in the methodology courses and 
to offer workshops for those who actually want to work with film in practice, which 
would allow them to gain a basic understanding of how to use a camera and a film 
editing program. It then largely depends on the interest and intrinsic motivation of 
the students as to whether they extend this basic knowledge, either through self-
study, other courses at the University or external courses.27  
It may sound complicated, but it is not so different to teaching any other 
method that is introduced to courses on research methods. For example, the skills re-
quired for conducting and analysing interviews or for a discourse analysis are equally 
rarely acquired in the obligatory “methods” course, but rather through practice out-
side of the requirements of the curriculum.  
 
                                                 
 26 There is also a need to include the interpretation of (audio)visual data – be it self-generated or accessed via 
portals such as YouTube – into the courses on methodology and methods. 
 27 The book Visual Research – A Concise Introduction to Thinking Visually by Jonathan Marion and Jerome Crowder 
(cf. Marion/Crowder 2013) offers a useful introduction to working with visual means without being restricted 
to a specific disciplinary focus. 
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Working with film in research and teaching at the Department of 
African Studies  
Students and staff from the Department of African Studies at the University of Vienna 
have been engaging in film-making for some time now. However, this has usually 
been carried out in the form of independent projects in addition to their studies/ 
work. The know-how required for such projects has thus been acquired outside the 
curriculum.28 
To my knowledge, the first time students were encouraged to consider film as 
a valid form of coursework was in 2011 as part of a course held by a colleague and 
myself.29 Two films of approximately 30 minutes were among the “non-written” re-
search outputs, which also included an audio feature. Though we deliberately en-
couraged students to consider film as a medium of expression for their research 
results, we did not include any lectures on filming and editing as part of the course. 
Supervision was more or less limited to the thematic content of the films, which both 
dealt with identities in diasporic contexts, in one case focusing specifically on lan-
guage and in the other on music.30 
1. “Identitäten/Realitäten” 
In 2012, the purchase of a camera by the Department of African Studies and funding 
for workshops on technical aspects of film-making, made it possible to offer a 
research course that ran for two terms and that aimed to produce a research film. 
                                                 
 28 The following people, who have studied or worked at the department of African Studies while working on their 
film projects, come to mind: Sonja Ohler, “Maybe Austria – Maybe Tanzania” (2004); Florian Förster and Johanna 
Dellantonio, “Jenseits die Statistik? – Aidswaisen Kinder in Kenia” (2005); Mischa Hendel, “Literary Voices of 
Equatorial Guinea. Subvaloradas, sin ser vistas. Voces Literarias de Guinea Ecuatorial” (2009); and Marie Rodet, 
“The Diambourou: Slavery and Emancipation in Kayes” (2014). 
 29 The course which I led together with Daniela Waldburger was called “Sprachliche und kulturelle Ausdrucks-
formen im transnationalen Raum – Schwerpunkt afrikanische Diaspora in Europa.” More information on this and 
other projects can be found on the website of the working group “Translocal Africa”, online at: https:// 
translocalafrica.wordpress.com. 
 30 The two films were “Über Sprachen sprechen. Sprachengebrauch in der afrikanischen Diaspora Wiens” by 
Kristina Kroyer, Christine Schordan and Miriam Weidl (https://vimeo.com/36564142) and “Music as Mouthpiece 
of Diasporic Identity” by Mathias Augdoppler and Melissa Ari (https://vimeo.com/31110641). Both films were 
screened at the department on 24 April 2012. 
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The film was produced collectively by all of the students that took part in the course, 
which proved to be a very time-consuming but rewarding process.31  
We began by reading literature on the topic of the course – diaspora in an 
African context – as well as literature on film in research processes. Eventually, a 
focus was chosen, research questions were developed and a film treatment was 
written, which contained specific interview questions as well as ideas on how to 
produce the film visually. A two-day workshop on how to use the camera, led by 
film-maker and visual anthropologist Andrés Carvajal, prepared the students for the 
filming and interviewing of interview partners who they had identified via personal 
contacts. The second term began with the transcription of interviews, the selection 
of relevant passages and the development of a storyline. Another important dis-
cussion that was held was on how to include the process of film-making in the film, 
and it was decided that the group would film itself during discussion processes so 
that the team and the process of reflection would be visible within the film. However, 
it later proved impossible to use the audio files of these discussions and the presence 
of the researchers in the film thus remained silent. Another two-day workshop, in 
which Andrés Carvajal introduced the students to the film editing software, was the 
basis for the long editing process. The students worked in teams of two on sub-
chapters of what eventually came to be called “Identitäten/Realitäten. Eine filmische 
Annäherung. Afrikaner*Innen der Zweiten Generation in Wien”32 (Wien, 2014, 28 mi-
nutes)33. The editing process was characterised by numerous controversial discussions 
on a variety of issues, such as the use of additional footage and music. Discussions 
also revolved around the experience of one of the interviews having to be cut from 
the film. This was due to one of the protagonists refusing to be included after 
watching the rough cut because he felt uncomfortable appearing in the film. 
Controversial discussions that included questions of representation not only 
characterised the process of film-making itself but also the film’s presentation, 
which eventually took place at the Department of African Studies on 8 May 2014 
                                                 
 31 Ten students participated in each term; half of them registered on both courses. The participants in 
alphabetical order were: Michaela Daxl, Daniel Fleck, Anna Fox, Marion Haberl, Agnes Hoffman, Muriel 
Holzer, Zsolt Horvath, Eva Maria Höritzauer, Lisa Klein, Kristina Kroyer, Sabine Lehner, Eileen Mirzabaegi, 
Valentin Neundlinger, Ela Posch, Miriam Weidl. 
 32 From today’s perspective, my preference would be for the term “Afro-Austrians” instead of “Second 
Generation”. 
 33 See https://vimeo.com/91160201. 
54 Reflections on the Role and Production of Research Films in African Studies 
with one of the protagonists in attendance. She underlined that her experience of 
being interviewed for the film had been a positive one, as she felt that she had been 
given enough time to express herself. She compared this to her experiences with 
interviews she had given for certain media outlets that had included her as an 
“African voice”, only to then shorten her statements beyond recognition. However, 
there was also some negative feedback. One African man in the audience raised 
questions on the issue of representation, relating to the fact that a team of non-
African students had done a film on students of (partly) African background. This 
was certainly a valid point, the relevance of which goes beyond film-making. Feminist 
postcolonial theorists in particular have critically questioned modes of representation 
for almost three decades and have contributed greatly to debates on the question of 
who speaks in the production and transmission of scientific knowledge34 – a debate 
which I am not in a position to take up here.35 
For the purpose of this paper, I would just like to note that questions of 
positionality and representation are even more prevalent in a film as it is clearly 
visible who is behind and who is in front of the camera. I would therefore claim that in 
general, film projects generate more criticism than research that is presented in 
written texts – for the very reasons the films are being made: because they reach a 
broader audience, they are able to show more dimensions of the research subject 
and they are perceived as relevant by more people. They therefore achieve the aim 
of getting research out of academic contexts. I have never received as much feedback 
on papers that I have written, neither have they stirred up so many emotions. And it 
is precisely due to this increased resonance that questions relating to research prac-
tices gain even more relevance. 
2. “Creating Comoria” 
The issue of who speaks for whom was also prevalent in the reactions to the first film 
project in which I was involved as a co-director36 together with Andrés Carvajal. The 
main research for the film whose title came to be “Creating Comoria – a documentary 
                                                 
 34 Cf. Minh-ha (1989), hooks (1992). 
 35 See e.g. Krenceyová (2014). 
 36 I had previously been a co-director together with Andrés Carvajal of another short film on (Franco-)Comorians 
living in France, more precisely in Bordeaux: “‘Je viens du Grand Parc et je suis Comorienne’ – Swahili Identities 
among the Comorian Diaspora in France – Part I” (https://vimeo.com/11982449). 
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on the Franco-Comorian Afro-folk music group Afropa in Marseilles” took place in 
Marseilles in February 2012, and was followed by a second shorter period in Sep-
tember 2012. During the second stay, a rough cut of the material shot earlier that 
year was presented to the two main protagonists and some new filming took place. 
The film material used in the film consisted of official interviews, informal conver-
sations or statements, rehearsals, footage from various parts of the city and differ-
rent events.  
The film features the work and life of its two main protagonists, Ali Cheikh 
Mohamed and Abdoulwahab Chaharani, two musicians who were born in Comoros, 
the Indian Ocean archipelago, and came to France at different stages in their lives. 
They met in Marseilles in 2008 and formed the group Afropa, which plays “Afro-Folk”, 
based on Comorian rhythms combined with music inspired by their youth icons, 
Santana, Dire Straits and Pink Floyd. They sing about politics, violence, racism and 
the challenges of life in general – mostly in Comorian but also in French. Their main 
aim is to show the heterogeneity of Comorian music, especially to the younger ge-
nerations of Franco-Comorians who have grown up in France. However, their music 
is also aimed at the general public, which usually reduces Franco-Comorian music to 
its most popular style, Twarab. The music, messages and strategies of Afropa are at 
the centre of the film – as well as their encounters with other Franco-Comorian 
artists. Through their artistic work, all of them contribute to the creation of a “Como-
ria”, in the sense of a transcultural space that is shaped by the realities of postcolonial 
France and the Union of the Comoros.  
As musicians who have so far not received much attention, Ali Cheikh Mo-
hamed and Abdoulwahab Chaharani were both enthusiastic about the idea of making 
a film and did not hold any reservations about appearing on camera. For them, the 
camera represented an opportunity to become seen, heard and thus known to a 
wider public. In this specific case, I am certain that the enthusiasm to be the focus of 
our research would not have been the same had we not aimed to produce a film. 
Although the research was not based on a participatory design as such, their 
interest in the film generated a specific dynamic that significantly influenced the 
whole process: they decided how they wanted to be seen and chose the places 
where the official interviews were held. For example, Ali Cheikh Mohamed chose 
the “hip” artist quarter “Cours Julien” as the location for the main interview, a place 
that they do not frequent as often as the images in the film might suggest. They 
therefore chose places where they wanted to imagine themselves, rather than places 
56 Reflections on the Role and Production of Research Films in African Studies 
where they are actually situated. The choice of these places gives a certain “image” 
to the film.37 The research was also guided by the interests of the main protagonists 
in many other respects. For example, they organised meetings with people they had 
not met in person until we came along with the camera: slam artists Ahamada Smis 
and Mohamed “Soly” Mbae, a Hip hop pioneer in Marseilles and founding director 
of the “Sound Musical School”, whose classes are the starting point for many well-
known rappers in the city. Two sessions at the radio station “Radio Galère” were 
also facilitated by our presence – with the presence of our cameras functioning as a 
kind of “proof” of the relevance of their music. More importantly, our interest in 
their work gave a boost to the self-confidence of the two artists, who later revolted 
against the person who had acted as their manager and who had actually played an 
important role during the main research process in February 2012. Upon our return 
a few months later we found out about the complete breakdown of the relationship 
between the artists and their manager, which had also resulted in the physical des-
truction of their guitars. Six months after the start of our research, we were thus 
confronted with a situation that would most likely not have happened without our 
research interest – for better or for worse. We bought new guitars and experienced 
a challenging phase in the project reflecting on how to deal with this conflict in the 
film. Together with the main protagonists, we decided not to address this matter in 
the film and instead attempted to turn the manager into a side figure who appears 
on several occasions but is not given a prominent voice. 
The first phase of the post-production process then lasted until May 2014, 
when an initial version lasting 96 minutes was presented at an academic conference. 
The feedback we received led to modifications and more importantly a reduction in 
length, thus at a second screening within an academic framework, a version lasting 86 
minutes was shown. Much of what was cut showed one of the protagonists partici-
pating in a Maulid, a religious ceremony, and a Wadaha, a women-only dance event 
that neither the protagonists nor we would have been allowed to attend had it not 
been for our status as researchers. While both the Maulid and the Wadaha are events 
that are important to Franco-Comorian communities, they were not directly related 
to the storyline and we thus decided to cut them in order not to generate stereo-
typical images. 
                                                 
 37 I regret that this issue is not dealt with in the film itself.  
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However, this was still not the end of the process. Further feedback resulted 
in yet more changes and editing. The result was the final version of the film, which is 
76 minutes long and is available online via the Vimeo portal.38 A website (http:// 
creatingcomoria.com) was created to present the project and more screenings of 
either the complete film or excerpts were held at academic venues. In Marseilles, 
the film was not screened at a venue organised by the film-makers but rather at an 
event organised by the main protagonists of the film. Furthermore, DVDs were pro-
duced that were distributed in Marseilles, mainly by the protagonists themselves.  
The main protagonists turned out to be completely satisfied with the film, but 
there was also one person39 who criticised the project as continuing the vein of 
research conducted on the Comorian community by outsiders. While it is certainly 
true that the film was directed by non-Comorians and was not based on any par-
ticipative concept as such, I would claim that the main protagonists participated in 
many respects – by guiding the selection of acquaintances and events as well as the 
choice of venues that would appear in the film. 
From today’s perspective, I see a major problem with the original title of the 
film, which was “Creating Comoria. Popular Culture and the Comorian Diaspora in 
Marseilles” and which contained two terms that are as broad as they are contested: 
“popular culture” and “Comorian Diaspora”. During the revision process that followed 
the second screening, the title was therefore changed to the present one: “Creating 
Comoria. A Documentary on the Franco-Comorian Afro-folk music group Afropa in 
Marseilles”. It highlights the focus of the film more accurately and reduces the im-
pression that the film might wish to make any authoritative statement on “the Como-
rian diaspora”. Further, as the film was actually a pre-study to the research project 
“Popular Culture in Translocal Spaces”, which also focuses on forms of popular culture 
among Comorians in Marseilles40 and which aims to produce research films, the 
question arose as to how to produce a film that was more based on a genuinely parti-
cipatory research design.41 
                                                 
 38 See https://vimeo.com/112961750. 
 39 I do not give further details on the identity of this voice for reasons of anonymity. 
 40 The project, which is funded by the Austrian Science Fund (2014-2018), also includes a focus on Cape Verdeans 
in Lisbon. See the project’s blog for more information: http://translocalculture.com. 
 41 See e.g. Pink (2007) and Gubrium/Harper (2013). Similar to the debates on issues of representation (see above), 
my aim is not to engage here with the wealth of literature on participatory research design from a critical per-
spective, but to reflect on certain issues based on practical experiences of working with film in research contexts. 
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Participatory research design essentially means including those upon whom 
research is being conducted in the process of knowledge production right from the 
beginning. In my opinion, among the many questions to be asked when designing 
participatory research, are: who decides on the roles in the first place and who is thus 
considered to be a researcher? Who decides on the topic? Who develops the research 
question? Who selects the interview partners? Who prepares the interview ques-
tions? Who conducts the interviews? Who transcribes them? Who selects the passa-
ges to be used? Who creates a storyline? Who uses the camera and who edits the 
film?  
It is quite common for interviews to be conducted by people other than the 
researcher, in many cases for reasons of language competence or access in general. 
The same holds true for transcriptions. It is also increasingly common for the camera 
to be handed over to others.42 In my opinion, the crucial point is when it comes to 
interpretations. Although I am convinced that it is quite common in qualitative re-
search practices to develop interpretations of data in collaboration with research 
assistants, their contribution is rarely made explicit.43 More often, the participation 
ends when it comes to developing the storyline and the editing process. These con-
siderations were taken into account in the most recent research film project, which 
is still ongoing at the time of writing, and about which I write from the perspective 
of producer as I am leading the research project “Popular Culture in Translocal 
Spaces”, which provides the funding for this project. 
3. “Twarab in Marseilles” 
The film, which has the working title “Twarab in Marseilles”, is directed by Andrés 
Carvajal and Mounir Hamada Hamza in cooperation with Katharina Fritsch, who 
works as pre-doc researcher in the project.44 The focus on Twarab, which is the most 
popular form of music in Marseilles was not clear from the beginning, but was chosen 
at an opening workshop held in Marseilles in March 2015, whereby Katharina Fritsch 
                                                 
 42 See, for example, projects such as Ipsum at http://www.ipsum.at/en/content/idea, which aim to enable people 
to express themselves through photography. Cf. also Brandner/Vilsmaier (2014). 
 43 In 2010, I chose the formulation “Birgit Englert with Nginjai Paul Moreto” in an attempt to acknowledge the role 
of my research assistant Nginjai Paul Moreto in the development of the arguments that I presented in the article 
“Inserting Voice: Foreign Language Film Translation into Kiswahili as a Local Phenomenon in Tanzania”, which 
I wrote for the Journal of African Media Studies. 
 44 Katharina Fritsch is writing her PhD thesis in Political Science at the University of Vienna. 
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and Andrés Carvajal met with four Comorian artists with whom there had been 
previous cooperation. 
Interviews with musicians, organisers of concerts and other people involved in 
the “Twarab business” were mainly conducted by the Comorian artists involved in the 
project, albeit with varying degrees of participation. As Mounir Hamada Hamza 
turned out to be the person with the most interest in the project, he conducted the 
majority of the interviews and agreed to participate in the editing process. The inter-
views were transcribed by Abdul-Malik Ahmad45 and during another workshop lasting 
several days at the beginning of September 2015, Andrés Carvajal, Mounir Hamada 
Hamza and Katharina Fritsch developed the concept of the film, based on the reading 
and watching of the interviews that form its basis. Throughout autumn 2015, Andrés 
Carvajal and Mounir Hamada Hamza met regularly to select which parts were to be 
included in the film and the latter wrote a text that he performed as the common 
thread to connect the different subjects that are dealt with in the film. 
Mounir Hamada Hamza has taken over the role of interviewer, co-editor and 
protagonist and his agency has shaped the film significantly. As a Comorian musician 
and comedian living in Marseilles, he is obviously in a different position with regards 
to the object of the film than the others involved in the project. However, he is not 
working on the topic of Twarab from an insider position in a more narrow sense, as 
despite singing also Twarab songs he is not involved in the business himself. Although 
Mounir Hamada Hamza became co-director of the film, it must be noted that the 
involvement of the other protagonists is no different to that of the previous film 
project. 
A recurrent point of discussion among the team members was to what extent 
self-representation and self-reflection should form part of the research, given the 
risk of the subject of the film being overtaken by the topic of self-reflection. The team 
eventually decided that self-reflection should be included in the middle of the film, 
placed where it would fit within the storyline. It was considered that placing it right 
at the beginning would award it too prominent a role and distract from the film’s 
main subject, whereas placing it at the very end would equally overemphasise the 
importance of the self-reflection.46  
                                                 
 45 Abdul-Malik Ahmad is a PhD student at the Laboratoire d’Economie et de Sociologie du travail, Aix Marseille 
Université, who works for the project on a contractual basis. 
 46 Katharina Fritsch and Andrés Carvajal, personal communication, 10 February 2016. 
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Whereas self-reflection has been awarded a relevant yet not overly-prominent 
place in the film on Twarab in Marseilles, it is the main subject of a different format 
that we are currently experimenting with as part of the research project: the so-called 
“Kitchen stories”. 
4. “Kitchen stories” 
The thinking behind the “Kitchen stories”, as proposed by Katharina Fritsch, was to 
point the camera not at others but at the researchers themselves, and to use the 
camera to reflect on things that are often not made explicit during the research 
process. This would not only allow us to rewatch the discussions at a later stage, but 
also enable us, as researchers, to experience being filmed as well as the sense of 
vulnerability this process can generate.47 
The recordings of the “Kitchen stories” thus consist of conversations between 
two people involved in the research project, discussing issues such as positionality 
or specific aspects such as the role of the film in this research project and in academic 
research in general. This thus provides an alternative space for more extensive self-
reflection, which cannot be included in the other film project discussed above. The 
idea is not to produce a long format film but rather to publish short clips on the 
research project blog, possibly accompanied by an analytical text – as texts in which 
project members reflect on the research process have also been produced. A first 
outcome remains to be seen.48  
Conclusion 
The film projects discussed above are characterised by varying degrees of reflection 
and participatory design. While film certainly has the potential to reduce the dicho-
tomy between the researcher and those who are the focus of the research, it is far 
from being an automatic outcome and instead requires specific strategies. Partici-
patory research designs are, of course, not specific to film but are of importance in 
research in general. However, somewhat cynically, it could be stated that as writing 
                                                 
 47 Katharina Fritsch, personal communication, 1 March 2016. 
 48 See the interesting article by An van Dienderen (2009) who made the process of a film project itself the object of 
analysis. In her case she turned this into an article, but of course this analysis could equally be turned into a film. 
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continues to have (much) more prestige in academia, it is usually done by the re-
searcher alone. Film on the other hand, which is not valued as much as an output 
within the academic system, is a kind of “playground” for more comprehensive forms 
of cooperation that are not limited to the phase of data collection, but might also 
include the editing process.  
In conclusion, I wish to state that my aim with this paper was not to propose 
film as the better instrument for the dissemination of research, but to argue for the 
recognition of approaches to publishing research results that go beyond written texts, 
whereby film is just one option of many, though it is a means that is gaining more 
and more importance in a world increasingly dominated by audiovisual products. 
The production of research films is not an easy task and besides the technical 
equipment and skills required, a profound reflection on many questions relating to 
research ethics and issues of representation is also necessary. I therefore wish to 
advocate the inclusion of reflections on the “Why” and “How” of working with re-
search films in the curriculum of African Studies, as this raises important issues with 
regards to research practices more generally. In that sense, these issues are of impor-
tance even if not all students will decide to engage in film-making, and in fact some 
students may also consciously decide against it as a result of this reflection process. 
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“Teach Them Our History”: Nigerian 
Identity Formation in Chimamanda Ngozi 
Adichie’s Half of a Yellow Sun 
Maximilian Feldner 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s novel Half of a Yellow Sun (2006), a historical novel 
dealing with the Biafran War, constitutes a literary work of symbolic national identity 
formation. John Hawley, for example, argues that Adichie’s novel “is a national novel 
in the sense that Ben Okri's Famished Road (1991) is a national novel, getting at the 
spirit of the Nigerian people, recreating that spirit in the specific lives of compelling 
characters, but at the same time refusing to be overtaken by the events of the war to 
the degree that some earlier novels may have been”1. Madhu Krishnan notes that the 
novel has some collective identity in mind, when she states that “the construction of a 
new communitarian identification is evident. This new identification is one that simul-
taneously transcends the confines of national consciousness while refraining from 
discarding the nation, as community, entirely”2. Susan Andrade sees Adichie as part 
of a tradition of Anglophone female novelists from Africa who have “increasingly be-
come more nationally engaged”3. According to Andrade, “Adichie’s novels represent 
a politics of the family while quietly but clearly telling stories of the nation”4. 
Indeed, Adichie herself explicitly links her literature to the idea of the nation. 
In an article for the New African, “The Role of Literature in Modern Africa”, she offers 
her understanding of the concept of nation: “A nation is not about the geography of 
land but the geography of the mind. It is an idea, or a collection of ideas”5. This geo-
                                                 
 1 Hawley (2008), 23. 
 2 Krishnan (2013), 187. 
 3 Andrade (2011), 93. 
 4 Andrade (2011), 91. 
 5 Adichie (2010), 96. 
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graphy of the mind is what literature can provide, as it “is about memory, history, 
reconciliation, and identity”6. She thus asserts the importance of literature in the 
service of identity construction in contemporary Nigeria. Her article makes clear that 
she believes a project of nation building to be relevant and necessary. Considering 
the problems that hold contemporary Nigeria in its grip, among which the tensions 
between the different ethnic groups and the aggressive expansion of the terrorist 
organisation Boko Haram are currently most prominent, the development of a strong 
collective identity would appear to be beneficial for a more peaceful future. That 
Adichie herself is a member of the African diaspora and therefore not a permanent 
resident of Nigeria only plays a minor role and is no real impediment to her com-
mitment. The African diaspora generally plays a decisive role in the task of nation buil-
ding and homeland development.7 As a novelist, Adichie’s contribution to this task 
lies in the field of literature. While the argument that Half of a Yellow Sun is a novel 
of national identity formation has generally been met with agreement, the question 
of how exactly the novel achieves this effect has been less satisfactorily answered.8 
In this paper, I will investigate Adichie’s storytelling methods to establish in 
what sense her novel can symbolically contribute to a collective Nigerian identity. I 
will discuss the literary techniques and narrative strategies she employs within the 
frame of the novel to tell a story of the nation. Generally, using the genre of the his-
torical novel, Adichie’s narrative serves as an account of Biafra’s existence, and thus 
contributes to a diachronic sense of identity in a Nigerian context. Importantly, the 
novel foregrounds its characters which makes it a character-driven rather than an 
event-driven novel. This narrative importance of the characters enables Adichie to 
construct a novel of national identity in several ways. Adichie’s central character, 
Olanna, is a realistically drawn character who makes comprehensible the experiences 
of a family that finds itself in the middle of a war. At the same time, she can be 
viewed as making possible a symbolic mapping of Nigeria as well as allegorically re-
presenting the idea of Nigeria as a whole. Other characters perform similar functions 
in the service of Adichie’s literary nation building. Ugwu, as the author of a fictive 
                                                 
 6 Adichie (2010), 96. 
 7 Cf. Arthur (2010), 12. 
 8 While critics have approached this question, and explained some aspects of Adichie’s project, no extensive 
collections of the rhetorical and literary devices Adichie uses have been presented so far. Krishnan mentions 
certain “rhetorical techniques that together address an imagined collectivity” (Krishnan 2013, 196), without ela-
borating in more detail on these techniques. Coffey (2014) presents an intriguing and valuable allegorical reading 
of the characters Olanna and Kainene, but mainly focuses on this one aspect and ignores important others. 
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history of the war, raises questions concerning historiography and the position of the 
historian. In addition, his story, which is a story of formation, resembles the structure 
of a Bildungsroman, a genre closely associated with the emergence of the nation. 
Odenigbo’s character, finally, serves as a medium for political ideas connected to 
post- and neo-colonialism. Despite these complexities, Half of a Yellow Sun (hereafter 
abbreviated as HYS) is by no means an abstract novel of ideas. Indeed, it is worth 
mentioning that due to Adichie’s abilities as a storyteller her novel is also engaging 
on an emotional level. Her characters are convincing and relatable human beings who 
easily allow emotional attachment and therefore make the world of the novel readily 
accessible. 
A Historical Novel about the Biafran War 
On the level of content, the novel quite obviously deals with the Biafran War, or the 
Nigerian-Biafran War, that raged between 1967 and 1970, and resulted from the 
secession of Nigeria’s south-eastern region, which was renamed Biafra. This war, 
“Africa’s first modern conflict,”9 is usually attributed to the inter-ethnic tensions 
between the Igbo and the Hausa. Together with the Yoruba, these ethnic groups 
belong to the largest and most dominant among the more than 250 groups that can 
be found within the boundaries of Nigeria. As these boundaries were arbitrarily 
drawn by the colonial powers, without regard for established cultural or linguistic 
areas, it is not surprising that the potential for conflict was already visible at the time 
of Nigeria’s independence in 1960. In her novel, Adichie writes that “Nigeria was a 
collection of fragments held in a fragile clasp” (HYS, 155). The tensions were exacer-
bated until they led to Biafra’s secession. This is not to say, however, that the origins 
of the war lie solely in the conflicts between groups with different ethnic or religious 
backgrounds. Such a line of argumentation is too simplistic and ignores the lasting 
impact of colonialism and the influence of foreign, neo-colonial agents in the region. 
Nevertheless, ethnic reasoning is prevalent in Adichie's Half of a Yellow Sun because it 
has become the historical narrative about the war that is most commonly accepted 
by the majority of those who were involved. 
                                                 
 9 Krishnan (2013), 188. 
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The novel’s title already indicates that Biafra and the conflict that characterised 
the state’s existence are of central importance. The expression “half of a yellow sun” 
serves as an intermedial reference to the Biafran flag, whose symbolism is explained 
in the novel: “Red was the blood of the siblings massacred in the North, black was 
for mourning them, green was for the prosperity Biafra would have, and, finally, the 
half of a yellow sun stood for the glorious future” (HYS, 281). The novel’s spatial and 
temporal settings also contribute to the notion that Biafra is the subject matter of 
the novel, as its events are set in Nigeria and Biafra before and during the three years 
of the war. Since an awareness of a common history is an indispensable part of any 
national imaginary10, the fact that Half of a Yellow Sun is a historical novel is the most 
obvious way in which Adichie’s novel constitutes a text of national identity formation. 
In her article on the role of literature, Adichie explains that “We [Nigerians] are a 
people conditioned by our history and by our place in the modern world to look 
towards ‘somewhere else’ for validation to see ourselves as inhabitants of the peri-
phery”11. She then claims that “[…] what has made other modern states succeed is a 
faith in its own idea of what it is and its place in the world [sic!]”12 and thus implies 
that she thinks that Nigeria lacks the cohesion a common historical consciousness 
usually presupposes. However, her article shows that she believes that literature can 
assist in creating a collective identity. 
It is significant that her novel is a historical recreation of the Biafran War, an 
event that still exerts significant influence on contemporary Nigeria13. It was a war 
that made apparent the rift in Nigerian society, a rift that arguably still has not been 
resolved. The lack of healing and reconciliation is also due to the fact that a significant 
portion of the Nigerian people found themselves on the losing side and their position 
has found little acknowledgement. It is their perspective that Adichie presents in the 
novel. The three central characters, Olanna, Ugwu and Richard are all aligned with 
Biafra. Like Adichie herself, Olanna and Ugwu are Igbo, the ethnicity of most citizens 
of Biafra. The novel is a touching and detailed portrait of a people at war, who have 
                                                 
 10 Smith argues that a national identity refers to “those feelings and values in respect of a sense of continuity, 
shared memories, and a sense of common destiny of a given unit of population which has had common ex-
periences and cultural attributes” (Smith 1990, 179). See also Benedict Anderson’s seminal work on the national 
imaginary, Imagined Communities (1983). 
 11 Adichie (2010), 96. 
 12 Adichie (2010), 96. 
 13 “The legacy of the Biafran War (itself the legacy of colonial policy) continues to shape life in Nigeria. Occasionally, 
Half of a Yellow Sun makes the connections more or less explicit” (Hodges 2009, 11). 
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to cope with the immediate circumstances of austerity and lack of food. The region 
became known for extreme poverty and starvation during this war, images which 
have considerably shaped the Western image of Africa at large. 
In her narrative, Adichie makes the Biafran perspective accessible. She mana-
ges to reclaim a version of history that is largely absent from official accounts. History 
is proverbially told from the side that proved victorious, and the Biafran War remains 
relatively unspoken of in official Nigerian historiography. Krishnan claims that  
“Statistics and dispassionate historical records of the war remain difficult to 
find, in part due to the absence of an official account of the conflict, despite 
the appointment of a four-man task force for the job, and in part due to the 
charged nature, rife with competing and discordant interests, of reporting from 
the time […]. The Biafran War is perhaps most notable for the fact that its inter-
national narrativization was largely controlled by Western interests and Western 
journalism.”14 
For this reason, it is not surprising that Hawley locates the best sources for informa-
tion about Nigerian history in art, and by extension in literature: “Contemporary 
fiction, though, suggests that time, and art, may by default have become the only 
effective means to digest the poison of the past, and to slowly heal from within the 
damage that has been done”15. Thus, when Adichie rewrites local history from a 
Nigerian perspective in order to counter prevailing Western views of the country, her 
fiction makes possible a coming to terms with the past and subsequently perhaps 
even healing. 
Adichie goes a step further than merely depicting the side that lost. She 
suggests that Biafra was not a project bound to fail. In her account, at least for the 
Biafrans their fate was by no means as obvious as it might look in retrospect. Coffey 
presents an argument according to which Half of a Yellow Sun questions the conclu-
siveness and finality of the project of Biafran statehood.16 This can most clearly be 
seen in the characters’ belief in Biafra’s success. When the war is already lost, and its 
end just not announced yet, for instance, Olanna still believes in a victorious outcome 
of the conflict (HYS, 409). Even when she accepts that the war is actually over, she 
does not feel defeated: “Hers was not a feeling of having been defeated; it was one 
                                                 
 14 Krishnan (2013), 189-191. 
 15 Hawley (2008), 16. 
 16 Cf. Coffey (2014), 71. 
70 “Teach Them Our History” 
of having been cheated.” (HYS, 415). Similarly, Ugwu for a long time, is convinced that 
the Nigerians will be blown to hell. When Ugwu watches Biafran children at play, he 
observes that they adopt the roles of the leaders of Nigeria and Biafra (HYS, 400). In 
their games, it is always the Nigerians who suffer a loss and not the Biafrans. The fact 
that the children adopt the narrative of a final success so seamlessly into their games 
indicates that Olanna and Ugwu’s optimism is not an exception, but that the belief in 
a positive outcome of the war must have been wide-spread. While this might be attri-
buted to successful war propaganda, it also shows that Biafra does not necessarily 
need to be seen as a project that was doomed from the outset. Instead, there is po-
tential for it to be perceived as a source of pride for the descendants of the Biafrans. 
In addition, the novel includes several instances where the past is reinter-
preted, which helps to show Biafra in a more positive light. At one point, for example, 
the official justification for the invasion of Biafra is related as a “police action to 
bring the rebels to order” (HYS, 180). This declaration is immediately countered by 
one of the characters, Kainene, Olanna’s sister. According to her, this is merely a ploy 
to cover the fact that Nigeria does not want to lose its access to the oil that is ex-
tracted from fields in the Niger Delta. Kainene’s statement makes clear that inter-
ethnic conflicts alone do not account for the war and thus evokes Walter Rodney, 
who, in How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, argues that “The civil war in Nigeria is 
generally regarded as having been a tribal affair. To accept such a contention would 
mean extending the definition of tribe to cover Shell Oil and Gulf Oil!”17 Nigeria’s war 
efforts are thus reinterpreted from a noble venture to a materially motivated act of 
power preservation. This shows how Adichie cleverly uses the means of the novel to 
counter specific lines of argumentation in order to present an alternative view of 
history. 
The discourse level also features numerous elements that contribute to Adi-
chie’s nation building in Half of a Yellow Sun. Her work represents a certain “Nigerian-
ness” by including elements from an Igbo folk tradition. Krishnan argues that despite 
the realist narrative registers of Half of a Yellow Sun, “mythic elements permeate the 
narrative, notably through its manipulations of the tropes of the ogbanje and the 
twin”18. Her narrative renders ordinary Igbo ritual and mythology, for example when 
Ugwu resorts to traditional herbs to prevent a crisis, or when Olanna visits a dibia, a 
                                                 
 17 Rodney (1974), 228. 
 18 Krishnan (2013), 199. 
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kind of seer, to find her missing twin sister Kainene. In this way, the novel can be seen 
as a “reconfiguration of Igbo mythopoetic tropes and rhetorical techniques that to-
gether address an imagined collectivity”19. Adichie’s style is to some extent also influ-
enced by Igbo culture, as she inserts untranslated Igbo words and phrases into her 
narrative. The narrative style altogether stands in the tradition of Chinua Achebe, who 
pioneered the translation of Igbo language patterns into English prose, including the 
extensive use of proverbs and rhetorical questions.20 
Adichie generally evokes a tradition of Nigerian literature, not only in her re-
ferences to Achebe, but more specifically by crediting the influence of other Nigerian 
novelists who wrote about the Biafran War. In her “Author’s Note”, included after the 
end of the narrative, she explicitly mentions books such as Flora Nwapa’s Never Again 
(1975), Chukwuemeka Ike’s Sunset at Dawn (1976) and Buchi Emecheta’s Desti-
nation Biafra (1982). Adichie also alludes to the poet Christopher Okigbo by creating 
Okeoma, a character explicitly based on Okigbo (HYS, 435). Using a fictionalised ver-
sion of the poet in her novel allows Adichie to pay homage to him in several ways. 
Odenigbo, for example, calls him “The voice of our generation!” (HYS, 51) and Ugwu is 
influenced by his style, even imitating it in a poem he writes (HYS, 375). In addition, 
popular Nigerian music pervades the novel. It is played in the background, listened 
to or sung along to by the characters. It is relevant that the popular Highlife musician 
Rex Lawson is repeatedly mentioned. He can be seen as a symbol of national unity 
and a collective Nigerian consciousness, especially because, as one character in the 
novel points out, “Rex Lawson is a true Nigerian. He does not cleave to his Kalabari 
tribe; he sings in all our major languages. That’s original – and certainly reason 
enough to like him.” (HYS, 109) 
The Narrative Importance of the Characters  
The main feature, however, that makes the novel effective as a story of the nation is 
its complex multidimensionality. According to Krishnan, Adichie demands “a multi-
dimensional view of the war and its effects through narrative forms that encourage a 
multivalenced engagement with history, cultural affiliation, and collective conscious-
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ness”21. This multidimensionality is most clearly achieved by dividing the narration 
among three different characters. Alternatingly, the chapters present the third-person 
perspectives of Olanna, her houseboy Ugwu, and Richard, the lover of Olanna’s twin 
sister Kainene. Kainene and Odenigbo, Olanna’s husband, are the other two central 
characters, but readers get access to them only through the perspectives of the first 
three characters. By telling the story through characters as diverse as Olanna, Ugwu 
and Richard, the novel is structured to represent multiplicity.  
Richard’s character is a good example for the novel’s multiperspectivity. As a 
white Briton, he is the only main character in the novel who is not Igbo, or even 
Nigerian. However, his presence is not that of a coloniser but of someone who is ge-
nuinely involved and invested in Nigeria. Interested in Igbo art, he came to Nigeria 
where he fell in love with Kainene. After having lived in Nigeria for many years and 
being married to a Nigerian woman, he considers himself Nigerian, and regrets that to 
a certain extent he will always remain an outsider. This is different with Biafra. Having 
been there at the inception of the state, he feels he has as much claim to it as the 
other Biafrans, which is another motivation for his involvement in the country’s fate. 
His main function seems to be that of an entrance point for foreign readers. He facili-
tates exposition that fits naturally into the narrative. Explanations that would be 
obvious to Nigerian readers and would therefore stick out, are rendered plausible 
through his character. In addition, he symbolises the hybrid identity of Nigeria. 
Richard attests to the fact that, due to their shared past, Britain necessarily plays a 
certain role in any Nigerian nation. However, despite his centrality in the narrative, 
his character still seems to inhabit a subordinate position to the two Igbo characters, 
Olanna and Ugwu, whose narrative functions I will outline in more detail below. 
1. Olanna 
Because all the characters in the novel are connected to and through her, Olanna 
inhabits the central position in the novel’s character constellation. When she marries 
Odenigbo she moves into his house, where Ugwu becomes her houseboy. She is affili-
ated with the third protagonist Richard through her twin sister Kainene. In addition, 
her connections extend to all the other characters of the novel, which symbolically 
links her to the different strata that make up Nigeria’s society. As the daughter of 
                                                 
 21 Krishnan (2013), 193. 
Maximilian Feldner 73 
  
chief Ozobia, she comes from the wealthy and politically influential class. Her husband 
Odenigbo, the intellectual radical, connects her to the intellectual elite. Among Ode-
nigbo’s friends are Okeoma, representing the artists, and Professor Ezeka, who rises 
in the ranks of the Biafran government to become the Director for Mobilization. In 
addition, through her sister Kainene she is connected to Major (later Colonel) Madu 
and thus the military class. Ugwu forms her link to the lower, the servant class, em-
bodied by Jomo and Harrison, Odenigbo’s gardener and Richard’s houseboy. Even if 
she rarely interacts with members of the servant class, she still makes a point of being 
friendly to them, remembering their names and thanking them for their services, 
which distinguishes her from the rest of her family. Also, she is able to connect even 
with chance encounters. For instance, she calms an elderly lady at the airport, which 
is rewarded several years later, when the lady’s son provides her with food at the 
relief centre in Umuahia. 
Her symbolic association with the different strata of Nigeria’s society can be 
extended beyond these examples. Unlike Odenigbo, who at one point is identified as 
“tribalist” (HYS, 20), and thereby associated with the proud identification with one 
specific ethnic group, foreign-educated Olanna is able to transcend the boundaries 
of ethnic structures. When she flies home from visiting her family in Kano, a city in 
the north of Nigeria, the man sitting next to her involves her in conversation. While 
she is annoyed by the derogatory things he says about the Igbo, she is pleased be-
cause he evidently does not recognise her as Igbo: “His prejudice had filled her with 
possibility […]. She could be a Fulani woman on a plane deriding Igbo people with a 
good-looking stranger” (HYS, 229). Also, while she enjoys the notion of not being tied 
down to one ethnic group, she wants to be able to communicate better with mem-
bers of other groups: “She wished she were fluent in Hausa and Yoruba, like her uncle 
and aunt were, something she would gladly exchange her French and Latin for” (HYS, 
41). Her openness to interaction and inter-ethnic affiliation can be seen in the fact 
that she was in a relationship with Mohammed, a Hausa, and thus a representative 
of the opposing side in the conflict. But unlike the partition of Nigeria into Biafra and 
Nigeria, Olanna’s and Mohammed’s relationship does not break apart due to conflict 
and strife, but because Olanna falls in love with Odenigbo. This indicates the com-
plexity of Adichie’s characters. Even though Olanna is open-minded enough to be in 
contact with members of other ethnic groups, her eventual husband is an Igbo, just 
like herself. This reflects the fact that Olanna chooses to side unequivocally with 
Biafra, although she and Mohammed remain on good terms even during the Nigerian-
Biafran conflict. In the war, the “Nigerians” represent the enemy, an unspecified me-
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nace that expresses itself in air raids and news from the front, and that otherwise 
remains mostly anonymous and removed from Olanna and Ugwu and thus from the 
readers. This does not, however, diminish the fact that Olanna can be seen as repre-
senting a united Nigeria before and after the war. Instead, it testifies to the ability 
of the novel to reflect “both the very range of identity constructions within Nigerian 
society and the multiple articulations of coexistent and sometimes contradictory sub-
jectivities and subject positions that continually shift in register and alignment”22. 
In addition to Olanna’s social interactions, her spatial movements also con-
tribute to her character’s symbolic potential. The depiction of her trips across the 
country constitutes a literary mapping of Nigeria. The various settings of the novel, 
all visited by her at some point or another, include Nsukka, Umuahia, Lagos, Port 
Harcourt, Abba, Umunnach, Orlu, and the unnamed village where Ugwu is from. This 
covers a large portion of the region that forms Biafra. But just as her choice of partner 
is originally not limited to the Igbo, Olanna also travels to other parts of the country 
as well, most notably to Kano in the North, where her relatives and Mohammed 
live. On one of these trips she travels by train and reflects upon the differences in the 
Nigerian landscape. When Olanna “got to Kano, it struck her once again how different 
it was from Lagos, from Nsukka, from her hometown Umunnachi, how different the 
North as a whole was from the South” (NYS, 37). The differences in the landscape that 
are subsequently described enable readers to mentally recreate and imagine the 
scenery. Nigeria is represented as a country that exhibits a great social as well as 
topographical variety. During the war, Olanna then remains within the boundaries 
of Biafra, which reflects her allegiances but also social realities of the war that make 
it difficult to impossible to move freely between the regions. Within Biafra, she covers 
a lot of ground, even though her movement is often motivated by the approaching 
Nigerian troops. In the beginning she lives in Nsukka with her family. This is a relevant 
symbolic gesture because this town is the intellectual centre of Biafra,23 and, as Ode-
nigbo emphasises, “free of colonial influence” (HYS, 32). Umuahia, where they move 
later, is similarly important, as it represents Biafra’s capital. 
The symbolism of Olanna’s character thus makes possible an allegorical reading 
of Half of a Yellow Sun. There are further reasons, such as the novel’s narrative 
structure, that point to the fact that the novel can be read as a national allegory in 
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Fredric Jameson’s sense, when he writes that “the story of the private individual 
destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world 
culture and society”24. A notable trait of the novel’s structure is that it is divided into 
four parts, the first and the third dealing with the early 1960s, the second and the 
fourth with the late 1960s. The first part is about Ugwu coming to Odenigbo’s house 
as a boy, around the time Olanna and Odenigbo’s relationship begins, and about 
Richard’s arrival to Nigeria and his settling in. In this part readers get acquainted with 
the main characters well before the war even starts, which enhances the possibility to 
empathise with them more strongly as they live through the experience of the war. 
Their story is told with such emotional depth that a bond is created between readers 
and characters. The second part sets in a few years later, and traces the outbreak of 
the war, from the first coup to Olanna and Odenigbo’s wedding, which is interrupted 
by an air raid. The fourth part is the longest – with almost 200 pages, as opposed to 
the 100 pages of the first two parts each – and describes the characters’ lives during 
the three years of war. The parts are arranged chronologically; the only deviation 
from this sequence is the third part, which interrupts the depiction of the war with 
a flashback to the early 1960s. About 50 pages long, it is the shortest of the four parts, 
but details some decisive developments in Olanna’s family. While she is away, Ode-
nigbo sleeps with a young woman from his village, resulting in her pregnancy. Olanna 
is eventually able to overcome her anger and pain, and she returns to Odenigbo ac-
cepting the baby as her own. But before that she sleeps with Richard, which causes a 
conflict with her sister Kainene. This means that the second part, set in the late 1960s, 
is filled with references to family conflicts that took place a few years earlier. Readers 
are not yet privy to what exactly happened as the causes of the conflict are only out-
lined in the third part. This contributes to a build-up of suspense, because readers 
are aware that events have occurred without knowing which exactly. 
This emphasis on the conflicts within the family highlights the fact that Half of a 
Yellow Sun is a novel of family as much as of the politics of war. This does not fully 
explain, however, why the story of the familial relationships so prominently interrupts 
the narrative of the escalating war. It seems that the family is supposed to serve as 
a kind of microcosm of the nation, and that the family conflicts mirror the national 
conflicts on a smaller scale. For instance, Odenigbo’s daughter, Baby, is born a few 
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years before the secession, but in the narrative this birth is presented in close proxi-
mity to the war events. It is thus not unreasonable to suggest that the baby repre-
sents Biafra, the newly-born state. Olanna accepts this baby, Odenigbo’s creation, 
as her own. This reflects her joining Biafra’s cause, which has previously been mainly 
associated with Odenigbo. Like Biafra, Baby experiences all stages of the war and is 
changed by it, losing her hair and weight. Significantly, however, Baby does not die at 
the end of Biafra. Together with Ugwu she represents the future of the Igbo. Instead, 
Olanna loses her twin sister Kainene, who disappears after illegally crossing the bor-
der to Nigeria shortly before the end of the war. Coffey presents a plausible and 
convincing reading of Olanna and Kainene representing the relationship between 
Nigeria and Biafra, a reading that is supported by the idea that Olanna is thoroughly 
affiliated with Nigeria at large: 
“Specifically, the relationship between the sisters Olanna and Kainene aligns 
with the relationship between (Northern) Nigeria and Eastern Nigeria, the latter 
known as the Republic of Biafra between 1967 and 1970. In the way that Kai-
nene grows emotionally distant from Olanna, eventually stops speaking to her, 
and suddenly disappears, so Eastern Nigeria increasingly clashed with Northern 
Nigeria during the early 1960s, seceded as the Republic of Biafra in 1967, and 
eventually ‘disappeared’ at the end of the war in 1970, as it was absorbed back 
into Nigeria.”25  
In this reading, the two affairs that led to the conflict between Olanna and 
Kainene mirror the two coups of 1966 that resulted in the war. In the first coup the 
Northern premier was supposedly killed by Igbo leaders, which led to a counter-coup 
in which General Gowon seized power, which intensified ethnic tensions in the 
country. Odenigbo, an Igbo character, is responsible for the first affair, Olanna, as the 
“Nigerian” character, initiates the second affair, which hurts her “Biafran” sister. In 
both cases, the second event comes as a reaction to the first.26 Assuming that Kainene 
actually stands for Biafra, it is notable that readers never have direct access to her 
thoughts. She can only be seen through Olanna and Richard, who both struggle to 
understand her. Biafra thus retains a certain inaccessibility for them and the readers. 
According to Boehmer, in its use of the twin motif, the novel once again points 
to the influence of Chinua Achebe. Kainene’s character and her disappearance con-
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firms the function of the characters to represent the nation, or a national destiny, as 
this “fratricidal war, which reduces all relationships to their bare bones, does not 
permit the twoness of the twins to last. One of the twins has, it seems, to be sacri-
ficed to familial and national destiny”27. Furthermore, the fact, that Kainene’s death is 
not confirmed, but that she has only disappeared, is interpreted by Coffey as a certain 
political possibility that Adichie presents here, because the project of Biafra is not 
closed and shelved.28 Baby’s survival also contributes to the notion that the idea of 
Biafra does, to some extent, survive. In a similar vein, Hodges argues that Kainene’s 
“disappearance, which remains unexplained at the end of the book, makes a more 
fitting metaphor for what’s lost at war’s end than her death would have been. [As] 
her absence remains irresolvable […], there is no closing of the book”29. In Adichie’s 
national allegory, the twins Olanna and Kainene thus represent the two halves of 
Nigeria, which are simultaneously united and locked in conflict and struggle. 
However, as argued above, the characterisation of the protagonists is too com-
plex for them to be mere allegorical figures. The correspondences are neither simple 
nor one-sided. Although Olanna in this analogy represents Nigeria, she is still a citizen 
of Biafra and a believer in its cause. During the last months of the war, after not 
having spoken to each other for a long time, Olanna and Kainene get close again and 
re-establish their bond. Their close relationship makes Kainene’s disappearance even 
more painful for Olanna. However, in terms of the analogy this close relationship at 
the end does not work. The characters of the novel are fully-fledged and thus complex 
enough not to be reduced to allegorical figures. This means that Adichie employs a 
kind of symbolism that adds layers to the narrative but that is not too oppressive or 
one-sided to overwrite the narrative itself. 
One of the novel’s strengths is the depiction of every-day life during the war, 
which is mostly conveyed in a realistic mode. It is this combination of realism and 
symbolism that makes the novel so successful in its recreation of the war. Adichie de-
picts the materiality of life in war chiefly through the perspective of Olanna’s cha-
racter. The reason is that Half of a Yellow Sun is less a war novel than “primarily a 
domestic novel focusing on the everyday as the characters try to maintain normal 
lives in the midst of chaos”30. Although the novel is set during the Biafran War, it 
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focuses not so much on the depiction of the war in terms of the actual fighting and 
the action at the front, but rather on the indirect effects the politics of war have on 
the people. The emphasis on the experiences of the normal people, embodied by 
Olanna and her family, enhances the realism of the depiction. Adichie’s characters 
have restricted access to information about the political and strategic aspects of the 
war. They concentrate on their survival, which is why their discussions and reflections 
on politics, prominent in the early chapters, increasingly retreat to the background 
with the continuation of the war. There is little in the way of historical exposition31, 
and the politics that shape the war only play a role in the novel when their effects 
are felt by the characters. This emphasis on the human scale makes the novel’s repre-
sentation of the war persuasive and comprehensible. In addition, Adichie’s approach 
avoids sacrificing her characters' complexities so they do not become mere ciphers in 
the statistics compiling the victims. 
Olanna is the character who most readily offers readers access into her world. 
She has to struggle for her family to survive. She has to make sure they have a place 
to live, she has to provide for them and find food, and she has to care for her sick 
daughter, look after Odenigbo and keep Ugwu out of trouble. Through her readers 
experience the war most vividly, especially as her family’s situation deteriorates. 
Their lives are disrupted by the war when they have to leave their hometown Nsukka 
to avoid the approaching Nigerian troops. In the process, they move from their spa-
cious house in Nsukka to a smaller house in Umuahia, Biafra’s capital. When they are 
no longer able to afford the rent there, they have to relocate to a small room. To-
wards the end, after the fall of Umuahia, they have to go to Orlu where they move 
in with Kainene and Richard. In this way, their spatial movements mirror the declining 
of their living conditions. Their first relocation already means a severe change, but 
living in a small room seems impossible to Olanna. “Olanna looked at it and could not 
imagine how she would live here with Odenigbo and Baby and Ugwu, eat and dress 
and make love in a single room” (HYS, 326, original emphasis). Olanna’s discomfort re-
gisters strongly in passages like the one quoted below: 
“Olanna glanced at the clutter that was their room and home – the bed, two 
yam tubers, and the mattress that leaned against the dirt-smeared wall, the 
cartons and bags piled in a corner, the kerosene stove that she took to the 
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kitchen only when it was needed – and felt a surge of revulsion, the urge to run 
and run and run until she was far away from it all.” (HYS, 337) 
This passage details well her frustration and discomfort with her situation. Implicitly, 
it also informs readers about the growing shortage of space, as Biafra is flooded by 
Igbos fleeing the war. Olanna eventually gets used to the room, but the room remains 
an indication for the sacrifices the civil society has to make in the war. 
Olanna’s character is exemplary of the human ability to cope with and adapt 
to changed circumstances when necessary. She is terrified of the frequent air raids, 
for instance – her own wedding ceremony is interrupted by such a raid –, but she 
forces herself to stop being afraid, deciding that “the vandals would no longer dictate 
the terms of her life” (HYS, 280). There are other worries as well. Money is central 
among them, as she cannot access her account at the bank in Lagos anymore. Run-
ning out of money, she has to rely on food from the relief centres. Initially, her pride 
makes her feel “as if she were doing something improper, unethical: expecting to get 
food in exchange for nothing” (HYS, 268). But soon enough “Olanna surprised herself 
by how easily she joined the inward rush of the crowd, how she moved nimbly from 
queue to queue, dodged the swinging canes of the militia, pushed back when some-
body pushed her” (HYS, 272). Another source of her worries are the physical changes 
she observes on herself and the others, and which are caused by the deprivations and 
stress of the war. She is, for example, surprised when she realises that she has ac-
tually lost a lot of weight during the months of food scarcity. Other, more dramatic 
changes in their bodies include her daughter’s loss of hair or her periods. “She wor-
ried about […] how her periods were sparse and no longer red but a muddy-brown, 
how Baby’s hair was falling out, how hunger was stealing the memories of children” 
(HYS, 389, 409). The war literally inscribes itself in the characters’ bodies. As a result, 
Olanna’s experience of the war is comprised of seemingly small details, especially in 
view of the grand scheme of things. But because of this emphasis on everyday details, 
her experiences become tangible and real. Just like the novel, Olanna’s character 
can therefore be read both in allegorical and realistic ways. 
2. Ugwu 
The realistic and allegorical reading holds true for the second main character, Ugwu, 
as well. In the following, I will focus on two functions he performs for an allegorical 
reading of Half of a Yellow Sun. The first is that he turns out to be the author of a 
fictive book about the Biafran War, and the second that his story fulfils the pattern 
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of a Bildungsroman. At the end of several chapters, excerpts from The World Was 
Silent When We Died, have been inserted. This mise-en-abyme, or book within the 
book, is represented in eight sections, in which the narrator summarises the content 
of the respective chapters. These cover Nigerian history from the creation of Nigeria 
by the British to the problems that followed independence, the coups and secession, 
the starvation of the Biafrans and the silence of the world during the war. The book 
is framed by a prologue depicting Olanna’s traumatic experience of the massacre of 
the Igbos and a poem about the war, which is fashioned after Christopher Okigbo’s 
style. Thus, it provides some contextualisation and adds to the narrative scope which 
would otherwise be restricted to the limited perspective of the novel’s characters. 
For most of the novel, the author of this fictive book remains unidentified, although 
the extracts, which can also be regarded as section summaries, are always placed at 
the end of Richard’s chapters. Throughout the novel, he is depicted to be working on 
the book, which suggests that he is its author. The “title of the book came to Richard: 
‘The World Was Silent When We Died’. He would write it after the war, a narrative of 
Biafra’s difficult victory, an indictment of the world” (HYS, 374). Importantly, however, 
it is finally Ugwu who is revealed to be the actual author. The last sentence of Half 
of a Yellow Sun simply states: “Ugwu writes his dedication last: For Master, my good 
man” (HYS, 433). But the torch was passed from Richard to Ugwu before that. Influ-
enced by Richard, Ugwu started writing after returning from his service in the war. 
When Richard notices the quality of Ugwu’s writing, he gives up his own plans about 
writing a book about the war and gives the title to Ugwu, arguing that “The war isn’t 
my story to tell, really”. As a response “Ugwu nodded. He had never thought that it 
was” (HYS, 425).  
That Half of a Yellow Sun is not merely a historical novel but is also occupied 
with reflections on the issue of history writing, evident in its use of mise-en-abyme, 
makes the novel an example of what Linda Hutcheon calls “historiographic meta-
fiction”. It serves an important function in Adichie’s literary project of nation building. 
With the highly symbolic transfer of authorship from Richard to Ugwu, Adichie claims 
the right to tell the history of Nigeria for her own people. Instead of a white Briton, 
however sympathetic he might be, it falls to a Nigerian, an Igbo boy, to tell the story 
of his country. This view is confirmed by several of the critics writing about Adichie’s 
novel. Meredith Coffey, for example, explains that the “authorial voice, then, belongs 
to an African, and specifically to a young servant who witnesses the conflict from both 
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refugee camps and the front lines, during his compelled service as a Biafran soldier 
– all making him a kind of ‘national scribe’”32. Andrade correctly points out that this 
ending is an inversion of Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart. It “parallels the shift of 
perspective at the end of Things Fall Apart: from the familiar Igbo to the alien British, 
from Okonkwo to the district Commissioner whose writing constitutes the official 
view of the world”33. Ugwu originally wanted to call his book “Narrative of the Life of 
a Country” (HYS, 424), influenced by the Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, 
which he reads during his time as a soldier. This clearly shows his intentions for his 
work, as does the cover he draws for his book. Ugwu “draws a map of Nigeria and 
traces in the Y shape of the rivers Niger and Benue in bright red. He uses the same 
shade of red to circle the boundaries of where, in the Southeast, Biafra existed for 
three years” (HYS, 82). Drawing such a map, where the course of the rivers Niger and 
Benue serves as synecdoche not only for Biafra but for the whole of Nigeria, is a highly 
symbolic act. It mirrors the literary mapping of Nigeria through Olanna’s trips through 
the country. Ugwu and Olanna thus render concrete the existence of Biafra, even if 
it lasted for only three years. 
Adichie places the power to tell the story in the hands of the Nigerians but she 
also indicates that writing about the civilians’ stories and experiences of the war can 
be empowering in itself. This is exemplified in one passage where Olanna tells Ugwu 
about a traumatic experience from the beginning of the war: “Ugwu was writing as 
she spoke, and his writing, the earnestness of his interest, suddenly made her story 
important, made it serve a larger purpose that even she was not sure of” (HYS, 410). 
Since Adichie’s novel is primarily a family novel focusing on the experience of inno-
cent victims of the war, it can be argued that this act of narration renders them and 
their stories important. Ugwu’s writing depicts the ability of literature to provide hea-
ling. He starts writing after he returns from his time in the military. Writing about 
the war he realises that he “would never be able to depict the very bleakness of 
bombing hungry people. But he tried, and the more he wrote, the less he dreamed” 
(HYS, 398). This shows that for him the writing process contributes to his overcoming 
the trauma of war. By writing his book, Ugwu follows in the footsteps of his “Master”, 
Odenigbo. His ambitions in that direction can be seen early on. Already at the age of 
twelve, shortly after starting to work for him, he pictures himself in Odenigbo’s po-
sition: “Late at night, after Master was in bed, Ugwu would sit on the same chair and 
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imagine himself speaking swift English, talking to rapt imaginary guests, using words 
like decolonise and pan-African, moulding his voice after Master’s” (HYS, 20). 
Depicting Ugwu’s trajectory, from his humble beginnings as a servant to the 
status of an author, the novel reflects his process of formation. It thus assumes the 
status of a Bildungsroman, which is a second important narrative function of Ugwu’s 
character. The novel opens with Uwgu still being a boy of about twelve years. Ode-
nigbo enables him to go to school and get an education. His teenage years are cut 
short by the onset of the war, which requires him to become a responsible young 
adult. Aside from caring for Odenigbo’s baby daughter, he works as a teacher before 
he is conscripted and forced to join the war effort. His increasing disillusionment 
about the war is indicative of this development. The use of the structure of the 
Bildungsroman is relevant in the context of Adichie’s effort to create a sense of 
national identity. After all, the Bildungsroman is the genre most typically associated 
with nation formation. The growth and development of the protagonist can be seen 
in analogy to the emerging nation. In The Way of the World, his study of the Bildungs-
roman, Franco Moretti makes visible the connections that exist between revolution 
and the Bildungsroman when he shows that the major works of that genre were 
written in the aftermath of a revolution. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Jane 
Austen, for example, wrote Bildungsromans after the two great revolutions of the late 
18th century, and Gustave Flaubert did the same after the failed revolution of 1848. 
While the situation in post-revolutionary Europe and post-independence Nigeria 
should be compared only very hesitantly, Adichie’s novel has a similar function to the 
one Moretti ascribes to the 19th-century Bildungsroman. It is supposed to help make 
sense of a new sociopolitical situation and to help establish an identity in a new order. 
In addition, for Moretti, youth is modernity’s “material sign”, its “essence”. It is, in 
other words, “the sign of a world that seeks its meaning in the future rather than in 
the past”34. Although Half of a Yellow Sun is a novel about the past, it doubtlessly 
seeks meaning for Nigeria’s future. The youngest characters of the novel, Ugwu and 
Odenigbo’s daughter Baby, can be taken to represent some optimism for the future. 
At the same time, Ugwu might be seen to stand allegorically for Biafra and the 
loss of its potential. Highfield reads Ugwu’s war experiences in a way that shows that 
even a person that the readers have gotten to know as a kind and friendly person 
throughout the novel, can commit such an act as the rape he is involved in, exempli-
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fying how war dehumanises people: “Though Adichie is clear about not wanting to 
create a utopia out of Biafra, it is difficult to read Ugwu as anything but a symbol for 
the potential of Biafra, snuffed out by the war”35. Either way, it is clear that Ugwu’s 
character performs important functions in Adichie’s attempt at writing a story of her 
nation, both as representing the Nigerians’ right to tell their own story and as a sub-
stitute for the nation’s development.  
3. Odenigbo 
Although Hodges claims that Adichie rarely resorts “to contextualizing historical ex-
position”36, the novel in fact offers such an exposition in terms of the historical, poli-
tical and philosophical underpinnings of the Biafran War. Some of them can be found 
in the sections from Ugwu’s book, such as in the extracts that present Nigeria’s 
history leading up to independence, but most of them are unobtrusively presented 
in the form of the characters’ conversations and dialogues. To Adichie’s credit these 
dialogues do not appear to be there only for the purpose of exposition, but they ac-
tually feel realistic and engaging. The main vehicle of political ideas and arguments 
is the character of Odenigbo. A radical intellectual, living in the university town of 
Nsukka, he represents the intellectual elite of Biafra. Like Kainene, Odenigbo is not 
directly accessible as a character. Instead, readers experience him through the per-
spectives of Olanna and Ugwu. Their excitement and fervour for the cause of Biafra is 
to a large extent due to his influence. He is Ugwu’s role model and the person he de-
dicates his book to. Olanna notices him for the first time when he confronts an act of 
prejudice (HYS, 29), reacting against the preference of a white person in a ticket line. 
Olanna is instantaneously impressed by his attitude and attracted to him. 
Through Odenigbo’s character the novel revisits several of the political discus-
sions that have characterised postcolonial Africa. He especially infuses Ugwu with 
postcolonial ideas. In his first conversation with the boy, for example, he shows him a 
map of the world and explains that the fact that Europe is depicted on top of Africa is 
a symbolic representation and not indicative of any “natural” order (HYS, 10). In his 
regular meetings with his friends, Odenigbo also frequently discusses political issues, 
such as the concept of pan-Africanism. Odenigbo sees blackness as a constructed 
notion, arguing that “I am Nigerian because a white man created Nigeria and gave me 
                                                 
 35 Highfield (2013), 272. 
 36 Hodge (2009), 8. 
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that identity. I am black because the white man constructed black to be as different 
as possible from his white. But I was Igbo before the white man came” (HYS, 20, origi-
nal emphasis). Due to the novel’s complexity, however, different viewpoints are pro-
vided, and so Odenigbo’s attitude does not go unchallenged. His friend, Professor 
Ezeka, makes the point “that tribe as it is today is as colonial a product as nation” 
(HYS, 20). In addition to the influence of European ideas on African self-conceptions, 
they debate the issue of racism. At one point, Odenigbo traces racist ideas back to 
their appearance in the Enlightenment philosophy of Hegel, Voltaire, Hume and Locke 
(HYS, 50), at another they talk about the racism employed to keep blacks in control 
in various countries, such as South Africa, Rhodesia, Congo and the United States 
(HYS, 110). At yet another occasion, racism is discussed as a basis of conquest (HYS, 
402). In this way, Adichie manages to weave political arguments into her narrative 
without succumbing to moralizing, preaching, or turning the novel into a manifesto. 
The politicising retreats to the background in the later sections of the novel. 
Instead, staying true to the realistic depiction of the war, the focus is directed at the 
increasing strain of the war and the necessity of basic survival. “Even the momentous 
event of Biafra’s surrender signifies to Olanna, whose sister has disappeared behind 
enemy lines, only one thing: she can go and find her sister”37. As politico-philosophical 
ideas become less important, Odenigbo’s character, in the beginning such a dominant 
and imposing figure, also slowly vanishes from the focus of the story, as he yields to 
alcohol and self-pity. His decline might represent the decline of the idea of Biafra. 
On the other hand, a new generation emerges with Ugwu, which seems to suggest a 
future in which the heritage of Biafra is not swept under the rug, but informs the 
identity of a unified Nigeria. 
The key to such a future, for Adichie, appears to be education, which is an issue 
that assumes central importance in the novel. Early on, when he realises that Ugwu 
was rarely allowed to go to school before he came to Nsukka, Odenigbo exclaims 
that “Education is a priority! How can we resist exploitation if we don’t have the tools 
to understand exploitation?” (HYS, 11). He sends Ugwu to school, which is crucial for 
the boy’s development to become a teacher and writer. In this sense, Odenigbo is re-
sponsible for Ugwu’s becoming a prototype of Achebe’s “novelist as a teacher”. 
Odenigbo’s pronouncements about education belong in the same category as those 
of Ngũgĩ wa Thiongʼo, who famously spoke about “decolonizing the mind”. This is 
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most obvious when Odenigbo says that “It is now that we have to begin to decolonise 
our education! Not tomorrow, now! Teach them our history!” (HYS, 75, original em-
phasis). Despite the urgency of this statement, it is only registered in passing by 
Richard. He hears it the first time he meets Odenigbo but is too busy coming to terms 
with his conflicted feelings about Olanna to really notice it. This again demonstrates 
how Adichie unobtrusively inserts postcolonial philosophy into a narrative that is con-
cerned with social interaction and matters of the family. Olanna equally emphasises 
education. Instead of making grand statements like Odenigbo, she puts her philo-
sophy into practice, teaching the children when the schools are closed during the 
war. Even when the situation is at its worst, she wants to make sure that education 
is not neglected. She notices that “[…] hunger was stealing the memories of the chil-
dren. She was determined that their minds be kept alert; they were Biafra’s future 
after all” (HYS, 389). Unlike some of the other political issues, education remains 
important and central, even as poverty and hunger leave their mark on the charac-
ters. As a result, education emerges as the main tool in Adichie’s project of nation 
building. “Teach them our history!” she has Odenigbo exclaim, and the implement-
tation of this notion is exactly what lies at the heart of her novel Half of a Yellow 
Sun. 
Concluding Remarks 
In sum, Adichie has written a novel that pursues the symbolic formation of a collective 
identity on several levels. Writing a novel about the Biafran War, she revisits the 
conflict from a Biafran perspective and thus presents and claims the point of view of 
the losing side. Her characters are allegorically aligned with Nigeria and can be seen 
to represent a collective Nigerian cultural identity. Her narrative can be read as a 
literary mapping of Nigeria and as a national allegory, without ever abandoning the 
realistic depictions of war experiences. Finally, her use of genre and the fact that she 
interlaces her narrative with elements from Nigerian cultural traditions testify to the 
fact that she is concerned with identity construction. The question which identity 
exactly is under construction here, however, is generally left open. It is no coincidence 
that I have only somewhat vaguely talked of the formation of a collective or even 
national Nigerian identity, without specifying which collective or nation is meant. Half 
of a Yellow Sun is clearly about Nigeria and also about Biafra but the novel’s implied 
author argues neither for a united Nigeria nor an independent Biafra. That the novel 
mostly depicts a Biafran perspective does not imply an argument in favour of a “New 
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Biafra”, an Igbo nation independent from Nigeria. While it is true that Baby’s survival 
points to a survival of the idea of Biafra, this seems to concern the state’s lasting 
impact on Nigerian affairs rather than an actual reactivation of the secessionist state. 
More than anything, it is the complexity of Olanna as an allegorical character which 
makes exact parallel readings impossible. She is at once a citizen of the state of Biafra 
and aligned with Nigeria, which is depicted as the opposing force throughout large 
parts of the novel. This seemingly paradoxical situation is enabled by the format of 
the novel which can accommodate her shifting identities and affiliations. While 
Olanna’s loyalties are never in doubt, her hybrid identity, as well as the novel’s 
“‘floating’ or transferable structure of allegorical reference”38, prevents Half of a 
Yellow Sun from being claimed by current Biafran nationalists such as the “Biafra 
agitation” movement. 
The fact that the implied author provides conflicting evidence and generally 
remains vague about the exact extent and shape of the Nigerian collective or nation 
she discusses, indicates that the novel is not so much a contribution to a conver-
sation around a new partition of Nigeria. The thrust of the novel’s argument rather 
goes along the lines of establishing Biafra’s legacy as a part of Nigerian history. The 
novel seems to invite discussion by offering an account of this decisive moment in 
Nigerian history from the perspective of one of the affected parties. Krishnan argues 
that Half of a Yellow Sun, “through narrative frames that question authorship and re-
frame tradition, create[s] narrative spaces in which the ever-shifting floating signifiers 
of an incomplete national trajectory may be reconfigured into a coherent community 
of belonging”39. Adichie employs narrative literature in her attempt to make Nigeria’s 
history usable for its present and future. To some extent, her novel has already 
managed to raise awareness about the existence and circumstances of Biafra and 
thus contributed to a more balanced perception on the Nigerian-Biafran conflict. 
This can be seen, for instance, in the fact that her novel is mentioned as a source for 
further information in the “See Also” section of the Wikipedia page on Biafra. Adichie 
claims that “Literature can lead to change, not by espousing crude propaganda but 
by creating a collective sense of who a people are”40. Approaching the question of 
national identity via culture, literature and art, Half of a Yellow Sun is not only an 
alternative but actually the ideological opposite to formations such as Boko Haram 
                                                 
 38 Jameson (1986), 78. 
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and its close ally Daesh, the self-professed Islamic State. In light of the aggressive poli-
tical nation building pursued by these terrorist organisations, politically conscious 
literature such as Half of a Yellow Sun can therefore provide alternative ideas and 
present a peaceful counter-stance in the endeavours to create a national identity. 
References 
HYS = Adichie, Chimamanda Ngozi (2006): Half of A Yellow Sun. London: Harper Perennial. 
 
Adichie, Chimamanda Ngozi (2010): The Role of Literature in Modern Africa, in: New African 
500, 96. 
Aijaz, Ahmad (1992): In Theory. Classes, Nations, Literatures. New York: Verso. 
Anderson, Benedict (2006 [1983]): Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism. London; New York: Verso. 
Andrade, Susan (2011): Adichie’s Genealogies: National and Feminine Novels, in: Research in 
African Literatures 42(2), 91-101. 
Arthur, John A. (2010): African Diaspora Identities. Negotiating Culture in Transnational Mi-
gration. Lanham/MD: Lexington Books. 
Boehmer, Elleke (2009): Achebe and His Influence in Some Contemporary African Writing, in: 
Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 11(2), 141-153. 
Coffey, Meredith (2014): “She Is Waiting”: Political Allegory and the Specter of Secession in 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Half of a Yellow Sun, in: Research in African Literatures 
45(2), 63-85. 
Hawley, John C. (2008): Biafra as Heritage and Symbol: Adichie, Mbachu, and Iweala, in: 
Research in African Literatures 39(2), 15-26. 
Highfield, Jonathan (2013): Obscured by History: Language, Culture, and Conflict in Chinua 
Achebe’s Things Fall Apart and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Half of a Yellow Sun, in: 
Birns, Nicholas (ed.): Cultural Encounters. Ipswich/MA: Salem Press, 262-280. 
Hodges, Hugh (2009): Writing Biafra: Adichie, Emecheta and the Dilemmas of Biafran War 
Fiction, in: Postcolonial Text 5(1), 1-13. 
Hutcheon, Linda (1988): A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction. New York: Rout-
ledge. 
Jameson, Fredric (1986): Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism, in: 
Social Text 5(3), 65-88. 
Krishnan, Madhu (2013): On National Culture and the Projective Past: Mythology, Nationalism, 
and the Heritage of Biafra in Contemporary Nigerian Narrative, in: Clio 42(2), 187-207. 
88 “Teach Them Our History” 
Moretti, Franco (1987): The Way of the World. New York: Verso. 
Rodney, Walter (1974): How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington/DC: Howard Uni-
versity Press. 
Smith, Anthony D. (1990): Towards a Global Culture?, in: Featherstone, Mike (ed.): Global 





Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie: 
Storyteller and Activist 
Silvia Lercher 
“For the prologue, he recounts the story of the woman with the calabash. She sat on the 
floor of a train squashed between crying people, shouting people, praying people. She 
was silent, caressing the covered calabash on her lap in a gentle rhythm until they 
crossed the Niger, and then she lifted the lid and asked Olanna and others close by to 
look inside. 
Olanna tells him this story and he notes the details. She tells him how the bloodstains on 
the woman’s wrapper blended into the fabric to form a rusty mauve. She describes the 
carved designs on the woman’s calabash, slanting lines crisscrossing each other, and 
she describes the child’s head inside: scruffy plaits falling across the dark-brown face, 
eyes completely white, eerily open, a mouth in a small surprised O.” (HYS, 82) 
Introduction 
In Half of a Yellow Sun, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie creates an imaginative reality 
about Nigeria’s civil war that lasted from 1967 until 1970, a war to counter Biafra’s 
secession from Nigeria. But rather than focusing on the hard-core facts, she imbues 
the narrative with multiple voices and thus creates a genuine portrayal of the history 
of her country, stemming from within the ethnic group of the Igbo. By including the 
fates of the various social strata affected during the war, the author ranges across 
the majority of the society who sought safety and a corruption-free life through 
secession. Although the story is held together by the authorial voice, it is narrated 
by the various characters in the novel – their corresponding stories deliver what 
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Robinson calls a “plurality of consciousnesses”1. The various stories unfold similarly to 
a legal case, demonstrating all the evidence that eventually led to the war. Adichie 
furthermore corroborates the stories by referring to far-reaching historical events 
such as slavery, colonisation, and the 1884 Berlin Conference in her novel. 
The epigraph refers to the riots in May 1966 in Northern Nigeria prior to the 
civil war that were incited by a previous coup, eventually resulting in a countercoup 
in July 1966. The misrule and corruption in the country climaxed in a failed attempt 
to overthrow the Nigerian government. As the ethnic group of the Igbo had long been 
envied for their ambition and advancement in the Nigerian society, they were made a 
scapegoat for all the shortcomings since independence. Over thirty thousand civilians 
were slaughtered in these riots; hundreds of thousands were injured and lost their 
homes and businesses to looters.2 At the time, close to a million Igbo were displaced 
and fled back to Eastern Nigeria, Igboland.3 In the novel, Olanna, an educated Igbo 
woman, experiences the riots and escapes the massacre at the last minute by fleeing 
on a train, where she encounters the mother who carries her daughter’s severed 
head in a calabash. 
With increasing scholarly interest in trauma theory concerning history, the 
focus has shifted from “what” to “how” and “why” something is remembered.4 Be-
longing to a generation that has not experienced the war first-hand, Adichie clearly 
draws on the collective memory of her family and people to create the story of Half 
of a Yellow Sun. Her engagement with the people, who have experienced a kind of 
transformation as a result of the civil war, rather than with the conflict itself, gives a 
novel approach to a history that was told innumerable times by the media, the mili-
tary elite, and world leaders, and was ‘tailored’ each time to suit each audience. 
Adichie allows various perspectives by giving the naïve houseboy Ugwu, Olanna, the 
educated Igbo woman, and Richard, the Englishman, a voice. Their accounts of the 
historical incidents in West Africa become a literal manifestation of post-indepen-
dence Nigerian history. This paper will discuss why a young Nigerian third generation 
author wants to raise awareness about a very traumatic past by engaging with the 
conflict anew. This contribution, in particular, will shed light on how the author tells 
the story of the civil war by lingering on specific details and why. 
                                                 
 1 Robinson (2011). 
 2 Achebe (2012), 82; see also in Ekwe-Ekwe (2011). 
 3 Achebe (2012), 83.  
 4 Whitehead (2004), 3. 
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“Nigerian Identity is Burdensome”5 
West African, that is to say Nigerian, history is part of an identity and legacy the 
author claims to carry. In the interview “Nigerian Identity is Burdensome”, Adichie 
claims that literature affects the way we think and helps to broaden our awareness 
of world knowledge. She furthermore emphasises her vocation as a storyteller and 
assures us she does not “write just for [her]self”.6  
“I grew up in the shadow of Biafra. I grew up hearing ‘before the war’ and 
‘after the war’ stories; it was as if the war had somehow divided the memories 
of my family. I have always wanted to write about Biafra – not only to honor my 
grandfathers, but also to honor the collective memory of an entire nation. 
Writing Half of a Yellow Sun has been my re-imagining of something I did not ex-
perience but whose legacy I carry. It is also, I hope, my tribute to love: the un-
reasonable, resilient thing that holds people together and makes us human.”7 
“For me this book is not an act of closure, it is an act of remembering. I don't 
believe in the concept of closure. I think that the traumas we have experienced 
remain an indelible part of who we are; we carry it with us always.”8 
The quotes above strongly demonstrate the author’s motivation behind writing 
Half of a Yellow Sun and her other stories of the Biafran war.9 Her engagement with 
the past is intended to provoke other Nigerians to also grapple with their country’s 
history. The author clearly does not want to bring about closure on the historical 
event. Rather, she expresses hope that her fellow Nigerians will enter into a dialogue 
with their story. The act of remembering, as she claims, may be a first step when 
dealing with one’s past. Reading the novel authorises an active involvement with the 
past, personally experienced or not, and furthers the (re)processing of the trauma. 
The resistance to closure allows the traumatic story of the civil war to journey across 
generations, perpetually nuancing its accounts and significance within a national 
and international context. 
                                                 
 5 Adichie (2004). 
 6 Adichie (2004). 
 7 Adichie (2006a). 
 8 Adichie (2007). 
 9 The author wrote a play, For Love of Biafra, the short stories “Harmattan Morning”, “Ghosts” and “Half of a 
Yellow Sun”, before turning the theme of the civil war into a novel of the same name.  
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Adichie is one of many Nigerian writers who took up the task of writing about 
the war. But what has changed with her generation’s literature is that the writers are 
emotionally and temporally distanced enough to assess the past and write a more 
objective account of the war.10 Decades before, Hawley states, “those closest to the 
Biafran fighting wrote scathingly and with immediacy … [like] reporters seeking to 
draw the world’s attention to an ongoing injustice”.11 Adichie has a different access 
to the past than other writers before her as she did not experience the war first-hand. 
She, nevertheless, claims the civil war to be part of her psychological makeup; it is a 
legacy she carries. By engaging with the war via her novel, the author confronts the 
story of the trauma of a nation. 
Theorising Trauma 
Many scholars in recent years have asserted the necessity of elaborating on trauma 
theory. Caruth’s theories, among other cultural theories on trauma, are centred on 
white Westerners within a Euro-American context.12 While the founding principles 
of trauma theory generally encapsulate the traumatic experience of the individual 
based on psychoanalysis and post-traumatic stress disorder, the theory was modu-
lated to also include collective trauma such as the Holocaust. Soon, however, scholars 
challenged the uniqueness of the Shoah by approximating it to (post)colonial atro-
cities.13 The intersection of postcolonial studies and trauma studies has become a 
promising one – some scholars insist on a “rapprochement between trauma studies 
and postcolonial studies”14 and the potential of actually “postcolonializ[ing]” trauma 
theory.15 Nevertheless, some researchers see the projection of something construc-
ted within a white and Western context as problematic and incompatible with non-
Western cultures. In this process, the conceptualisation of trauma also needs to be 
redefined. According to Visser, trauma studies entail two competing currencies: on 
the one hand, there is the tenet of the trauma’s “unspeakability”; on the other, there 
is the notion that the narrativisation of the trauma becomes an act towards “healing 
                                                 
 10 Hawley (2008), 18.  
 11 Hawley (2008), 17. 
 12 Craps/Buelens (2008), 2. 
 13 Craps/Buelens (2008), 2. 
 14 Craps/Buelens (2008), 3. 
 15 Visser (2011), 270. 
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and recovery”.16 The doubt whether trauma affords the right framework for dealing 
with the aftermath of colonisation remains. However, by means of rejecting the Euro-
centric hegemonic notion of trauma theory and including “complex issues of compli-
city, guilt and agency”17, Visser hopes that a revised theoretical framework may allow 
postcolonial studies to further its understanding of a traumatic history and open new 
possibilities of analyses and readings. She furthermore asserts that a “reorientation 
towards narratives that are forward looking, striving for subversion of the traumatic 
experience rather than its containment in melancholia” is essential.18 
Half of a Yellow Sun represents such a narrative. Adichie has no qualms about 
addressing the “unspeakable”, or – in other words – the collective trauma of her 
nation, nor is she trapped in melancholia. She is emotionally and temporally dis-
tanced enough to articulate the traumatic events that had befallen the ethnic group 
of the Igbo. In her novel, for instance, she describes the riots in the North with the 
maimed and slashed bodies: 
“She paused for a moment because of how glaringly bright and hot it was, with 
flames billowing from the roof, with grit and ash floating in the air, before she 
began to run towards the house. She stopped when she saw the bodies. Uncle 
Mbaezi lay facedown in an ungainly twist, legs splayed. Something creamy-white 
oozed through the large gash on the back of his head. Aunty Ifeka lay on the 
veranda. The cuts on her naked body were smaller, dotting her arms and legs 
like slightly parted red lips.” (HYS, 147) 
Later, as Olanna escapes the ordeal, the author very visually describes Olanna’s 
encounter with the woman who carries the severed head of her daughter in a cala-
bash. Also, with the story of Ugwu’s participation in the bar girl’s gang rape, the 
author addresses some of the realities of war and its repercussions on seemingly the 
most innocent of people: 
“On the floor, the girl was still. Ugwu pulled his trousers down, surprised at the 
swiftness of his erection. She was dry and tense when he entered her. He did 
not look at her face, or at the man pinning her down, or at anything at all as he 
moved quickly and felt his own climax, the rush of fluids to the tips of himself: a 
self-loathing release. He zipped up his trousers while some soldiers clapped. 
Finally he looked at the girl. She stared back at him with a calm hate.” (HYS, 365) 
                                                 
 16 Visser (2011), 274.  
 17 Visser (2011), 280. 
 18 Visser (2011), 279. 
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Furthermore, the acuteness of famine and disease are captured by Adichie in 
the description of the refugee camps: 
“They were naked; the taut globes that were their bellies would not fit in a shirt 
anyway. Their buttocks and chests were collapsed into folds of rumpled skin.” 
(HYS, 348) 
“The thick, ugly odours of unwashed bodies and rotting flesh from the shallow 
graves behind the buildings grew stronger. Flies flew over the sores on children’s 
bodies. Bedbugs and kwalikwata crawled; women would untie their wrappers 
to reveal an ugly rash of reddened bites around their waists, like hives steeped 
in blood. (HYS, 390, original emphasis) 
By addressing the people’s plight rather than the conflict itself, the author 
intrinsically directs her writing towards the experienced traumata of the Biafrans be-
fore and during the war. And although she did not experience the war herself, she 
becomes the representative of this trauma. Adichie becomes the agent of change 
engendering reconciliation of the collective trauma. By communicating it to the 
reader via her novel, she unleashes a slice of history that has deeply impacted not 
only on the Igbo, but also on the rest of the Nigerians. The Nigerian war is not taught 
at school in Nigeria and remains a silenced narrative19 or an unspeakable story. Adi-
chie, however, felt morally obliged to write about her country’s history and “to take 
ownership of a history that defines [her]”.20 The author bluntly names and evokes the 
brutal violations of the conflict in her novel. While addressing her nation’s traumatic 
past, Adichie even incorporates traumata experienced by nations other than hers 
[Igbo] in the novel: 
“After he writes this, he mentions the German women who fled Hamburg with 
the charred bodies of their children stuffed in suitcases, the Rwandan women 
who pocketed tiny parts of their mauled babies. But he is careful not to draw 
parallels.” (HYS, 82) 
What Adichie accomplishes here, is what Rothberg calls “multidirectional me-
mory”.21 The traumatic events are not set in competition. Rather, they stipulate a 
collective memory on “singular yet relational histories”.22 This approach sustains a 
transcultural approximation of the suffered or enduring traumata and subverts ob-
                                                 
 19 Achebe (2012), 228; Ouma (2012), 34. 
 20 Adichie (2006b). 
 21 Rothberg (2008), 225, original emphasis. 
 22 Rothberg (2008), 225. 
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stacles of race. The white and Western, particularly the European, reader might not 
necessarily be capable of empathising with the violence occurring in Africa, but he or 
she can certainly identify with his or her own past concerning two catastrophic World 
Wars. The devastating experience of a mother losing her child in a most unnatural 
way becomes the universal symbol of trauma. It is a notion that breaks the boun-
daries of nations, religion and race, facilitating retrospection and understanding of the 
past trauma. 
 Furthermore, Adichie’s engagement with the past resists melancholia, as de-
scribed by Visser, by also shaping a story of Nigeria’s abundance, particularly in the 
earlier chapters before the situation climaxes. Adichie is capable of bringing into play 
the rich culture she inherited. By conveying to the reader Igbo phraseology and ex-
pressions throughout the narrative, she provides an insight into a culture full of tra-
dition and custom, allowing the reader a glimpse of Igbo society and entrepreneu-
rism. Her focus on Nigeria’s assets or the highly educated Nigerian workforce to 
which also Olanna, Kainene and Odenigbo belong, thus destabilises the traumatic 
background and draws the reader away from the ills of the conflict, depicting an era 
of short-lived prosperity. The narrative of Half of a Yellow Sun is forward-looking, 
defying closure. Therefore, the novel, although avoiding a “happy end” since Kainene 
is still missing,23 provides a dynamic picture: A future where everything is possible – 
bygone affluence or the return of a loved one – despite the devastating experienced 
trauma. The author’s endeavour of weaving together as many different stories con-
cerning her country’s history deconstructs the perception of incessant trauma and 
catastrophe and may aid to construct a new collective memory and a reanimated 
agency on behalf of the Igbo. 
A powerful message is also conveyed in the film adaptation. I believe Adichie 
agreed to the film adaptation with the proviso that it be shot in Nigeria, so that her 
country’s story would reach as many people as possible. The themes of the film, as 
in the novel, put the war atrocities in the background, focusing primarily on the chal-
lenges people were facing. All of the cast interviewed agree that the film is about 
how Nigeria is perceived in and outside its borders. The actors felt strongly about 
the need for Nigeria to process some of its most difficult past.24 The film also lays 
the foundation for the processing of the traumatic history as it literally visualises the 
                                                 
 23 Kainene fails to return from afia attack, a trading opportunity across the Biafran border. 
 24 Bandele (2013), DVD. 
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story it seeks to tell the audience. It being shot in Nigeria elevates the story’s authen-
ticity. It creates an ambience, which, according to the cast, turned the film into an 
even more powerful and genuine story,25 especially since Biyi Bandele’s interspersed 
archive footage by BBC and ITN journalists shows the blunt reality of the British 
post-imperialism damaging legacy. 
Adichie – Twentieth Century Spokeswoman 
After the publication of Half of a Yellow Sun, Adichie maintained in an interview that 
in some respects her nation was still at war.26 The post-civil war era marked by cor-
ruption and disunity continues until this day. On the one hand, a lot of Igbo believe 
that corruption in the aftermath of the civil war was a tool to marginalise the ethnic 
group; on the other, within the Igbo community corruption was resorted to as a 
“survival strategy”.27 In the light of ethnic marginalisation, corruption and perpetual 
crime, Adichie argues, “[i]f we had a real middle-class, if jobs and security and energy 
were things we could fairly take for granted, then I think the conflicts that mas-
querade as ethnic or religious would reduce”.28 Concerning the religious conflicts 
that have escalated over the last decade with the insurgency of Boko Haram, Adichie 
in the article “The President I Want” in The Scoop refers to the failure of the Nigerian 
government to protect its citizens in the face of continuous violence. According to 
Adichie, her nation is experiencing “the most violent period […] apart from the Biafran 
war”.29 The author of Half of a Yellow Sun has become an activist in many ways, dis-
regarding the fact that activism has cost others their lives or imprisonment in the 
Nigerian history of misgoverned regimes. In the speech “Community and Consensus: 
My Hope for Anambra”,30 Adichie praises the State’s recovery from its vulnerability, 
concerning safety, education, health and agriculture. She outlines the inherent values 
of Igbo culture, namely “[t]he values of conscience and integrity” and “[o]f com-
munity and consensus”, and delivers a very forward-looking account of the social 
and economic possibilities and potential in Nigeria from the example of Anambra. 
                                                 
 25 Bandele (2013), DVD. 
 26 Adichie (2007). 
 27 Smith (2014), 791. 
 28 Adichie (2007). 
 29 Adichie (2014b). 
 30 Adichie (2014c). 
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But Adichie does not solely comment on political issues of her country. Recently, she 
has also addressed her disapproval of Nigeria’s law that criminalises homosexuals. 
She demands a repeal of the law and argues a strong case against it in the article 
“Why Can’t He Just Be Like Everyone Else?”31 While the majority of Nigerians supports 
the law, she claims that a true democracy can only then be in place when minorities 
are also protected. She furthermore points to the irony of prioritising the condem-
nation of homosexuality in a country that is rife with deficiencies and grievances of 
a more challenging nature than romantic love between people of the same sex. 
Furthermore, in “I Decided to Call Myself a Happy Feminist”,32 Adichie declares her 
stance on gender and that she simply refuses to be disconcerted about well-meant 
but unsolicited advice concerning feminism. She talks of the dynamics of culture and 
its intrinsic potential of adaptability and change, attainable by women and men for an 
equal future. Adichie feels a strong obligation towards her past and her people and 
truly demonstrates her adherence to Achebe’s belief “that it is impossible to write 
anything in Africa without some kind of commitment, some kind of message, some 
kind of protest”.33 She successfully transmits her concerns via her writing but also via 
her communication directly with the public through speeches and lectures, initiating 
a valuable educational process. 
Conclusion 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, who describes herself as a storyteller, addresses the 
ultimate story concerning her nation, namely the story of trauma. By doing so, 
Adichie not only focuses on the historical timeframe around the Biafran war, she also 
conjures up images of slavery, oppression, and colonisation. Her engagement with 
her nation’s devastating past, then, becomes rumination on history, revealing new 
aspects and perspectives, which aims at (re)processing trauma. Thus, a fresh dialogue 
between the past and the present is established, which will shed new light and signi-
ficance on Nigerian history. The author’s temporal and perhaps emotional distance 
from the civil war allows her to address some of the atrocities directly by referring 
to names and sites of the past crimes that some authors have avoided in their 
                                                 
 31 Adichie (2014a). 
 32 Adichie (2014d). 
 33 Achebe (2012), 58. 
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accounts of the war.34 However, while Adichie openly conjures up massacres, broken 
political agreements, and ambushes, she predominately focuses on the people and 
their transformation as a result of the conflict. The stories of her main protagonists 
mirror Adichie’s perception of Biafran history, whereby how she narrates the selected 
stories is of importance rather than what stories she tells. The addressed stories syn-
thesise the larger story of trauma. The author thereby initiates a critical examination 
of the past that includes the reader. The fragmentary plot is typical in trauma fiction 
to illustrate an incomprehensible event. Thus, the reader is taken from a safe time 
to the midst of the struggles and back again. By doing this, Adichie disrupts the notion 
of the seeming perpetual single story of catastrophe concerning the country. Some of 
the stories in the novel also change this perception by highlighting the resourceful-
ness of the Igbo people in general and in times of hardship. The author’s multi-voiced 
novel is then transformed into an instructive tale and incentive for reassessing the 
past. The educational aspect of the novel is interesting insofar as over half of the 
Nigerian people are under the age of thirty and 44 per cent are under fifteen years 
of age35 and therefore were not alive during the time of the war. The author under-
went an epistemic journey by engaging with the history that defines her and her 
nation. Her assessment of the past is not an indictment of the world, but an attempt 
to understand a traumatic event and to raise a new awareness about it. Reiterating 
the stories about the war resists closure. Adichie’s narrative, particularly, adds to the 
already existing ones and therefore enables the construction of a well-documented 
history of the traumatic past of Nigeria in the consciousness of the people. At the 
same time, the narrativisation of the trauma offers an opportunity for psychological 
healing. The inclusion of other nations’ traumata, such as the shelling of Hamburg, 
evokes and embodies, for the Western reader in particular, a devastating European 
background, which calls upon humanity and arouses awareness of a comparable 
damaging past, whereby Westerners are also educated on a story most prefer to 
eschew. The same applies to the Rwandan history. The reference to the Rwandan 
genocide in the narrative furthermore points to the global repercussions of colonial 
intervention and the neo-colonial countries’ ensuing struggle for power, highlighting 
that the story of the Igbo has not and will not remain an isolated one.  
                                                 
 34  For example Ken Saro-Wiwa in Sozaboy (1996). 
 35 Hawley (2008), 16-17. 
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African Manpower Development during 
the Global Cold War: The Case of 




States from both opposing blocs, including the two German states, hoped for political 
influence and improved trade relations by providing scholarships and training future 
decision-makers and administrators, while Tanzanian authorities hoped that students 
would return as highly skilled labour to fuel Tanzania’s development process, an ex-
pectation also held by donor countries. As Tanganyika’s (and later Tanzania’s) political 
leader Julius Nyerere pointed out in an interview in the early 1960s, the lack of quali-
fied manpower was a fundamental obstacle to development: “You can never begin to 
develop this country until you have sufficiently educated people within [y]our own 
borders.”2 Yet the overarching interests of the Tanzanian, East German and West 
German governments could never fully determine the trajectories, experiences and 
                                                 
 1 The research on which this contribution is based has been funded by the Austrian Fund for Sciences within the 
framework of the research project “Personal cooperation in ‘development aid’ and ‘socialist aid’ in the context of 
system competition” led by Berthold Unfried. Research in Tanzania has been conducted with the kind assistance 
of Oswald Masebo of the Department of History at the University of Dar es Salaam. This text presents pre-
liminary results from my on-going PhD project in which I investigate the circulation of development workers and 
students between Tanzania and the two German states. I would like to thank the workshop participants as well 
as Sarah Hanisch, John Kasonta, Atufigwewe Humphrey Mwakyoma, Jana Otto, Marcia Schenck and Berthold 
Unfried for comments on previous versions of this text. 
 2 Interview with Julius Nyerere, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_-LW7rNiCg (accessed 23 Dec 2015). The 
interview is thought to have taken place shortly after Nyerere was elected Prime Minister of Tanganyika in 1961. 
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decisions of the students who went overseas to study on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain. Quite the opposite, personal circulations and mobility of African students 
during the Cold War could bring about unintended effects. A Tanzanian who had 
studied in the United Stated recalled a bon mot that was widely used at the time: 
“The most capitalist people who came back here are the ones who had gone to 
the Soviet Union. Frankly. (laughs) […]. [T]hey learned the bad side of socialism 
by going to the Soviet Union. But for us, it was mainly theoretical and the only 
socialism we knew was the one in Tanzania. Which had a human face. […] So we 
used to joke and say that if you want a capitalist, send them to study to the 
Soviet Union or to Cuba. If you want a socialist, send them to a Western 
country.”3 
This joke was apparently in circulation around the globe.4 It tells us that the 
supposed ideological transformations of individuals were grounded in their experi-
ences of material realities abroad. Students saw and felt the practical outcomes of 
ideologies. Living abroad and making sense of these experiences was not just know-
ledge accumulation and qualification, as the sending states would have it. The experi-
ences encompassed also more than disillusionment or resistance to paternalism and 
compulsion, aspects emphasised in recent studies about “Third World” students in 
the “First World” and “Second World”.5 As the quote also makes clear, not everything 
was about the East and the West: there was, as the central point of reference for any 
comparison, an “own” kind of socialism. For Tanzanian students it is also true what 
Odd Arne Westad postulated for the era of system competition, namely, that the 
“most important aspects of the Cold War were neither military nor strategic, nor 
Europe-centered, but connected to political and social development in the Third 
World”.6 
With decolonisation and the exodus of colonial officials and other expatriate 
staff, the political elites of African states were confronted with a serious lack of quali-
fied personnel to run the newly independent states. Compared to other British colo-
nies such as the Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya or French territories, 
                                                 
 3 Interview #4, Tanzanian PhD student in the USA (with DAAD scholarship). 
 4 Anne Dietrich (University of Leipzig) encountered the same bon mot in narratives of Cuban interview partners. 
See also an article about business practices entitled “How the Soviets create African capitalists” (New African, 
October 1987). 
 5 This argument is eloquently made by Quinn Slobodian, see Slobodian (2008). 
 6 Westad (2006), 396. 
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the investments into the education system of the UN mandate territory Tanganyika 
had remained minuscule. As a result, a study by the Ford Foundation from 1962 found 
that the numbers in Tanganyika were “amongst the lowest figures of high-level 
manpower encountered in any country even the least industrially developed.”7 Of 
university graduates present at the time of independence in Tanganyika in 1961, only 
a tiny fraction were Africans: of 164 doctors, 16 were Africans, of 57 lawyers, only 
two, and of 84 engineers, only one.8 In neighbouring Zanzibar, which was to join 
Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, the situation was by no 
means less aggravating. 
In the Five-Year Plan 1964-69 the government proclaimed the objective to 
reach personal self-sufficiency: by 1980, no expatriates from overseas should be 
needed anymore.9 Political and popular pressures for Africanisation and nationali-
sation contributed a great deal to the urgency with which this project was pursued. 
While the build-up of a national educational infrastructure was still on-going, two 
strategies were implemented by the Tanzanian as well as other African governments 
to meet the demand of qualified personnel: first, the recruitment of expatriate ad-
visors, experts and volunteers to “fill the gaps”; second, the deployment of young 
men (and, more rarely, women) to obtain the required qualifications at universities 
and other higher institutions of higher learning abroad. 
“Abroad” would increasingly refer to countries other than the former colonial 
power. In the 1950s, even those states east and west of the Iron Curtain without 
(recent or contemporary) colonies began to take an interest in awarding scholarships 
to students from countries that were on the verge of or had just attained political 
independence.10 In the context of the Cold War, many states of the global South 
were keen to diversify their foreign relations. Sending students to different countries 
in the “First”, “Second” and “Third World” was a means to cross-cut and balance 
spheres of influence as well as making efficient use of available resources, wherever 
these might come from. Few countries were able to diversify aid relations and desti-
nations for scholarship holders like Tanzania. The political objective of self-reliance 
did not preclude politicians from going “aid-shopping” around the world, thereby 
                                                 
 7 Cited in Pratt (1976), 21.  
 8 Iliffe (1979), 573. 
 9 Pratt (1976), 129-130. 
 10 de Saint Martin et al. (2015), 20. 
104 African Manpower Development During the Cold War 
playing superpowers and other donors off against each other.11 Through Ujamaa, 
the Tanzanian model of development, Nyerere envisaged a distinct form of “African 
Socialism” which found adherents in Western countries of social democratic orient-
tation and also the Bretton Woods institutions.12 At the same time, Tanzania attracted 
large amounts of aid from China and – to a smaller extent – from countries of the 
Eastern Bloc and Cuba.13 Tanzania was a sought-after ally also because of its leading 
role in the non-aligned movement and its geopolitical position in Sub-Saharan African, 
being a politically stable country that served as a major hub for African liberation 
movements. That was the particular context Tanzanian students came from. 
As a recently evolving body of literature about “Third World students” has 
shown, neither sending nor receiving countries remained unaffected by these ex-
changes and circulations of persons who were crossing political, ideological, eco-
nomic, and cultural boundaries. In contrast to earlier scholarship on the topic that 
focussed on stays in Western countries, discussions of experiences in state-socialist 
countries have prevailed and enlarged our understanding of these practices of soli-
darity to be ambiguous, being neither simple indoctrination nor a one-way street. A 
number of authors have juxtaposed the lofty rhetoric of international solidarity, 
comradeship and peoples’ friendship with frictions and discriminatory practices on 
the ground.14 Drawing attention to shortcomings of real existing socialism, students 
from Africa (and elsewhere) were “probing the limits of internationalism” as it was 
understood and sanctioned by East European authorities.15 Studying experiences 
and practices of students thus reworks the understanding of real existing socialism 
and its connections to the larger world. Accounts looking beyond the Iron Curtain 
found “Third World students” as important catalysts of student activism, arguing 
that the emergence of a West German New Left in the 1960s and its global perspec-
tive would remain inconceivable without these actors.16 
Students’ trajectories, especially when seen in the perspective of life-stories, 
were often transnational. Individuals had to deal with difficulties arising from de- 
and re-valuations of social, economic, cultural and political capital in the process of 
                                                 
 11 Engerman (2011), 196. 
 12 Eckert (2007), 221. 
 13 Gleijeses (2002), 243-244. 
 14 Slobodian (2015); Hong (2015). 
 15 Matusevich (2009); Hessler (2006). 
 16 Slobodian (2008); Brown (2009). 
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border crossing.17 Mobility was not only a way to enhance capital, at times border 
crossings also put it at risk. The feasibility of venturing was itself dependent on indi-
vidual life trajectories and resources available to the students. Strategies of students 
sent overseas are, however, only conceivable if we have an understanding of the 
sending and receiving mechanisms, of selection criteria and opportunity structures in 
sending and receiving countries. The diversity of trajectories should be seen against 
the background of this larger canvas.  
This contribution is an attempt to link the debate about Third World students 
in European states with the development project that states in the global South pur-
sued. The case of Tanzania and the two German states seems particularly appropriate 
for an enquiry regarding these postcolonial exchanges, given the fact that both 
countries maintained substantial relations with Tanzania and hosted Tanzanian (until 
1964: Tanganyikan and Zanzibari) students from the late 1950s. The Tanzanian efforts 
to achieve self-reliance in terms of qualified personnel are reconstructed through an 
analysis of the manpower reports to the president, giving the perspective of the ad-
ministration. While the reported numbers are notoriously unreliable, as the authors 
of the report frequently lament, the information about manpower development 
efforts and failings is insightful, as the actual scope of action and constraints of state 
action are visible in material. The state comes out as willing, but feeble in its efforts to 
plan and control the development of a qualified workforce. In character, these reports 
are marked by dry technocratic prose totally unimpressed by discursive shifts.18  
Aside from archival materials accessed in both Germany and Tanzania, quali-
tative interviews19 conducted with former first degree, postgraduate and PhD stu-
dents constitute the major sources to reconstruct differing scopes for agency and 
positionalities. These are at the heart of the second part of this contribution. A typo-
logy will illuminate the different kinds of channels through which students could go 
abroad. The institutional background affected the experiences students had in West 
or East Germany and also determined expectations for the return. A striking aspect of 
                                                 
 17 Kelly/Lusis (2006); in the definition of the various forms of capital, I follow this article, which is close to the con-
ceptions of Pierre Bourdieu who introduced this multivalent use of the term capital. 
 18 An exception can be found in URT, Manpower Report 1975, vii-viii. 
 19 I would like to thank Berthold Unfried, who conducted some interviews together with me, and Atuswege Burton 
who assisted greatly with conducting, transcribing and interpreting interviews. In total, we interviewed 18 
Tanzanians who studied in the GDR as well as 20 Tanzanians (some already included in the first group) who 
studied in the FRG. 
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the trajectories is that students often crossed borders – especially from East to West 
Germany – and deviated from the designated pattern of departure, sojourn and re-
turn. As will be shown, Tanzanian students, although often “sent” rather than choo-
sing to go to the German states, employed mobility as a means to enhance their 
economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital. Yet, the feasibility of transnational 
mobility, especially from the East to the West, was itself dependent on resources 
available to the students. The transnational strategies were also informed by expec-
tations of the political and economic situation upon return in Tanzania.  
Tanzanian manpower development: Plans and realities 
Directly after Independence in 1961, Nyerere had been reluctant to follow the advice 
of advisors from the Ford Foundation to quickly “Africanise” the high- and middle-
level ranks in the civil service and the military (not speaking of the private sector). 
His main argument was to ensure efficiency of the administration lest to put the 
smooth operation of state institutions and development projects in jeopardy. The 
more wide-spread opinion was, however, that Africanisation was necessary to dis-
mantle the colonial racial hierarchy of Europeans, Indians and Africans and thus an 
indispensable corollary of political economic independence.20 When Nyerere stepped 
down after just nine months in office to – so the official explanation went – streng-
then the party’s organisation, Vice President Rashidi Kawawa took over government 
affairs and sped up Africanisation.21 In the course of the 1960s, Tanzania became 
“the only country in Africa to adopt and implement a policy of investing in post-
primary educational and training institutions only in accordance with the kinds 
and numbers of such skills needed for the economic development of the na-
tion”.22 
The planning practices were underpinned by the assumptions of human capital 
theory which was promoted by US-American economists since the late 1950s and 
became the globally dominant mode of thinking about education. Manpower de-
velopment planning was a sub-component of the larger endeavour of state planning 
and the state’s responsibilities to generate and attract sufficient human capital for 
                                                 
 20 Buchert (1994), 93-94. 
 21 Pratt (1976), 122-126. 
 22 URT, Survey of Manpower Requirements, 1, original emphasis. 
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socio-economic development. The surveys carried out in Tanzania corresponded to 
the recommendations formulated at the UNESCO conference for African states held 
in 1961 in Addis Ababa, considering education “to be an economic investment de-
stined for consumption by other economic sectors”.23 
The realisation of Tanzania’s first development plans after independence fell 
short of many a hope but certainly not the drive towards self-sufficiency in terms of 
manpower. The establishment of the territory’s first own university college in 1961 
which was to become the University of Dar es Salaam in 1970 was a success as sig-
nificant as the rapid expansion and nationalisation of secondary school education. 
The problem was that these advances had come at the price of slower expansion of 
primary and adult education and had done little to make society more equal. The 
explicit turn towards Ujamaa and African Socialism with the Arusha Declaration in 
1967 increasingly problematised the privileges that the educated few were enjoying. 
Degrees and certificates continued to form the major criterion of access for better 
jobs with higher pay, more decision-making power and fringe benefits.24 Functio-
naries of the ruling party as well as leftist academics demanded that education serve 
wider, social and political purposes instead of just economic rationalities. Education 
“had to become a vehicle for mobilization, for class organisation, and for constraining 
elites.”25 Nyerere’s influential pamphlet Education for Self-reliance, which was pub-
lished shortly after the Arusha Declaration and remained the rough guideline for edu-
cation policies until the 1980s, called for “co-operative endeavour, not individual 
advancement”.26 Schools should become self-reliant units of production, instilling 
practical skills and socialist values instead of purely academic knowledge.  
There was thus a tension between Ujamaa’s egalitarian vision of education and 
technocratic manpower planning processes which were also implemented mainly 
through the education system.27 With primary-school leavers being excluded from 
the state’s manpower qualification and allocation measures, manpower planning had 
an elitist edge.28 Allocation numbers depended upon the projected needs, and adjust-
ments could easily be made through quota limitations of scholarships for higher edu-
                                                 
 23 Buchert (1994), 93-94.  
 24 Sachs (1980). 
 25 Samoff (1994), 92. 
 26 Nyerere (1967), 7. 
 27 URT, Survey of Manpower Requirements, 1; Bienefeld (1972), 174-178.  
 28 URT, Manpower Report 1969, 2.  
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cation, as the government decided how many persons were to receive scholarships 
for university studies.29 During the 1960s, projections and realisation matched fairly 
well. Tanzanian manpower planning officers were invited to international conferences 
and seminars to talk about the success story and train planners from other African 
countries.30 A commenter observed that “[o]n balance manpower planning in Tan-
zania has been conscientiously and effectively implemented, but orientation has ten-
ded to be technocratic and de facto conservative by making the future conform to the 
present.”31 In 1980, however, Tanzania was still far from self-sufficiency, i.e., from the 
ability to qualify students and fill posts using own resources. The hands-on optimism 
of the early 1960s had evaporated and the perspective plan from 1980 to 2000 did 
not even include manpower projection figures anymore. What had happened along 
the way? Why did the state lose track of the manpower planning process, so success-
ful in the 1960s? 
Essentially, the future turned out to be quite unlike the present. Despite its 
strong rhetoric and appeal beyond Tanzania’s boundaries, Education for self-reliance 
did neither significantly alter the pyramid-like structure of the education system nor 
the structures of tertiary education. Neither did the call to pursue an anti-elitist 
education policy curb the de facto production of an educated elite that occupied key 
positions in government, administration, parastatals and private companies, although 
class, gender and regional discrepancies were partially levelled.32 Tanzania’s edu-
cational system continued to contribute to “stratification and the perpetuation of 
an educated elite class.”33 In the longer run, the manpower policy was only partially 
successful. Nationalisation proceeded with great strides and the ranks of the civil 
service filled with citizens. By 1980, 99.5% of all civil servants were Tanzanians, but 
numerous posts with higher requirements remained vacant due to a lack of qualified 
persons.34 The majority of youths could not go on with education and did not have 
access to the sector of formal employment. The education system, especially as far 
as higher education was concerned, remained highly dependent on external funds, 
training opportunities abroad and expatriate staff. The gap between plan and reality 
could not be closed, despite – and partly even because of – education migration 
                                                 
 29 URT, Survey of Manpower Requirements, 25-27; URT (1989), 66.  
 30 URT, Manpower Report 1969, 19.  
 31 Bienefeld (1972), 174.  
 32 Buchert (1994), 93-94. 
 33 Block (1988), 113. 
 34 URT, Manpower Report 1980, vii-viii. 
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overseas. Additionally, many highly qualified Tanzanians like doctors and engineers 
were dissatisfied with government salaries and difficult working conditions and often 
opted for alternative options in parastatal or private enterprises, or abroad.35  
Other negative influences after the mid-1970s could not possibly be avoided by 
Tanzania: the sharp rise in oil prices, protracted droughts and the Uganda war all con-
tributed to a depletion of foreign exchange reserves, further aggravated by the drying 
up of sources of foreign capital. When the economy of the country took a dive in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, Western donors became disenchanted with Ujamaa and 
demanded the abandonment of the socialist experiment. Tanzania had hoped that 
more aid would be forthcoming and was unprepared when it did not. This included 
offers for scholarships.36 Relations soured and improved only after Nyerere stepped 
down in 1985. Ujamaa and Education for Self-reliance were quietly abandoned, 
making way for structural adjustments as demanded by the IMF.37  
Tanzanian university students at home and abroad 
During the time of Ujamaa, the Tanzanian state intervened directly in education and 
career, but tried to strike a balance between individual preferences and “society’s 
needs”. After graduation, students were obliged to work for the government for a 
minimum of five years as a matter of reciprocating the education paid for by Tan-
zania’s farmers and workers. Starting in the late 1960s, the government had tried to 
regulate education abroad in stricter terms. As educational contents were increasingly 
nationalised and geared towards Tanzania’s socialist project, citizens should be al-
lowed to go abroad only for the courses unavailable in Tanzania. Authorities particu-
larly feared an alienation of young Tanzanians and emphasised that only local training 
would enable graduates to develop problem-solving capacities adapted to the en-
vironment.38 Scholarships should be awarded only to fulfil (expected) requirements. 
In contrast, countries such as Kenya, India or Egypt implemented a supply-based 
manpower training policy that led to unemployed graduates on the hand, but on 
                                                 
 35 Iliffe (1998), 208-214. 
 36 URT, Manpower Report 1970, 13-14.  
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tarians from Denmark”, Dar es Salaam, 2 February 1978. 
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the other hand opened up the possibility to “export” qualified staff.39 Having a group 
of educated, but unemployed persons was seen in the Tanzanian administration as 
an “overproduction of skills” to be avoided, as it could generate a discontent group 
of educated people threatening the stability of the vulnerable nation-state.40 
Two political decisions should ensure that graduates felt a sense of duty to 
serve their country, and both of them had an immediate impact on the life tra-
jectories of university students. The first one was the introduction of the mandatory 
enrolment of secondary school leavers in the Jeshi la kujenga taifa, (literally “Army 
of Nation-Building”, usually called National Service) in 1966. Instructors instilled, in 
a paramilitary training, discipline and obedience (utii), a sense for duty and patrio-
tism (uzalendo) and the readiness to defend the country against enemies. Including 
lessons and lectures, the National Service was a “para-military-cum-political insti-
tution”.41 Living and working side by side with other volunteers with less or no formal 
education – and taking orders from officers with lower levels of education – should 
break the elitist attitudes of the students. The second political decision with a direct 
impact on life trajectories was the Musoma Resolution in 1974 which stipulated 
that students were to work two years after National Service in order to prove that 
they were ideologically mature to deserve the privilege of tertiary education.42 Ad-
verse side effects were empty seats at university and unused offers for studies over-
seas.43 
The total number of Tanzanian students sent overseas rose steadily until 1970 
and then gradually dropped as more degree courses were established at the Uni-
versity of Dar es Salaam. The number of students selected for courses abroad de-
                                                 
 39 Mnzava (1978), 17-18; Mnzava was responsible at the University of Dar es Salaam for handling scholarships; see 
BA Koblenz, B 212/59064, Dr. H.J. Niesel, Bericht über eine Dienstreise nach Dar es Salaam, 24.1.1977; Nairobi, 
26 January 1977. 
 40 URT, Manpower Report 1974, X. 
 41 CCMA, 1091, E.M. Anangisye, Report on National Service as Submitted to the Second Vice President Mr. R. M. 
Kawawa, without date [ca. 1966]. 
 42 The new policy implied that “student performance will no longer be appraised by considering the students’ aca-
demic ability only. Students attitude to such things as nation building, national ideology etc. will be included in 
the final selection. That is why direct entry to University had to be abandoned to enable the people concerning, 
through working with the prospective candidate, to get a clearer picture of the candidates to University.” (URT, 
Manpower Report 1974, 25). 
 43 URT, Manpower Report 1975, 30, 33, 37; a major problem was that workers who were generally fit and ready to 
join university would not forsake their salaries in exchange for a meagre allowance. 
Eric Burton 111 
  
creased by 65% until 1975/76.44 According to the manpower reports, which some-
times had to rely on estimations when statistics from the Ministry of Education 
were unavailable, between 1,000 and 1,500 Tanzanian students were constantly 
abroad following degree courses. The actual number seems to have been much 
higher, amounting for roughly 2,500 students being trained at East African universities 
at the time.45 Receiving countries of all ideological colours could be found all over the 
world. While some students had gone to Eastern Europe already in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, the number increased significantly in the years thereafter. Tanzania 
diversified its aid relationships, including grants for academic qualification, following 
political and diplomatic rows with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Great 
Britain and the United States in 1965 which had the side effect of significantly re-
duced assistance.46 Apart from the U.S. and the UK, major destinations receiving at 
least 40 students from Tanzania included Canada, the USSR, Yugoslavia, East Germany 
and West Germany, India, Romania, Hungary, Cuba, China, Australia and Italy.47 In 
1979, for instance, the largest groups of Tanzanians were in India (206, almost all 
Geology or Engineering), the UK (186), the United States (165) and the Soviet Union 
(145), followed by Romania (86, mostly medicine) and Cuba (85, mostly medicine).48 
In total, Tanzanians were studying in over 30 countries.49 
The number of Tanzanian university students in the German Democratic Re-
public (GDR) was around 30 in the mid-1960s and reached 98 in 1974, making them 
one of the largest groups of African students in the GDR by that time.50 Between 1965 
and 1979, 57 Tanzanians had obtained a university degree from GDR universities, 5 
had secured a PhD and an additional 21 individuals had been awarded the title of an 
engineer. Another 299 Tanzanians had by then undergone a formal job training 
(Ausbildung), and 227 had pursued various courses from union, youth, journalist and 
                                                 
 44 URT, Manpower Report 1975, 38. 
 45 URT, Manpower Report 1971, 29; if one includes students that had gone abroad with private funding, the 
number would definitely exceed 2,500. In Great Britain alone, the British Council counted 1,011 Tanzanian 
students, as opposed to 455 according to the manpower report; see Gee (1980), 246. 
 46 Pratt (1999), 140; Mnzava (1978), 48. 
 47 URT, Manpower Report 1972, 30; PAAA, MfAA, C 345, Übersicht über Studenten Tansanias, no date [probably 
1965], Fol. 29. 
 48 URT, Manpower Report 1979, 64 
 49 URT, Manpower Report 1980, 104-107.  
 50 PAAA, MfAA, C 345, Übersicht über Studenten Tansanias, Fol. 29; URT, Manpower Report 1975, 94. 
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cooperative associations.51 67 Tanzanian students were still present in 1988, mean-
while outnumbered by students from the GDR’s more recent focus countries Ethiopia, 
Mozambique and Angola.52 Only during the 1960s there were more Tanzanian stu-
dents in West than in East Germany. 75 Tanzanians studied in the FRG by 1965, twice 
as much as in the GDR.53 After the diplomatic fallout in the same year between 
Tanzania and West Germany over the opening of a GDR consulate on the mainland, 
the number fell. The manpower report lists only 15 students for 1971. The number 
increased to 70 students until 1977 as a result of the improved relations between 
Tanzania and the West German social democratic government between 1969 and 
1982.54 As both German states gradually reduced the intake of new Tanzanian stu-
dents in the late 1970s due to political and economic reasons, the 1970s represent 
the peak of education migration between Tanzania and the German states. Common 
to both German states was the minuscule participation of women in state-sponsored 
programmes, reflecting the gender ratio of Tanzanian students abroad: of 1,170 
Tanzanians students registered to be abroad in 1977, only 31 (or 2.6%) were female. 
Of the few female students going to East and West Germany before 1990, some 
were women who secured scholarships following their husbands. 
A persistent tendency was that cooperation with countries in the “East” and 
“South” on the academic level served mainly to acquire first degrees, while Tan-
zanians travelling to the “West” were more likely to follow postgraduate courses, 
including PhD programmes. This is, of course, not to say that there were no Tan-
zanian PhD students in East European countries, but they represented a smaller share 
of the total number. One reason for the East-West difference was the re-orientation 
of Western countries’ development policy towards poverty alleviation and rural de-
velopment, meaning that less money was made available for scholarships. To ensure 
the highest possible impact and influence of scholarship programmes, official funds 
were increasingly channelled to serve postgraduate education. After 1965, scholar-
ships were whenever possibly provided “sur-place”, i.e. to finance studies at the Uni-
versity of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania instead of overseas.55 The perceived (more than 
empirically researched) phenomenon of the “brain drain”, of students not returning 
                                                 
 51 BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, DE 1/58694, „Zusammenarbeit zwischen der DDR und der VRT in den Bereichen 
Kaderausbildung/Experteneinsatz“, without date [1980/1981]. 
 52 BStU, MfS, HA II 28716, Bl. 100. 
 53 PAAA, MfAA, C 345, Übersicht über Studenten Tansanias, no date [probably 1965], Fol. 29. 
 54 URT, Manpower Report 1971, 30-31; URT, Manpower Report 1977, 62. 
 55 DAAD, 40 Years Supporting Excellence. DAAD Regional Office for Africa, Bonn 2014, 16-17. 
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to their home countries, played a significant role in the policy shift. East European 
countries, in contrast to Western countries, were chronically short of foreign ex-
change. They tried to pay whatever costs in national currency. This implied that 
scholarship programmes were bound to a stay in the country which provided the 
scholarship. The Tanzanian Ministry of Education also sponsored students, especially 
for first degree courses.56 It preferred countries like India, where eight students could 
receive a degree in engineering for the same costs that would be incurred by a single 
student in Sweden.57 During the early 1970s, most Tanzanians in East European and 
Asian countries studied engineering, medicine, agricultural sciences, geology or 
veterinary medicine. Only few read economics, political economy or philosophy.58 In 
Western countries, as in the East, the majority of students followed science courses, 
but a significant share also studied accounting (the most popular course in Great 
Britain) and economics.59 
By and large, sending students worked quite well. Tracking the progress of 
students abroad, however, was more difficult; and ministries quarrelled over the re-
sponsibility for their reintegration.60 Expressing a state of ignorance and helplessness, 
the manpower report for the year 1970 posed the questions: “Where are they [the 
graduates from overseas universities]? Have they left the country? Did they ever 
return from overseas? Are they in lower level posts?”61 A survey conducted among 
Tanzanian students in Great Britain raised concerns. 92% of the 563 students that 
the embassy knew of had departed with a government scholarship, and most of these 
were willing to return – but very few had actually done so.62 The fear not to get an 
appropriate job loomed large among the reasons to extend the stay abroad, both in 
the UK and in West Germany.63 To East German (and East European) authorities 
such concerns were of little relevance: after graduation, students had to leave. En-
                                                 
 56 URT, Manpower Report 1980, 104-107.  
 57 Personal conversation with a Tanzanian student who studied in India in the 1970s, Dar es Salaam, 30 No-
vember 2014. 
 58 URT, Manpower Report 1975, 36; in Romania and Cuba, most Tanzanians studied medicine, whereas in India, 
most studied engineering or geology. 
 59 URT, Manpower Report 1971, 29.  
 60 URT, Manpower Report 1974, 46.  
 61 URT, Manpower Report 1974, 102. 
 62 URT, Manpower Report 1970, 92-94. 
 63 PAAA, ZW 119384, Seminarbericht Reintegrationsseminar für tansanische Studenten vom 2. bis 5. Mai 1976 
in Bad Godesberg, Bonn, 31 May 1976, 2; Court (1979), 543. 
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forcement of this principle, agreed with Tanzania, was stricter than in the West. But 
this did not mean that all of the students directly returned to Tanzania. 
Pathways from Tanzania to East Germany and West Germany 
The figures given above are problematic especially because they usually exclude pri-
vately paid studies and mask important differences between the students. What 
kind of experiences students made in East and West Germany depended not only 
on time and place, but also on the mode of education migration. There are at least 
five groups of Tanzanians that were eligible for regular university courses in the two 
German states, having different social backgrounds and perspectives. The typology 
presented here works best for the time from the late 1960s to the late 1980s. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, on-going political transformations and the still unaccomplished 
ossification of donor institutions and regulations made for trajectories that were far 
too diverse to be pigeonholed into exclusive categories. A couple of hints to these 
years will illustrate that limitation.  
The first group are secondary school leavers with good or excellent marks and 
appropriate subject combinations for fields like medicine or engineering sciences. 
These students would naturally be very young and have little or no work experience, 
apart from the stays described above in the National Service and (especially after 
the Musoma Resolution) possibly a brief period of employment. This group formed 
the majority of students who were sent to the GDR and the Eastern Bloc, usually 
within the framework of bilateral aid agreements. If they returned successfully with 
their first degree, they mostly filled the middle ranks of administration. 
The second group comprises academic staff of the University of Dar es Salaam, 
especially young tutorial assistants and lecturers who had gained their first (and 
eventually second) degree in East Africa, or in few cases overseas, and were now 
expected to continue with their studies so that postgraduate courses might also be 
offered in Tanzania. In contrast to other countries, the close and institutionalised 
bond of the PhD student to his or her supervisor at a German university (tellingly 
called Doktorvater or Doktormutter), required that in most cases an agreement be 
reached between candidate and supervisor before any application could be accepted. 
This meant in turn that personal networks played a decisive role in facilitating the 
contacts between a Tanzanian PhD student and his or her supervisor in Germany. 
Returning students or German lecturers teaching at the University of Dar es Salaam 
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were often instrumental in giving a hint as to which professor or department could be 
approached. As a result of such personal and institutional legacies, there exist a 
“Konstanz group” and a “Hamburg group” among Tanzania’s most notable legal prac-
titioners. 
A third group, also sponsored, are so-called counterparts and other project 
staff employed in (or seconded to) German-funded development projects. This would 
be the case in a wide range of projects supported by West Germany, like the set-up of 
the Faculty of Engineering at the University of Dar es Salaam – which in fact shows 
an overlap with the second group – and a few undertakings from the GDR, most 
significantly a commercially oriented joint venture in Mbeya in southern Tanzania. 
Local engineers and technicians were trained in the GDR to run the textile mill after its 
completion. Personal contacts between German development workers were often 
crucial for the selection of beneficiaries. If the required courses were not offered in 
West Germany, bursaries were also given out for other Western countries. This 
arrangement gained importance in the late 1970s and 1980s when counterpart trai-
ning was increasingly seen as a prerequisite for the sustainability of projects. As both 
German states were more or less powerless in Tanzanian staff transfer matters, 
they could not avoid that many counterparts did not or only shortly return to work 
in the project, especially when the qualification had opened up new avenues.64 
The fourth group is made up of students whose stays were facilitated by the 
party, mass organisations and political foundations. Courses could last from weeks 
to several years and usually aimed at strengthening counterpart organisations in 
Tanzania – workers’ and cooperative unions, the party’s Youth League etc., although 
in some cases, the East German organisations also financed stays leading to regular 
university degrees. Ties on this level were particularly strong with the GDR, also due 
to the fact that they served as a surrogate for official state relations until 1972.65 
Partly because of these historically close relations between GDR and Tanzanian 
mass organisations, their West German counterparts (including the foundations 
close to the largest political parties) had difficulties to establish any meaningful co-
operation.66 
                                                 
 64 Interview #110 with former GDR diplomat serving in the GDR embassy in Tanzania; Interview #25 with former 
FRG development worker 
 65 In the 1960s, West Germany had constantly upheld the pressure on Tanzania (and other aid recipients) not to 
establish full diplomatic relations with East Germany; see Gray (2003); Engel/Schleicher (1998). 
 66 Vinnai (2010), 112, 114, 120, 158. 
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A fifth and enormously heterogeneous group of students went abroad for 
studies as a matter of privately sponsored sojourns – through churches, companies, 
or personal and family funding. These only played a role for West Germany, as the 
GDR accepted students from Tanzania only when they were “delegated” by the 
institutions named above, also to ensure that graduates would indeed be in a po-
sition to make an impact in Tanzania and improve relations. The mode of sending was 
also significant for the return: While university graduates who had received govern-
ment bursaries (practically all from the University of Dar es Salaam and all of those 
who went through bilateral agreements) had to serve at least five years in official po-
sitions, those who could afford to pay for courses abroad or received private scholar-
ships were free to choose their place of employment.67 Individual trajectories within 
these groups did, of course, still vary enormously.  
The tendency observable for Zanzibar in the 1960s – that the elite could go 
West, but “ordinary people” were sent to the East68 – might also apply, though less 
clear-cut, to Tanzania mainland. Students leaving Tanganyika or Zanzibar in the tumul-
tuous and heated years shortly before or after dependence seem to have gathered 
also more travel experiences than later generations; three first degree students 
arriving in the GDR in the early 1960s, for example, had gone through party and union 
channels to Guinea, Liberia and Egypt.69 
In the following years of postcolonial Tanzania, the passage from secondary to 
higher education was crucial. Secondary school leavers could express their prefe-
rences for further education through filling in standardised forms. In these forms, 
students were asked what they wanted to study, but not where they wanted to 
study.70 Germany, no matter if East or West, was not a first choice-destination. As in 
other African countries that were still aligned towards Anglophone and Francophone 
school systems, going to German-speaking and East European countries meant the 
additional trouble of learning another language which inevitably prolonged the 
duration of the stay. Full recognition of school certificates and academic titles on 
                                                 
 67 BA Koblenz, B 212/26037, Dr. Scheibe (DAAD) to Dr. Hellmann (DAAD), without place, 12 September 1967; this 
would be for example the case for scholarships from the Aga Khan Foundation, but not for those from the 
Rockefeller Foundation. 
 68 Burgess (2009), 65-66. 
 69 UAL, WIFA 0411, CV of student Kassim M. G., Bl. 20; ibid., StuA 12291, Confirmation of Cairo University con-
cerning student M., 5 January 1963; Adam Shafi, Mbali na nyumbani, Nairobi 2013. 
 70 Interview #63, Tanzanian student in the GDR (graduate) and FRG (PhD). 
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arrival and return was often hit-or-miss, and the degree one would acquire would 
not come from a university that had any prestige in Tanzania. Others had hoped to 
be allocated to universities in Dar es Salaam or Nairobi and were quite hesitant to go 
to Eastern Europe, knowing that they would be unable to return and see their rela-
tives for several years. If ulaya (Europe), many thought, then better prestigious desti-
nations like “Mother England”71 or the United States.72 Several interviewees selected 
by the state for GDR scholarships said that they first protested and then accepted only 
because they knew that this might well be the only opportunity to get their hands 
on a degree. Some respondents mentioned that they and their relatives were happy 
to get this opportunity to go abroad, and young students especially seem to have 
been quite unaware of Cold War binaries when they left in the 1970s: 
“Those days we didn't really know that there is East Germany – at least me – or 
West Germany. We didn't know that there is a big difference between the 
Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc. For us, Europe was Europe and we were 
happy that we were going there. […] We didn't know how different it is, but 
we knew it is something better.”73 
Respondents who had studied in the GDR in the 1970s also told that they had 
been surprised to find themselves in East Germany, not even knowing that a mea-
ningful difference to the West existed.74 This might partially be explained by Tan-
zania’s consequent politics of non-alignment which was also reflected in the country’s 
education policy. From Tanzania during Ujamaa, the boundaries between African 
socialism, East European state-socialism, Maoism, Titoism and social democracy in 
Scandinavia and West Germany were of little significance. The North-South dimension 
was relevant due to Tanzania’s commitment to decolonisation, anti-imperialism and 
the erection of a New International Economic Order, the East-West competition of 
systems much less so. Songs sung in the camps of the National Service were re-
minding young Tanzanians “that we were on the frontline of the African liberation 
                                                 
 71 Interview #66, Tanzanian student in the FRG. 
 72 The Swahili term for Europe, ulaya, stretches its semantics easily to embrace all privileged parts of the world with 
white majorities. It may include the United States, Australia and Russia, but not Japan or Saudi-Arabia.  
 73 Interview #63, Tanzanian Student in GDR (graduate) and FRG (postgraduate). 
 74 GDR teachers in Tanzania – who were supposed to instruct students and colleagues about the differences 
between East and West Germany – also reported difficulties in communicating their vision of East-West com-
petition; see BA Berlin Lichterfelde, DR 2/25494, DDR-Lehrerexperte B. an MfVobi, Dar es Salaam, 13 August 
1971; BA Berlin Lichterfelde, DR 2/25494, Günter R., Bericht 1. Halbjahr 1970, Mzumbe Secondary School 
Morogoro, Mzumbe, 15 June 1970. 
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struggle”75, not that they belonged to East or West. If specific arguments were 
brought forward for choosing76 a German destination, these would usually refer to 
the high reputation of “German” technology or work attitudes.77 Only in very few 
cases did students state that they had particularly wanted to study in the GDR, and if 
so, for political reasons or because possibilities elsewhere were exhausted.78 
Experiences of integration, indoctrination and discrimination 
In West Germany, Julius Nyerere’s popularity in left-wing circles as a model for en-
lightened political leadership and enthusiasm for Ujamaa also informed the image 
of Tanzanian students, described by a sympathetic social democrat as “among the 
politically most conscious from the African continent”, an “ideologically firm and ho-
mogeneous” group with the self-perception that they were among the chosen few 
selected to serve their people.79 Teachers and functionaries in the education system 
of the GDR – some of whom might even have had weaknesses for Ujamaa, but 
could impossibly let these sentiments influence their judgement – routinely dismissed 
as immature and wrong the views of those Tanzanians who publicly aired their pre-
ference for African Socialism or what East Germans identified as “Maoism”.80 In con-
trast, Tanzanians who criticised their country’s official development philosophy from 
a Marxist-Leninist perspective were evaluated in the most positive language.81 
The ideological endowments of those sent abroad were far from monolithic, 
and they did change in the course of their stay, though it seems impossible to pin-
point particular transformative moments. Both German states expected foreign stu-
                                                 
 75 Mwakikagile (2006), 33-34. 
 76 In some cases, the selection processes could be influenced. In the case of the GDR, registration forms required an 
answer to the question of why one wanted to study. 
 77 Cf. Burgess (2009), 65-66. 
 78 UAL, StuA 109 336, Application, Bl. 5; Interview #104, Tanzanian student in the GDR. 
 79 PAAA, ZW 119384, Klaus Wedel (Stv. Leiter der Internationalen Abteilung der FES), Projektbeschreibung für 
Reintegrationsseminar für tansanische Studenten vom 3. bis 5. Mai 1976 in Bad Godesberg, Bonn, 31 March 
1976, 2; views were less enthusiastic in the 1960s and, again, in the 1980s, but still very positive, at least in the 
left spectrum. 
 80 UAL, StuA 12291, Beurteilung des Studenten K., 27 November 1963, Bl. 28; UAL, StuA 116549, Dr. jur. P. Ter-
zopoulos (Institut für Völkerrecht), „Einschätzung des Studenten O.G.C.“, 5 January 1968, Bl. 7; UAL, StuA 
116549, Zeugnis des Herder-Instituts für Y.A.H., Leipzig, 6 June 1964, Bl. 43. 
 81 UAL, WIFA 0411, Prof. Kramer, Gutachten zur Dissertation „Die volkswirtschaftliche Planung in den Entwicklungs-
ländern, dargestellt am Beispiel Tansania“ von Kassim Mrisho Guruli, no date [1969], Bl. 19. 
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dents to integrate into regular university life, in the case of the GDR even to share 
rooms with East German fellow students (often suspected to be spying on foreign 
students). Political and cultural attitudes where transmitted through obligatory pre-
paratory language courses at Goethe Institutes in West Germany or Herder-Institut 
in Leipzig. In the first months of the stay, students often engaged in some haggling 
over the full recognition of qualifications and a tug-of-war with institutions (both 
German and Tanzanian) when they wanted to switch courses, also employing the 
language of manpower development and arguing that the change would be in the 
interest of the nation.82 Many interviewees described themselves as having been 
apolitical or at least not politically committed, but even those admitted having partici-
pated in demonstrations and sit-ins in West Germany’s 1968 or state-sanctioned 
political rituals in the East. A detailed evaluation of political activities would require 
sensitivity to legal contexts and global as well as local political settings beyond the 
scope of this paper.83 A more constant aspect than political activism seems to have 
been the political education in the GDR and how it was perceived. 
Even though most Tanzanians in East Germany did not study social sciences, 
the attendance of classes in Marxism-Leninism was required, at least after 1969.84 
Interviews with students who had studied in the GDR often contained references to 
the obligatory nature of these courses, and that failing or refusing to participate in 
the subject would have lead to expulsion. Several former GDR students recalled 
threats and pressure from authorities to join extracurricular activities sanctioned by 
the ruling party. Some interviewees compared the content of Marxism-Leninism 
classes with the subject of Development Studies taught in Tanzanian secondary 
schools and at the University of Dar es Salaam, often drawing on (neo-)Marxist theo-
ries and being similar to GDR policies in terms of its anti-imperialist outlook.85 
Most graduates from the GDR argued that their knowledge – the cultural 
capital they had appropriated through years of hard work – was just as good as that 
of returnees from Western states. They claimed to have received “very solid” and 
altogether non-ideological training in the GDR,86 also alluding to the universality of 
                                                 
 82 UAL, R 280, Bd. 5, Chief G.P. Kunambi (University College of Dar es Salaam) an den Rektor der KMU, 10 No-
vember 1968, Bl. 114-115; Interview #65, Tanzanian student in the GDR. 
 83 Slobodian (2008). 
 84 For details about subjects taught, see Müller (1995), 90-91. 
 85 Interview #76, Tanzanian student in the GDR; Interview #14, Tanzanian PhD student in the FRG. 
 86 Interview #63, Tanzanian student in the GDR (graduate) and FRG (PhD). 
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knowledge: “If you add two and two, whether you are in East or West, it is four. […] 
In medicine or wherever, the principles are the same.”87 On one level, such state-
ments illustrate the belief in neutral, globally applicable knowledge. They can also be 
read as a re-validation of degrees and knowledge obtained in East European countries 
against bipolar Cold War discourses more generally and Western-trained admini-
strators in particular who would regard Eastern Bloc returnees as indoctrinated 
stooges unworthy to man important positions in Tanzania’s state institutions (see 
also below). De-politicising the knowledge was one strategy to counter these sus-
picions. But there was more to this statement than just a rhetorical strategy to defend 
oneself and re-valorise one’s symbolic and cultural capital. GDR authorities were 
always aware that sound qualification was the best propaganda. It was not for no-
thing that graduates of engineering or tropical agriculture were able to pursue PhD 
programmes in West Germany without problems. 
Some students likened the disciplinary methods encountered in the GDR with 
experiences from Tanzania: like in the National Service, one respondent said, one was 
supposed to “shut one’s mouth” (kufunga mdomo).88 All emphasised that political 
activities – in the sense of opposing authority – were impossible in the GDR lest one 
be sent home, having wasted the opportunity to get a degree. Even the former leader 
of the union of Tanzanian students in the GDR reported that he was “shut up” by 
authorities when, in 1980, he wanted to enquire into the death of a Tanzanian 
student that had upset the community.89 A similar incident in the Soviet Union had 
sparked a demonstration of African students on Moscow’s Red Square against wide-
spread racism seventeen years earlier in 1963.90 In this case, the death – suicide 
according to the official version, just like in the 1963 incident – did not lead to open 
protests. This was probably not only due to the stifling of doubting enquiries, but 
also because living conditions were significantly better and discrimination not ex-
perienced as threatening as in the early 1960s Soviet Union. In the GDR, too, con-
ditions seem to have been harsher in the 1960s. In 1968, the Committee of African 
Students and Workers in the GDR sent a letter to GDR authorities in which it ex-
pressed serious criticism of wide-spread feelings of racial superiority in the popu-
lation, leading repeatedly to provocations, brawls and physical assaults of groups 
                                                 
 87 Interview #92, Tanzanian student in the GDR. 
 88 Interview #43, Tanzanian student in the GDR (graduate) and FRG (PhD). 
 89 Interview #65, Tanzanian student in the GDR. The death is documented in UAL, DIB 346, Bl. 50. 
 90 Hessler (2006). 
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against individual students.91 As Julie Hessler pointed out for the case of the Soviet 
Union, African students who felt and observed racism as part and parcel of their host 
society seriously challenged the orthodoxy of authorities which held that discrimi-
nation and violence was not part of real socialism, but only an aberration brought 
about by individual hooligans.92 That also applied to the situation of African students 
in the GDR, who mentioned in their letter that salespersons, taxi drivers, waiters, 
conductors and post office employees were the groups with which there were the 
largest tensions.93 As counter-measures, the authors proposed an improved intro-
duction to German culture for new arrivals, meetings with GDR authorities and 
citizens to settle salient issues and several measures to educate East Germans about 
contemporary life-realities in Africa, since movies usually only showed the barbarities 
of colonialism and not the bustling contemporary life at the universities of Nigeria 
and Ghana.94 
Kuruka ukuta – Transnational strategies of capital accumulation 
Like any border, the Iron Curtain, too, was selectively permeable, and Tanzanians 
(unlike some Africans whose governments told GDR authorities to restrict mobility) 
were in principle free to travel to countries on both sides of the Wall. Most were 
drawn westwards. GDR authorities could not keep Tanzanian students from going to 
West Berlin to visit friends and relatives, go jobbing and shopping. Some went re-
gularly to earn money in car factories and slaughter houses, perform housekeeping 
work in private homes or pursue other occasional jobs. While West Berlin was the 
most convenient destination in terms of border-crossing, two interviewees stated 
that they had left the GDR for as far as Sweden to make some cash during their 
summer vacations. Others also stayed in the GDR to work there during holidays. The 
crucial door-opener for ventures beyond the Wall was, as several interviewees 
                                                 
 91 UAL, R 0280, Bd. 5, Schreiben des Komitees der afrikanischen Studenten und Arbeiter in der DDR, ohne Datum 
[1967/68], Bl. 86-90; the letter of complaint was addressed to the leading organs of the GDR. 
 92 Hessler (2006), 37-38, 56-57. 
 93 UAL, R 0280, Bd. 5, Schreiben des Komitees der afrikanischen Studenten und Arbeiter in der DDR, ohne Datum 
[1967/68], Bl. 86-90 
 94 UAL, R 0280, Bd. 5, Schreiben des Komitees der afrikanischen Studenten und Arbeiter in der DDR, ohne Datum 
[1967/68], Bl. 90 
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emphasised,95 having a contact person at hand: an uncle in Sweden who could send 
some US dollars to make the journey, a friend in West Berlin who could borrow the 
ID that was needed to work in the factory or an old, friendly German lady offering 
both work and accommodation.  
Students without a social network extending beyond the Wall did rarely go 
West, possibly also influenced by repeated calls of GDR authorities to abstain from 
doing so. A Zanzibari unionist who had gone to the GDR in 1961 to pursue a 2-year-
course in trade unionism remembered how “trapped” he felt when he and other 
course participants from Africa, Asia and Latin America were warned in the opening 
session: “Whoever goes to West Berlin is an enemy.”96 Even in later years, students 
had to direct a request to the responsible department of the university to be allowed 
to leave and get a visa, stating the reason for the journey. Since 1978, the authorities 
collected statistics about these requests. On the list of students from African coun-
tries at the Karl Marx University of Leipzig, Tanzanians ranked first with 34 requests 
for a trip to West Berlin and 11 requests for a trip to the “capitalist foreign countries” 
(kapitalistisches Ausland) in 1977/78.97 With 28 Tanzanian students enrolled, this 
meant that the travelling activity exceeded the GDR’s limit of tolerance of one visa 
per person per year and that measures had to be taken, including personal con-
versations and more involvement in state-sanctioned extra-curricular activities and 
excursions.98 Reasons most frequently given for journeys to West Berlin were visiting 
compatriot friends and relatives, shopping of goods “ostensibly” not available in the 
GDR’s foreign currency-based shops offering exclusive goods (Intershop)99, running 
errands (e.g. concerning passports or luggage) and settling financial matters (cashing 
cheques, withdrawing money).100 
Trying to maintain at least some kind of relationship with the students in 
Eastern Europe, the Tanzanian government also sacrificed some of its meagre foreign 
                                                 
 95 Traces of these activities can also be found in the archives; see, for instance, UAL, StuA 116549, Dr. jur. P. Terzo-
poulos, Einschätzung des Studenten Oscar G. C., 5 January 1968, Bl. 7. 
 96 Shafi (2013), 471; to ensure that all participants would understand, the warning was written on a board in 
German, English and French. 
 97 UAL, DIB 259, Statistik zu Visaanträgen, 6 November 1978, Bl. 25. 
 98 UAL, DIB 259, Analyse über Feriengestaltung ausländischer Studierender der KMU 1978, Leipzig, 16 November 
1978, Bl. 63-65. 
 99 For GDR Intershops and official GDR strategies to attract foreign exchange see Judt (2013). 
 100 UAL, DIB 259, Analyse über Feriengestaltung ausländischer Studierender der KMU 1978, Leipzig, 16 November 
1978, Bl. 63. 
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exchange reserves to pay a small once-per-year-allowanc of US$ 150101 channelled 
through the Tanzanian embassy in Moscow to the scholarship holders. Recipients 
called this annual payment Ahsante Nyerere (Thank you Nyerere). The hard currency 
which students received from their embassy or earned in Western countries gave 
them access to prestigious luxury goods that were out of reach for the majority of 
the East German population: jeans, hi-fi systems and records, whiskey and cigarettes 
of a kind not available in the GDR. Some students also sent care packages to their 
relatives in Tanzania where the economy had collapsed in the late 1970s and even 
basic commodities like soap and tooth paste were scarce. Sending remittances was, 
according to one respondent, mostly done by students in West Germany who re-
ceived larger stipends and had more opportunities to earn additional income.102 
Journeys from the GDR to other Eastern countries were less popular and mostly 
realised through the party-affiliated youth organisation or university programmes 
and thus had an official or semi-official character. Few were interested in going there, 
knowing that East Germany was still having the highest standard of living in the 
Eastern Bloc, and those that went came back with confirmed expectations.103 West-
East journeys also occurred, although it was mostly Tanzanians studying in West 
Berlin who would use that opportunity.104 Compared to the multi-purpose journeys 
of their fellow students living in the East, GDR-bound tours were usually confined to 
private visits and occasional shopping, taking advantage of cheap prices of consumer 
goods.  
Through everyday life, industrial placements and small jobs, Tanzanian stu-
dents received deep insights into the actual workings of capitalism and socialism in 
the German states. They were able to compare what they had heard in class with 
reality, and confronted teachers in Marxism-Leninism with their observations.105 
Those who did not cross the Iron Curtain might still come to the conclusion that many 
fellow East or West German students and even some teachers at university were in 
                                                 
 101 TNA, Acc. 597, FA/E160/11 (Part C), Malipo ya posho 1979/80 – Wanafunzi wote wasomao G.D.R. toka Tanzania; 
the document lists 1,200 Tanzanian Shillings for every student, equal to US$ 150 at the contemporary ex-
change rate. 
 102 Interview #76, Tanzanian student in GDR (graduate) and FRG (postgraduate). 
 103 Interview #47, Tanzanian student in GDR, Interview #104, Tanzanian student in GDR. 
 104 Others felt repelled by the menacing atmosphere at the border (Interview #41, Tanzanian PhD student in the 
FRG) or were discouraged by their supervisors (Interview #1, Tanzanian PhD student in the FRG). 
 105 Interview #75, Tanzanian student in GDR (graduate) and FRG (PhD). 
124 African Manpower Development During the Cold War 
fact “against the system”.106 Students had access to the unofficial scripts of socialism 
and social democracy and their experiences made them particularly sensitive for the 
shortcomings of the societal orders. The meaning of these experiences and trans-
national exchanges went far beyond material aspects. They spoke to wider topo-
graphies of ideology in the global Cold War. The material flows were, however, the 
most tangible ones, and they influenced decisions a great deal, as one interviewee 
remembered. Together with other Tanzanians, he had finished the course and  
“we were then ready to go back to Tanzania, but we applied for a [postgraduate] 
course [in West Berlin]. You know, I wanted to continue right away with PhD. 
Some of the students were able to do that. […] Nobody wanted to stay in East 
Germany for some further training there because we thought we will go back 
much poorer than those who are studying in West Germany. Yes. We got a bit 
more money and bought a car.”107 
In the 1970s and 1980s, when Tanzanian import regulations were extremely 
strict, students returning from overseas were still keen on transferring as many assets 
as possible to Tanzania. They imported, sometimes illegally, refrigerators, cars108, 
music systems, gas cookers, tools and later also computers, using the money they 
had earned in the jobs mentioned above or also through the omnipresent black 
market economy. Cars and fridges were used to run small businesses and were thus 
valuable assets to complement meagre salaries with an additional income.109 West 
German currency could also be sold with wide profit margins on the Tanzanian black 
market in the 1980s.110 Many interviewees admitted having traded or smuggled 
goods and currencies between East and West in small quantities, and mentioned 
that they knew others who were more diligent in these commercial activities. A 
group of four Tanzanians leaving the GDR in 1988 (when customs regulations in 
Tanzania had relaxed) was spectacularly successful not only in saving up money, but 
also in converting good relations with a church community into material gains: they 
                                                 
 106 Interview #75, Tanzanian student in GDR (graduate) and FRG (PhD). 
 107 Interview #63, Tanzanian student in GDR (graduate) and FRG (PhD). 
 108 Concerning the drastically reduced import of cars to Tanzania in the course of the 1970s, see Biersteker (1980), 
241-243. Some interviewees were able to take several cars from West Germany to Tanzania, while others 
mentioned that they would have liked to do so, but could not because of regulations. 
 109 Tripp (1997). 
 110 Apart from interviews, this is also mentioned in BStU, MfS, HA II/28716, Hauptmann Wessler, Information vom 
30.4.1985, Magdeburg, 2 May 1985, Bl. 74. 
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shipped to Tanzania electric and household devices valuing over 20,000 Mark, partly 
financed through donations from benevolent church community members.111  
Other students, PhD students especially, tended to focus on academic achieve-
ment and put less energy into economic ventures. In fact, very few really had the 
necessity to do so: Tanzanian students coming through institutional arrangements 
received monthly stipends exceeding those of their fellow East and West German 
students. Tanzanians who had come to West Germany equipped with scholarships 
also enjoyed better conditions compared to the majority of other students from 
Latin America, Asia and Africa. Only one in five students from the global South re-
ceived official support, and with diminishing job opportunities in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, many fell into poverty.112 In economic terms, Tanzanian students could 
thus rightly consider themselves as privileged, and some indeed did, also mentioning 
that these privileges were not always well-taken by members of the local population 
in the GDR.113 
In the 1960s, there seem to have been many foreign students who decided to 
leave East European countries, particularly the Soviet Union, before they had ended 
their studies, escaping for academic reasons or because of experiences of racism.114 
Another type of East-West-migration was pursued after the main objective of the 
educational visit, as seen from the state’s perspective, had been achieved. Graduates 
from GDR universities went to West Germany to continue with PhD studies or post-
graduate courses targeting students from the global South, as mentioned in the quote 
above. Information about these courses spread in students’ word-of-mouth networks. 
Others simply wanted to earn additional money before returning to Tanzania where 
adequate employment, income opportunities and the next possibility to go abroad 
were all uncertain. Commonly, motives of pursuing higher degrees and accumulating 
                                                 
 111 BA Berlin Lichterfelde, DQ 4/5432, Eingabe des Superintendenten des Kreiskirchenrates des Ev. Kirchenkreise 
Halle (Saale) an das Afro-Asiatische Solidaritätskomitee DDR, Halle (Saale), 8 November 1988; BA Berlin 
Lichterfelde, DQ 4/5432, Stv. des Ministers für Außenhandel der DDR Gädt an Ministerium für Elektrotechnik 
und Elektronik, 8 June 1988; the share of the donations was 4,000 Mark for the purchase of the goods and 
another 4,000 Mark available for shipping. 
 112 BA Koblenz, B 138/34578, Rainer Henseleit, Die Rolle der deutschen Hochschulen im Nord-Süd-Dialog, November 
1978, p. 40; BA Koblenz, B 138/34583, Anton Pfeifer (BMZ) an Bundestagsmitglied Helge Schmedt, Bonn, 29 
March 1984. 
 113 Interview #65, Tanzanian student in the GDR; Interview #104, Tanzanian student in the GDR. Confer also the 
autobiographical writing of the Rwandan student Nsekuye Bizimana; Bizimana (1989), 93. 
 114 Mac Con Uladh (2005), 180-181. 
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more money were intertwined with each other.115 Decisions to stay or go were, of 
course, also significantly influenced by love relationships, especially when they led to 
marriages and the birth of children. Tanzanians with the necessary contacts “jumped 
over the wall” (kuruka ukuta), as one interviewee expressed it116, to further pursue 
economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital. Students already in West Germany 
simply extended their stay, sometimes even asked to do so by their supervisors.117 
Several stayed six, eight or even twelve years in the FRG, even PhD students. That is a 
striking difference to the four to six years that were usual in the GDR,118 although in 
many cases one needs to add the time they spent in West Germany afterwards. 
Some students applied for a scholarship from West German institutions while 
they were still in the GDR, though this seems to have been unsuccessful if they had 
no additional contacts and no backing from Tanzanian state authorities.119 Postgra-
duate courses specifically targeting Third World students and development workers, 
like the Seminar für Landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung (Seminar for Agricultural De-
velopment) at the Technical University of Berlin or the trainee programme at the 
Technical University of Clausthal, included visits to Tanzania and thus enabled the 
participants to knit new professional bonds. Credentials from a Western state were 
particularly sought by those who hoped for employment in Tanzanian enterprises.120  
Risks of return and mobility 
No matter if one had studied abroad or in Tanzania, it was still the state’s prior claim 
to allocate university graduates who had received official scholarships. Several inter-
viewees remembered that upon return, they reported to the respective ministry 
which then allocated them to certain positions. Of course, contacts were instrumental 
in influencing these processes: Three students returning from a postgraduate course 
                                                 
 115 Interview # 63, Tanzanian student in the GDR (graduate) and FRG (PhD). 
 116 Interview #40, Tanzanian PhD student in FRG. 
 117 According to a survey from the 1980s, only 17% of all students from “developing countries” in West Germany 
intended to return directly after graduation; Schmidt-Streckenbach (1987). 
 118 UAL, DIB 346, Liste der Absolventen der Karl-Marx-Universität aus Tansania, 25 March 1974, Bl. 143-150; medi-
cine students needed more time. 
 119 DAAD Archives, B212/91392, DAAD an BRD-Botschaft Dar es Salaam, ohne Ort, 7 June 1979; DAAD Archives, 
B 212/91395/4, A.A.A. an DAAD, Magdeburg, 2.5.1989; some were still able to continue directly; Interview #64, 
Tanzanian student in the GDR (graduate) and FRG (PhD) 
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in Berlin managed to be sent to a development project supported by West Germany, 
as the project leader and other expatriate development workers had also taken the 
same course.121 Academic staff and project counterparts returned, usually, to their 
earlier employer, as their stay had been part of staff qualification schemes.  
It is striking that Tanzanians who have studied in the two German states have 
in large part returned, especially if compared to those in the U.S. or the UK.122 Despite 
economic hardships, Tanzania has always been a politically stable country, which 
cannot be said of many other states in Africa. The wish to put one’s knowledge to 
work and help Tanzania were also cited as reasons for the decision to return, echoing 
discourses of moral responsibility that were shared between Ujamaa, Western 
development aid discourses and state-socialist practices of solidarity. Restrictive legal 
frameworks of the two German states also played a role, as did experiences of dis-
crimination and feelings of not belonging. Three interviewees (both GDR and FRG) 
said that they had received job offers, but felt it impossible to stay in Germany be-
cause of rampant racism and physical violence (one respondent told that he was 
almost killed during a skinhead assault in his own apartment). They referred to the 
years between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. 
In a few cases, graduates returning from the GDR were able to pursue a PhD in 
West Germany after having worked a few years in Tanzania. Language skills, estab-
lished contacts, full recognition of degrees and less competition as compared to the 
Anglophone world facilitated a second long-term stay. Noteworthy is that a couple 
of students returned to the GDR to obtain their PhD, sometimes after more than 10 
or 15 years of absence and – in the case of one returnee – postgraduate courses in 
India, Ireland, Italy, the U.S. and Belgium.123 One reason for these candidates to leave 
Tanzania and (re-)turn to East Germany once more might well be the age restriction 
for scholarships in Western countries. This regulation hit Tanzanians in particular 
because of the duty to attend National Service and, after the Musoma Resolution, 
have work experience before being selected for university.124 The fact that their 
                                                 
 121 Interview #63, Tanzanian student in GDR (graduate) and FRG (PhD). 
 122 This impression is based on numbers of returnees given in the manpower reports as well as information from 
interviewees. 
 123 UAL, Grad A 0068, Application, Bl. 8. 
 124 Until 1986, the DAAD accepted to support PhD programmes only for persons with a maximum age of 32 years. 
Of 81 applications for DAAD scholarships between 1976 and 1989, 41 were refused – 19 (or 46%) of which 
because the candidate was deemed to be too old (own calculations using correspondence from BA Koblenz, B 
212; DAAD Archive, B 212; there were more applications in total, but not for all correspondences available). 
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qualification was fully recognised in the GDR, but not in other states also played a 
role.125 Ideological sympathies might have played a role, but even when they did, they 
did not determine agency after return. A case in point is Lucian Msambichaka who 
had obtained both his first degree and PhD in the GDR and became, in the beginning 
of the 1980s, one among a small group of influential economists advocating for 
liberalisation of the economy.  
But reintegration into the contested and transforming institutional landscapes 
of Tanzania was often a delicate matter, far from the technocratic allocation of 
human capital. In 1968, Member of Parliament Stephen Mhando complained that 
Eastern bloc returnees were treated with “hostility from Western-educated senior 
civil servants” who would “only recognise British qualifications when employing the 
youths.” He cited the example of two doctors returning from the GDR who were 
being “kicked around” by senior officials in the Ministry of Health and Housing, 
“questioned about their Marxist-Leninist political indoctrination, and initially told that 
their academic qualifications were not recognised.”126 In 1970, all Zanzibari doctors 
who had studied in the Soviet Union were required by Zanzibar’s Minister of Health 
Ali Sultan Issa to declare that their qualification was insufficient to practice and that 
they resign from their posts. They did resign, but refused to let their qualification be 
devalued. Ali Sultan Issa forbade them to leave the island and made a secondary 
school leaver the new head of Zanzibar’s Lenin Hospital.127  
In the second example, it was the competition between rivalling kinds of 
socialism which was responsible for the devaluation of their qualification: Zanzibar 
increasingly relied on Chinese assistance in the health sector, and Chinese pressure 
demanded that obnoxious elements were ousted from influential positions.128 In the 
first example, the dividing line runs between administrators who were silent pro-
ponents of a “technocratic” ideology of Western style and adherents of Soviet-style 
communism. In both examples, the returnees from the Eastern Bloc had to bear the 
brunt of these divisions. Even in later years, when the system conflict had cooled 
down, holders of East European degrees and PhDs were often regarded with sus-
                                                 
 125 Only in 1982 was East Germany able to talk Tanzania into signing a treaty in which the value of academic grades 
was put on record; BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, DC 20/5425a, Vfg. Nr. 185/82 vom 21.10.1982. 
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picion129 and viewed as “not marketable”.130 In many cases, they had to struggle to 
find adequate positions. Apart from some political sympathies in party union and 
circles, there was little additional value seen in experiences within state-socialism in 
the GDR, although East German degree and PhD holders were still in the best position 
if compared to other returnees from other COMECON countries. As a Tanzanian 
who obtained his PhD in the GDR remembered, the ideological trench-fighting was 
quite moderate in comparison to other countries like Kenya because of Ujamaa: 
“It depended on where you came from. If you came from Kenya and you went to 
the Eastern Bloc instead of going to Western Bloc you would be looked down 
[upon] but if you came from Tanzania which was Ujamaa oriented […]. I will tell 
you that so many big people went to the East to study. […] And what people 
actually try to find out was what you offer in the classroom, but there was also 
this material view in the sense that if you went to the Western Bloc you were 
likely to come back with a good car or something like that but if you came from 
the east […] you didn't get a chance to work like those who went to the West, 
were they would work and find jobs work and get those cars, so there was that 
difference.”131 
Studying abroad was about more than just about education and also about 
more than just ideological conflicts, it was deeply embedded into material inequalities 
and possibilities to make use of them. The prestige of GDR degrees, certificates and 
PhDs was substantially reduced in Tanzania, unless they were bolstered up by some 
Western credentials.  
Conclusion 
The joke quoted in the introduction of this text could also be taken as a riddle. How 
could it possibly be that Tanzanian students sent to communist countries returned 
as capitalists, and vice versa? The argument was that this question had to be ans-
wered by including the invisible third party, the sending country, and by opening the 
analytical focus for transnational practices which undercut the Cold War binaries of 
East vs. West.  
                                                 
 129 Interviewees who had studied in Western countries cited examples of “political doctorates” which were finalised 
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 130 Interview #75, Tanzanian student in the GDR (graduate) and FRG (PhD). 
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As Quinn Slobodian noted referring to 1960s West Germany, “Third World stu-
dents studying abroad arguably felt the pressures of an economic-utilitarian approach 
to education more acutely than any others. They were also the first to resist against 
it by acting publicly as both students and political actors, in the face of vigorous 
state attempts to silence them.“132 Tanzanians, especially the ones leaving for a first 
degree, doubtlessly also felt these pressures, as the Tanzanian state decided about 
their destination and also allocated graduates to jobs. This power ceded beyond Tan-
zania’s borders. On top of that, political activity pitted against state authorities was 
not the only way of subverting managerial state perspectives. The empirical material 
presented suggests that for students in East Germany, opposition against state au-
thorities was not inexistent, but stifled. Nevertheless, they employed transnational 
strategies to enhance their social, cultural, symbolic and economic capital, strategies 
which were more tolerated than accepted by authorities, and definitely not initiated 
from above. 
As a result of the return to Tanzania, some kinds of capital were devalued, 
while others could be converted or used in another instance of mobility for the sake 
of education and economic gains. Access to Western contacts, currency, goods and 
qualifications was particularly valuable. Some students in the Eastern Bloc might 
indeed have become entrepreneurs under the particular circumstances of a commu-
nism which was unable to fully de-link itself from the capitalist world system,133 
while Tanzanians in West Germany might have played a role and been transformed 
in leftist student activism. Partly, however, the joke also tells something about the 
situation in Tanzania. Tanzanian students returning from communist countries had 
to de-politicise their qualifications to advance, while students returning from capitalist 
countries were well-advised to distance themselves from colonial attitudes, imperia-
lism and career-oriented individualism through some left-wing rhetoric. Whatever 
explanation provides more insight can only be determined through individual trajec-
tories and life-stories. Meanwhile, a perspective paying attention to economic aspects 
of transnational mobility and the vulnerable prestige of qualifications may help us to 
understand why students acted as they did – seeking border crossings or not, choo-
sing insubordination, adaptation or – most likely – a path that could be reduced to 
neither. 
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The Role of the United Nations in the 
Congo-Crisis: An Instrument to Enforce 
National Interests? 
Thomas Lechner 
“avant l’indépendence = après l’indépendence” – nothing expresses the important 
national interests during the Congo-Crisis in the background more, than this comment 
written on a blackboard in the Congo in July 1960 by Belgian army chief General Emile 
Janssens.1 Of which nature those significant interests were, was shown a lot earlier. 
The African continent was not in the lens of the superpowers after World War 
II. That changed when most African states were on their way to independence. In 
April 1955, at the first Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, twenty-nine third world 
leaders met to form a third bloc. The goal was not to become involved in the Cold 
War struggle of the superpowers. The participants were committed to the principles 
of the United Nations and opposed to colonialism and imperialism. Both Moscow 
and Washington were not eager to see a third bloc. While U.S. President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower did not even send an observer to this event, Moscow publicly welcomed 
the efforts of the participants not to become part of the western bloc. Although there 
was no U.S. involvement, the United States did not turn a blind eye to the actions 
taking place on the African continent. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles reported to the administration that none of the soon independent African 
states were ready for self-government by the time of independence and thus could 
be a favoured Soviet target. Dulles tried to convince third world leaders that the 
African “neutralism” would benefit the Soviet Union.2 Seen from this angle, the U.S. 
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saw the Bandung conference as a drift of the participating states toward the Left. 
Krushchev, although officially welcoming it, worried that too much independent inter-
national organising among Third World leaders could make it more difficult to gain 
influence.3 In one school of thought, the U.S. foreign policy was not only determined 
by the political and strategic Cold War struggle but also characterised by American 
capitalism. A detailed knowledge of its expanding economic role helps to understand 
U.S. involvement around the world.4 The U.S.-Africa policy was first written down in 
the position paper of the National Security Council NSC5719/1 in July 1957. The Natio-
nal Security Council agreed that the African continent was going to have an increa-
singly important influence on the course of world events and depended on Europe 
as a source of imports from undeveloped countries and as the major supplier of 
private and public investments. On the other hand, the U.S. estimated that Europe 
needed the African market, as well as Africa’s minerals and agricultural products. 
Therefore the U.S. saw it as desirable that the European powers and Africa kept their 
economic relationship on-going after the colonial period had ended. The American 
economic interest in Africa at that time was not comparable with other areas, being 
about $500 million in investments. The continent was a source of strategic materials 
such as asbestos, cobalt, columbite, corundum, industrial diamonds, tantalum ore, 
palm kernel oil, chemical chromite, and uranium. Besides these materials, the stra-
tegic value of Africa was the area’s geographic location as air and sea route to the Far 
East. Therefore the primary strategic interest of the U.S. was to prevent Communist 
control over the area. The National Security Council suggested bringing American 
influence to bear by acting through the United Nations and to seek to influence any 
consideration in the UN along constructive lines. In the National Security Council’s 
opinion a premature independence would have been as harmful to our interests in 
Africa as would be a continuation of nineteenth-century colonialism. Therefore the 
U.S. policy towards Africa should be tailored to the capabilities and needs of each 
particular area. Confronting Soviet offers to African states, alternatives should be 
provided, but a direct competition with the Soviet offer should be avoided. In the face 
of the upcoming independence of African States the impression should be avoided 
that the United States were prepared to underwrite their eventual independence in 
order to avoid claims from areas that had not been independent by then. In the case 
of the Congo, the Belgians appeared to be “in the best position to continue the eco-
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nomic development of their dependent area, the Congo – a rich area in its own 
right.”5 To achieve their own goals the United States pursued a dual policy with anti-
colonialism on the one hand and support for the colonial elites on the other. Gerhart 
Niemeyer of the State Department’s policy planning staff noted: 
“Our policy should be based on the general premise of the right to self-deter-
mination […]. Obviously, so long as the present world tensions prevail, our natio-
nal interest is closely bound to precisely those countries which still to [a] greater 
or lesser degree carry the stigma of colonial imperialism. When these tensions 
safely subside, other considerations will become valid”.6 
The Belgians pursued their own goals in the Congo and tried to isolate it since 
the beginning of their trusteeship. Likewise neither the United States nor the Soviet 
Union should become too deeply involved in the Congo. Therefore the Belgians limi-
ted the communist representation in the Congo and just allowed a single Czecho-
slovakian consulate and thwarted direct U.S. contacts with the Congolese as long as 
their trusteeship remained. Due to American economic interests in the Congo the U.S. 
tried to intensify their contacts with the Congolese, and John Foster Dulles warned 
the Belgian foreign minister Pierre Wigny about failing in the Congo and opening it 
to Communism.7 
For the Soviet Union, Africa was not interesting until the death of Stalin in 
1955. This changed with Stalin’s successor Nikita Krushchev, who saw the African 
continent as a great opportunity to spread communist ideas and to gain influence. 
Krushchev had an active interest in foreign affairs. In the background, Krushchev was 
involved in all the major Soviet foreign policy decisions and put his personal stamp, 
as Stalin before, on the Soviet foreign policy. The new Soviet foreign policy can be 
described as peaceful coexistence with a certain competition between socialism and 
capitalism. The neutral and non-aligned movement of newly independent African 
states aroused his interest. He thought that a major war between the superpowers 
could be avoided and there would be a worldwide transition to socialism. The Soviet 
Union supported this desired transition with diplomatic support for the Bandung 
movement of Non-Aligned states, as well as economic and military aid to newly inde-
pendent states.8 Furthermore, Moscow realised that Africa became more important 
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to the U.S. because, among others, Vice President Richard Nixon made a trip to Ghana 
to advertise independence in 1957 and the American costs for propaganda in Africa 
increased by US$ 500.000 to US$ 5.884.000.9 The Soviet response to this was the plan 
to open Soviet departments in Africa, collect information about hostile propaganda, 
create Soviet propaganda for Africa, and send delegations to African states.10 Espe-
cially for newly independent states, the Soviet propaganda was very tempting. The 
Russian Red October revolution inspired a lot of people who were dreaming of getting 
out of colonial oppression.11 
Not only had the different political propaganda expressed the new foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union, but the Soviet economic interests also changed in 1959. 
The principle of all economic relations to third world countries should be charac-
terised by friendly foreign policy. The Soviet Union wanted to assist the newly inde-
pendent states with technical and economic support. Third world building projects 
should be financed with Soviet credits and accomplished by Soviet workers to show 
to the receiving states that the Soviet Union would help them out of humanitarian 
reasons and that the western aid was just used for capitalist interests.12 The costs of 
this new Soviet-African economic program did outweigh benefits by far. Even Krush-
chev acknowledged this fact. The Soviet Union also fought imperialism and capitalism 
by criticizing it at the UN Trusteeship Council but was itself criticised for its aid of sen-
ding snow ploughs to Guinea. The Soviet Union knew far too little, hence Krushchev 
sent representatives to Africa to learn more about the continent. In Moscow an Africa 
Institute was created in 1959 with Ivan Potekhin as its director. Potekhin was one of 
the few Soviet Africanists who also met Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, and 
Ahmed Sekou Toure himself.13 So both superpowers had generated special interests, 
political, economic and strategic, for the African continent which until 1960 had 
nearly been a blank area on the political landscape. All those interests collided in 
the Congo right after independence when riots broke out and the United Nations 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold tried to calm down the situation. 
The Congo Crisis was not predicted by the Western powers, which is perhaps 
the reason why no plans to secure the mineral wealth of the Congo existed. However, 
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the problems were not unpredictable at all. In January 1960 the Belgian government 
called for a Round Table Conference in Brussels with all Congolese parties. Patrice 
Lumumba, the imminent Prime Minister of the Congo, at that time was still in prison 
for inciting a riot, and so the Belgians believed that they could create a centralised 
Congolese government without Lumumba. Yet the Congolese party Mouvement 
National Congolais (MNC) refused to attend the conference without Lumumba. The 
Belgian government yielded to the political pressure and flew Lumumba to Brussels. 
The conference participants agreed to hold national elections in May 1960 and the 
independence date was set for June 30.14 
The Belgians thought that the Congolese would accept a kind of continued 
guardianship and wanted to stay in control of defence, finance, and foreign affairs. 
All representatives of the Congolese parties declined that suggestion but for a man 
named Moise Tshombe. When the conference ended, the Congolese had achieved 
everything with one big exception – the economic questions. Although the Belgians 
succumbed in those official talks, they believed that they could somehow keep con-
trol of the Congo.15 At least the Belgians could convince the Congolese representa-
tives to guarantee that the new Belgian government would respect Belgian property 
in the Congo.16 At the time of the Round Table Conference in Brussels, no conference 
participant could guess how the upcoming elections were going to end. Nobody could 
forecast the overwhelming victory of the MNC and Lumumba, and this result was the 
least desirable for the Belgian government, because the MNC included the strongest 
and most feared nationalists, especially Patrice Lumumba. On 30 June 1960 the new 
government took office with Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister and Joseph Kasa-
vubu as President. Furthermore, Lumumba appointed Joseph Mobutu to the position 
of Secretary of State for Defence.17 
High representatives from around the world travelled to the independence 
ceremony in Leopoldville to witness the beginning of Congolese self-government. 
Guests to this event included former U.S. Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy 
and U.S. ambassador-to-be Clare Timberlake. The Soviet delegation was headed by 
Mirzo R. Rakhmatov, Vice President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The UN 
was represented by Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche. These guests proved the impor-
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tance which the United States and the Soviet Union attached to Congo’s indepen-
dence. Belgian King Baudouin held a badly prepared speech, in which he praised the 
Belgians as liberators from Arab slavery and warned the Congolese not to be at-
tracted by foreign powers and to undermine the positive development of the Congo 
during the last eighty years as Belgium’s colony. The new President Joseph Kasavubu 
ignored the speech of Baudouin, thanked the Belgians and promised a future partner-
ship with Belgium. The next speaker was Patrice Lumumba although not scheduled 
to speak.18 Quite contrary to Baudouin’s description of the 80 years of colonial rule, 
Lumumba said: 
“Our lot was eighty years of colonial rule. We have known sarcasm and insults, 
endured blows morning, noon and night because we were niggers [...].”19 
All guests could see that the Belgians and Congolese shared a different opinion 
and that the Congolese would not continue a friendly partnership with Belgium. Ro-
bert Murphy even remembered the veins on King Baudouin’s forehead standing out 
while Lumumba was speaking. Murphy immediately sent the message: “if we are not 
here soon with enough aid the Communists will be”, to Washington.20 
The written records of U.S. Chief of Station in the Congo Larry Devlin show that 
this estimate was correct: 
“During July and August 1960, several hundred Soviet personnel entered the 
Congo. […] There were also a number of twin-engine Russian Il-14 cargo/ 
passenger planes based at Ndjili and at the airport in Stanleyville, the up-river 
capital of Orientale province. Each plane had two or three crews as well as me-
chanics, interpreters, and other personnel. The aircraft carried cargo that had 
come from larger Russian planes. Some of it was in boxes marked with a Red 
Cross symbol, but the boxes seemed remarkably similar to small arms and 
ammunition boxes. … Some years later, we found some of those boxes with Red 
Cross symbols still unopened … The boxes contained rifles, machine-guns, and 
ammunition.”21 
Right after independence the Soviet Union flew personnel and cargo into the 
Congo and the U.S. also immediately strengthened its position in the Congo by in-
creasing the personnel of the CIA. Even the Belgians had not considered leaving the 
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Congo and stayed without abandoning their colonial privileges. Therefore and be-
cause the ranks and wages of the Congolese soldiers were not raised, a mutiny within 
the Congolese army erupted just some days after independence when General Emile 
Janssens wrote his infamous comment on the blackboard. They committed acts of 
violence against Europeans and the remaining Belgian soldiers intervened to restore 
order. Yet because of a far too brutal course of action, the Belgian involvement just 
enforced the riots and led to strikes by civilian workers. The new government could 
not do anything to calm the situation and because of this defencelessness Moise 
Tshombe, meanwhile the President of the government of the province of Katanga, 
seized the moment to declare Katanga’s secession, which was immediately supported 
by the remaining Belgian citizens, Belgian companies, and even by the Belgian govern-
ment. Katanga was important for the Belgians because it brought 45% of the Congo’s 
public revenues. The Congolese government therefore sent a telegram to Washington 
to ask for help to restore public order. The U.S. declined and referred them to the 
United Nations,22 which since its foundation, was thought of as an extension of its 
own power. That US-UN-policy appeared in the Korean War, where U.S. soldiers 
fought under a UN mandate against Chinese and Korean communist forces.23 After 
the U.S. had declined, the Congolese government informed the UN that the Congo 
was occupied by the Belgian military. The Congolese did not only ask the UN for 
help, but also the Soviet Union and Ghana. In the meantime the Sudan and Liberia 
offered military support too. The Secretary General of the United Nations Dag 
Hammarskjold pressed for intervention in the UN Security Council, because in his 
opinion international peace was threatened.24 Also the superpowers signalled that 
they would work through the United Nations or at least would not hinder UN in-
volvement. Resolution 143 (1960), which was adopted by the UN Security Council 
on July 14, called upon the Belgian government to withdraw its troops from the 
territory of the Republic of the Congo and authorised the Secretary General to take 
all necessary steps to provide the Congolese government “with such military assis-
tance as might be necessary until the national security forces are/were able to meet 
fully their tasks, which meant to gain control of the Congo again.”25 The UN Operation 
in the Congo (ONUC) was born. 
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Afterwards Larry Devlin revealed why the Soviet Union, in his opinion, was de-
termined to intervene in the Congo. He stated that in case the Soviet Union took 
control of the Congo, they used the state as a base to infiltrate the nine countries 
around. This would have been an extraordinary power base in Africa. As a side effect 
they would have gained control over the raw materials and minerals of the Congo, 
especially cobalt, which is used in missiles and other weapon systems. Furthermore, 
they would have increased their influence both in the third world and within the UN. 
He thought that the Soviet Union’s long-term objective was to outflank NATO.26 
In summary, every actor had its own interest in the Congo at the time the UN 
became involved. The Soviet Union wanted to gain influence with propaganda and 
economic relations, the U.S. wanted to keep the Soviet Union out and save its own 
mineral imports, the Belgians wanted to stay close to the Congo’s mineral wealth and 
the Congolese wanted sovereignty and independence. How those interests influenced 
the behaviour of all conflict parties and the role of the UN during the Congo Crisis 
can be seen in the following events, which took place prior to the assassination of 
Patrice Lumumba. 
Although the U.S. approved resolution 143, they did not criticise the Belgians, 
who had not implemented it. The United States ambassador to the United Nations, 
Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., interpreted the resolution as not requiring the Belgians to 
leave the Congo, instead viewing their presence there as mandated by the UN. On the 
contrary, the U.S. ambassador in the Congo, Clare Hayes Timberlake, warned of a 
Belgian withdrawal.27 
Also the Soviet Union approved resolution 143 but demanded, in addition to 
the Belgian withdrawal afterwards, the restriction of the UN mandate to African UN 
forces. However, the U.S. threatened to use their right of veto. When Patrice Lu-
mumba gave an ultimatum to Ralph Bunche, deputy of Dag Hammarskjold, in which 
he demanded that the UN should throw the Belgians out of the Congo by force lest 
he would turn to the Soviet Union, he was believed to be irrational by the U.S. and 
the UN. At the end of July there were already 11,000 UN soldiers in the Congo, but 
ONUC still operated without a formal agreement with the Congolese government. 
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In mid-July the U.S. decided to move on without Lumumba, in order to not risk the 
secession of Katanga, because the Congo would have been susceptible to Soviet aid.28 
The Belgian government withdrew its troops until August 7 from every Congo-
lese province with the exception of Katanga, which highlights the enormous signify-
cance of Katanga and its mineral wealth to Belgium. The Belgian government not only 
resisted the U.S. by keeping the Congo isolated until independence, but also the UN 
by remaining in Katanga even though the Security Council ordered a withdrawal. As a 
consequence of Belgian resistance, the Security Council adopted another resolution 
on August 9, which ordered yet again a withdrawal of Belgian troops especially from 
Katanga, and made clear that the UN should not act as a conflict party.29 This was 
the last time the superpowers coincided in the Security Council. Moise Tshombe 
threatened the United Nations that any UN troops entering Katanga would be 
attacked. The Belgian king and the U.S. supported Moise Tshombe’s behaviour and 
so Ralph Bunche recommended to Dag Hammarskjold to delay the intervention of 
UN troops in Katanga. The Secretary General pushed this resolution because Krush-
chev expressly demanded that the UN Security Council should approve of a military 
invasion of Katanga, even if by force. While the U.S. and Belgium tried to keep 
Katanga untouched by UN forces, the Soviet Union pressed the UN to restore the 
unity of the Congo. The Secretary General unwaveringly refused to invade Katanga 
by force and so the Security Council adopted a second request for withdrawal. 
Hammarskjold stated that a military invasion into Katanga would make the UN forces 
a political instrument. Congo’s UN representative Justin Bomboko repeated Patrice 
Lumumba’s argument in the UN that “Belgian troops systematically looted our 
garrisons while ONUC had forced the national Congolese army to lay down its 
weapons.”30 
In August 1960 the Soviet Union offered Lumumba military aid outside the UN 
and he accepted because he needed resources to reintegrate Katanga.31 
The U.S. agreed to the resolution in the UN Security Council but at the same 
time made sure that they did not annoy Moise Tshombe too much, and they pursued 
a so-called mid-way policy. The explanation for this U.S. attitude can be found in the 
                                                 
 28 Namikas (2013), 73-79. 
 29 S/RES/146 (1960). 
 30 Namikas (2013), 84-85. 
 31 Namikas (2013), 7. 
144 The Role of the United Nations in the Congo-Crisis 
financial interests of the Eisenhower-administration members in the Katanga pro-
vince. The U.S. government advisor Robert Murphy was director of Morgan Guaranty 
International, which had close relations to Belgium. William Burden, U.S. ambassador 
in Brussels, was the director of the American Metal Climax, which was supportive of 
the Katanga secession because of its interests in Congolese copper. The company of 
U.S. Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillan granted a loan of 15 millions US$ to the 
Belgian Congo in 1958. U.S. Under-Secretary of State Livingston Merchant owned a 
large amount of stock shares of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga.32 The UMHK also 
played a central role in the secession of Katanga because the rich Belgian company 
which controlled the mining in the resource-rich region supported Moise Tshombe.33 
Not only did members of the Eisenhower administration have varied interests 
in the Katanga province, but also the United States itself needed the mineral wealth 
of Katanga. The U.S. was the main customer of Congolese uranium in 1960, and it 
also imported copper and covered their demands of industrial diamonds by 80%, 
tantalum by 50% and cobalt by 75%. The main strategic value was with uranium, but 
also the geographic position caused the U.S. to enforce their influence in the Congo, 
especially in Katanga.34 The United States UN policy in 1960 was targeted at widening 
the community of the concerned and they were able to do so because the U.S. had 
a leading position within the UN. This can be seen even at the UN panels, especially 
in the so-called “Congo-Club”, which consisted, among others, of three Americans, 
namely executive assistant Andrew Cordier, UN Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche, and 
Secretary of UN-Africa Committee Heinz Wieschoff. Heinz Wieschoff did not even 
let UN Under-Secretary for Political and Security Council Affairs, the Soviet Georgij 
Arkadjev, look at the UN documents concerning the Congo, even though Arkadjev 
was Wieschoff’s boss. Those Americans were responsible for the UN Congo policy. 
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. policy towards the Congo was to have the Belgians in 
control of the Congo and since Patrice Lumumba did not stop trying to throw the 
Belgians out and threatened to accept Soviet support, he became an enemy to the 
U.S. and to the UN at the same time. Chief of Station Larry Devlin stated on August 
18 that the 
“Embassy and station believe Congo experiencing classic Communist effort take-
over government. Many forces at work here: Soviets, […] communist party, etc. 
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Although difficult determine major influencing factors to predict outcome 
struggle for power, decisive period not far off. Whether or not Lumumba ac-
tually Commie or just playing Commie game to assist his solidifying power, 
anti-west forces rapidly increasing power Congo and there may be little time left 
in which take action avoid another Cuba.”35 
This was apparently the time when the decision was made to get rid of Lu-
mumba, because he was thought to be irrational and a “Castro or worse”. Those attri-
butes were accredited to Lumumba when he flew to Washington in August 1960 to 
talk with Secretary of State Herter and Under-Secretary C. Douglas Dillon personally. 
A later declassified record of the conversation showed that it was Lumumba’s de-
termined defence of the Congo’s sovereignty that caused a problem to the U.S.36 
Krushchev tried to use the western and UN behaviour in the Congo for the 
interests of the Soviet Union to gain influence. From August 25 to 30, thirteen inde-
pendent African states met in Leopoldville to evaluate their support for ONUC. Krush-
chev sent a greeting to this conference and warned that the western imperialists 
would not only threaten the independence of the Congo, but that this was also an 
aggression against all African states. He invited all African states to form a common 
front against imperialism. The representatives at this conference were not impressed 
by the Soviet offer and tried to cajole Lumumba into cooperating with the United 
Nations. Even Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah, who also had close relations to 
the Soviet Union, made it obvious that he would not support Lumumba’s struggle 
for independence with troops, but rather the ONUC. Although Krushchev’s plan to 
create an anti-imperialist alliance did not work out as planned, he sent twenty-six 
planes and five helicopters to the Congo. Ten Ilyushin-14s flew to the Congo, the rest 
was shipped by boat. He also supplied Ghana with additional weapons to help in the 
Congo Crisis if necessary. All those actions took place outside of the United Nations, 
because in the UN Security Council every Soviet request was impeded by the U.S. 
With the support of Soviet planes Lumumba tried, after a consultation with Soviet 
ambassador Yakovlev, to conquer the provinces Kasai and Katanga in early Septem-
ber. His ambitious operation failed, however, and it was the first time that UN troops 
had to fire in self-defence.37 This was a preposterous situation, having the legally 
elected Prime Minister and his soldiers engaged in combat with UN troops. Due to 
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the tense atmosphere in the Congo and simply too much non-UN involvement in the 
Congo, Dag Hammarskjold devised the plan that the UN should take control over the 
Congo again. He wanted to run the Congo as a trusteeship, but without calling it that. 
The Soviet Union and the Congolese rejected this plan. With growing Soviet influence 
in the Congo, the U.S. enforced their efforts to put the plan into action to get rid of 
Lumumba.38 At this time the U.S. also started to plan their actions outside the UN as 
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that 
“in addition to United Nations actions, effective or otherwise, the United States 
must be prepared at any time to take appropriate military action […] to prevent 
or defeat Soviet military intervention.”39 
On September 5, Kasavubu removed Lumumba from office although he denied 
this U.S. suggestion in August. In response Lumumba dismissed Kasavubu. Lumumba 
then fled to Stanleyville, to where he also wanted to relocate the democratically 
elected government.40 Lumumba was still supported by the parliament that annulled 
both dismissals. Thus Kasavubu also dismissed the members of parliament for a 
month. During this struggle for power the UN supported Kasavubu and Andrew 
Cordier, the deputy of Dag Hammarskjold in the Congo, closed all airports so that 
Lumumba could not move his troops with the Soviet planes. UN forces also took over 
all Congolese radio stations and hindered Lumumba from talking to the Congolese 
citizens, while ensuring Kasavubu could explain his perspective of the on-going 
struggle. On September 14, the Congolese army chief Joseph Mobutu took power by 
a military coup and expelled the Soviets from the Congo. With the appointment of 
Rejeshwar Dayal as commander of the UN forces in the Congo a turnaround of UN 
Congo-policy was achieved. This was necessary because the UN was obliged to the 
legally elected government of the Congo, which de facto no longer existed. Dayal 
wanted to reposition the UN in the Congo to be absolutely neutral and tried to medi-
ate between Kasavubu and Lumumba. Due to upcoming rumours of CIA assassination 
plans, Dayal placed Lumumba under preventive detention. Dag Hammarskjold advo-
cated a reappointment of Patrice Lumumba in an emergency special session of the 
UN General Assembly from September 17 to 20, but the U.S. rejected every possible 
solution. A member of the Bureau of African Affairs of the U.S. State Department 
stated: 
                                                 
 38 Namikas (2013), 89-90. 
 39 Westad (2007), 139. 
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“We dare not accept new elections in the Congo. […] We dare not accept the 
convocation of the Parliament. […] We dare not even see Lumumba included 
in a coalition government for fear that he could come to dominate the cabinet. 
For a country that subscribes to the democratic creed, this is a remarkable pre-
dicament.”41 
Although Mobutu took power by a military coup in the Congo and Lumumba 
was in UN preventive detention, the US still feared the influence Patrice Lumumba 
could exert. From the viewpoint of the US, Mobutu was an important ally and a kind 
of guarantee that neither Lumumba nor the Soviet Union would seize power in the 
Congo. Devlin stated that Mobutu was an anti-communist, who condemned the 
Soviet propaganda.42 
As a consequence of the new UN Congo policy, the General Assembly adopted 
resolution 147 (1960) in which the UN requested all states to accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council. Furthermore the Security Council asked the con-
flicting parties to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration 
of law and order and also from any action which might undermine the unity of the 
Republic of the Congo, especially to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of 
arms or other materials of war and military personnel.43 
However, this new UN policy came too late for the Soviet Union. Since the U.S. 
and UN actions in September, the Soviet Union held the opinion that a troika would 
represent the UN better than a General Secretary. The troika should be composed of 
a member of the Eastern Bloc, a member of the Western Bloc, and a member of the 
Non-Aligned Movement. Certainly Krushchev thought that the Non-Aligned Move-
ment tended towards the Soviet Union rather than to the U.S. and the ex-colonial 
powers.44 
In the meantime the UN met problems in the Congo. After the coup Mobutu 
wanted the UN to acknowledge his new military government and end the preventive 
detention of Patrice Lumumba, but the UN commander Dayal refused. Dayal reques-
ted that the Congolese parliament be reinstated and the national Congolese army 
disarmed. This caused frustration in the U.S. because they feared that Lumumba 
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would seize power again. At a later date Dayal would declare that Mobutu was fi-
nanced by the U.S. and the attempts of Mobutu to capture Lumumba had actually 
been assassination attempts. Due to the problems the U.S. had with the new UN 
commander they suggested a dismissal of Dayal, but Hammarskjold declined and criti-
cised the latest actions of the U.S. in the Congo himself. In this chaos Lumumba fled 
from preventive detention. This chance was immediately grabbed by the U.S. and the 
Belgians, who blocked every possible escape route and captured him.45 When 
Lumumba was imprisoned, his deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga announced 
that from that moment on he was the head of the only legal Congolese government. 
Gizenga and his troops gained control of the Orientale province and many Congolese 
soldiers joined the army of Gizenga. On December 1960 they conquered the Kivu 
province and moved south along the shores of Lake Tanganyika gathering more 
soldiers. This army was even able to occupy the city of Manono in northern Katanga. 
Another battalion stationed in the Orientale province attacked the Equateur province 
and took over control of the northern parts. This military campaign became a high risk 
for Mobutu’s military government and the U.S. but, as Larry Devlin stated, Krushchev 
missed the chance to seize the opportunity to obtain a foothold in Africa. Krushchev 
did not exploit this extraordinary opportunity and waited to see what action the other 
African nations would take, but they were divided over a common plan on this issue.46 
On January 17 Lumumba was taken to Katanga.47 At that point his fate was sealed. 
Even Larry Devlin admitted that he received the order to kill him.48 On one of the fol-
lowing days, Lumumba was killed, but it was never revealed who had been respon-
sible for his death. 
When Krushchev was informed about the assassination, the Soviet Union broke 
off diplomatic relations with the UN Secretary General. From that moment on the 
Soviet Union considered the position of the UN Secretary General simply as non-
existent and enforced their demands for a UN troika.49 The death of Lumumba was 
followed by demonstrations and propaganda campaigns everywhere in the Soviet 
bloc aimed at criticising the U.S., the NATO and the UN.50 Within the UN Krushchev 
tried to exploit the death of Lumumba to increase Soviet influence. He accused Ham-
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marskjöld of being an accomplice in the murder and demanded once more a troika 
instead of the position of a General Secretary.51 
Conclusion 
The United Nations served western interests in the beginning of the Congo Crisis. In 
1960 the UN was seen as an extension of U.S. power as U.S. troops fought in Korea 
against Chinese and Korean Communist forces. With the Congo Crisis the UN deve-
loped into a different organisation. It could also be shown that the Soviet Union had 
absolutely no influence in UN decisions, despite its right of veto in the Security 
Council, and that the UN hampered every Soviet action in the Congo. The change 
within the UN was also the reason why western powers acted through the UN in the 
beginning of the crisis and began to take more and more actions outside the UN 
when Dayal gaining control over the UN forces in the Congo. The reason why the 
western powers had their own interests in the Congo was mostly because of the 
strategic value of the geographic position and the mineral wealth of the Congo in the 
Cold War. It was essential for Belgium and the U.S. to maintain control of the Congo’s 
mineral wealth and to keep the Soviet Union out. As soon as Krushchev realised that 
Soviet actions were hampered by the “US-controlled” UN, he demanded to install a 
troika instead of the position of the UN Secretary General. This was also an attempt 
to gain influence within the UN shifting the balance of powers in the UN. About the 
role of the United Nations during the Congo Crisis, Krushchev summed up later at 
the Vienna Summit 1961 that the United Nations were very well able to act against 
the will of individual states.52 Although the role of the United Nations changed after 
Dayal had been in charge of the UN forces, it was still not in favour of the Soviet 
Union. The UN tried not to act as a conflict party, neither on the U.S. nor the Soviet 
side, but as an objective observer who intervenes to obtain peace if necessary. Not 
only the UN had an impact on the chaotic run of events during the crisis. Larry Devlin 
stated later: 
“In retrospect, I think that Lumumba’s actions and statements may well have re-
sulted from his limited education and his total lack of experience in dealing with 
sophisticated leaders and governments. While I never believed that Lumumba 
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was a communist, I did believe he was politically naive and inherently unstable. 
Our view in the embassy was that he did not have the leadership qualities to 
hold this vast, disintegrating country together and, sooner or later, the Russian 
bear would seize its chance and pounce. This may seem far-fetched years after 
those hectic days at the height of the Cold War, but the Soviets had long before 
demonstrated their ability to work from within to control trade unions, peace 
groups, political parties, and other groups in Europa and Asia. There was no 
doubt in our minds that the Congo was a strategic linchpin in that epic 
struggle.”53 
Although Devlin ascribed characteristics such as naivety and inexperience to 
Lumumba, in 1960 he was conceived such a threat to the U.S. that they wanted to get 
rid of him at any price, and the UN was unable to frustrate the U.S. and Belgian 
efforts. It can be said that at the beginning of the Crisis the UN was an instrument of 
the U.S. and western interests, but developed during the crisis to the point where it 
no longer was an instrument of western nations. 
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Conventional wisdom tells that the African continent is conflict-prone and particularly 
well known for an extraordinary persistence of violence. This wisdom is connected to 
a large number of coupe d’états, of “corrupt” leaders, and of bloody wars in the post-
colonial period, as well as of increasingly “failing” states (increasingly in number as 
well as in intensity.1 Some ascribe these patterns essentially to the colonial “defor-
mations” of society and hence the processes of societal reorganisation during colonial 
times,2 while others see the root causes for these kinds of problems essentially in 
the failed “modernisation” of African societies.3 
In this broader context, this contribution is more of a rather explorative sketch 
of a research project than actually already providing sophisticated results. We depart 
from earlier work on conflict systems,4 the concept of social orders with limited and 
open access in connection with violence5 and its application to conflicts,6 to develop 
this into an institutional perspective addressing the multiple roots of conflicts: some 
of them are located within the countries concerned, some in their regional context, 
some at the global level. Specifically, we want to start a discussion about the inter-
play between international and national institutionalisation in the post-colonial period 
                                                 
 1 See Zartman (1995), Reno (1998), and Rothberg (2004) for informed assessments of this development. 
 2 As prominently done by Amin (1971) and Frank (1978). 
 3 This view follows stages-of-growth like logics as pioneered in Rostow (1962). 
 4 See Exenberger/Gebrewold (2009). 
 5 See North et al. (2009, 2013). North et al. (2013) is a case study collection also containing two interesting 
African cases: Kaiser/Wolters (2013) on the still largely dysfunctional order in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and Levy (2013) on the more promising example of Mozambique. 
 6 See Exenberger (2014). 
154 African “Limited Access Orders” and Post-colonial Conflicts 
and hence to address the global dimension of conflict causation and conflict manage-
ment in the case of the African continent. While also the local institutional environ-
ments will be considered, which are very likely to be different types of orders with 
(usually strictly) limited access in the African case, steps of institutionalisation at the 
global level are of particular concern. Hence, the concept of a limited access order 
will be explicitly applied at the global level to better understand these overarching 
configurations. 
On the following pages, a brief introduction into the logic of limited access 
orders will be given, applied for post-colonial conflicts in Sub-Sahara Africa and finally 
linked to the global level of institutionalisation influencing African conflict systems. 
The logic of limited access orders 
About ten years ago, Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, Barry K. Weingast and Steven 
B. Webb set sail on a brave endeavour: they developed and introduced a new insti-
tutional approach to “interpret recorded human history”7. The approach departs from 
the insight that 
“all societies must deal with the problem of violence. In most developing 
countries, individuals and organisations actively use or threaten to use 
violence to gather wealth and resources, and violence has to be restrained for 
development to occur.”8 
The approach finds the answer to this problem in credible institutionalisation 
of arrangements between people and groups with violence potential, leading to a 
typology of social orders from limited to open access, categorizing the various more 
or less successful historical and contemporary solutions to this problem. At the basis 
lies the distribution of economic rents and an analytical partition of all societies into 
elites, functionally understood as “dominant coalitions”,9 and a hardly differentiated 
rest. These “economic rents” are a result of any economic process and partly reflect 
the monetary value created by it. Hence, rents in this sense can originate from the 
crude extraction of primary resources as well as any transaction on markets as well 
                                                 
 7 So reads the subtitle of North et al. (2009) and an earlier working paper. 
 8 North et al. (2013), 1. 
 9 North et al. (2009), 18. 
Andreas Exenberger 155 
  
as any kind of innovation, and they will be distributed somehow. Consequently, the 
crucial question is who decides in favour of or against the formal and informal rules 
of distribution and particularly how these decisions are made. In this respect, limited 
and open access orders differ fundamentally: while in open access orders the central 
organising principle is rule-based competition, in limited access orders it is coalition-
based exclusion. While in open access orders all people are free (in principle) to par-
ticipate in political and economic processes as they wish, in limited access orders 
meaningful participation in political and economic processes is limited to members 
of the dominant coalition or close associates. While in open access orders conflicts 
of all kinds are usually solved by well-defined procedures without the use of any 
direct violence, in limited access orders the use of force is a constant threat to over-
throw any agreement although the actual probability is largley dependent on how 
developed and stable the order already is. 
The logic of the order has strong consequences for the economic activities in 
a society. The more open an order is, the more people will participate in the eco-
nomy, and hence the more goods and services will be provided more efficiently. But 
at the same time also the economic rents from these activities will have to be 
distributed more equally among more people. The more limited and fragile an order 
is, the less goods and services will be provided less efficiently, but fewer people will 
be profiting from it and hence their relative share will be bigger. Hence, institutions 
are more and more “inclusive”, the more open the respective order is, and more and 
more “extractive”, the more fragile.10 The resulting trade-off between the absolute 
value of total wealth produced in society and the relative value per capita in the 
dominant coalition after redistribution is also the explanation why extractive orders 
can be sustained. While better institutionalised and hence less risky orders always 
provide more in absolute terms for all, they possibly provide less in absolute terms 
(and certainly in relative) for elites. The best rational choice for a warlord may thus 
be to stay at war, certainly as long as this is the basis of his power and thus his share 
of resources, while, with respect to the provision of public goods and hence from a 
societal perspective, this is certainly the least favourable option.11 In the end, a bigger 
piece from a smaller cake may be preferable to a smaller piece from a bigger cake – 
                                                 
 10 This terminology is borrowed from Acemoglu/Robinson (2012). 
 11 Panther (2014) summarises it by the truism that “violent conflict in a society will break out when groups com-
manding some resources of organised violence have reasons to believe that this will be to their advantage. 
This is the more likely if the costs of doing so are low and the expected gains high.” (Panther 2014, 30) 
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with the people with violence potential as factual deciders what kind of cake is 
produced and certainly as first to choose their pieces.12 
Limited access orders are further distinguished into “fragile”, “basic” and 
“mature” according to their degree of sophistication, which can be measured along 
three dimensions: is there some kind of societal control over the means of violence? 
Is there some kind of rule-of-law at least between elites? And are there perpetually 
lived organisations in the political or economic sphere without close ties to the 
dominant coalition? These three dimensions also represent – as “doorstep con-
ditions” – necessary prerequisites for a transition towards open access and of course 
the existence of formal rules is far less relevant than the existence of credible actual 
practises (be it based on formal rules or informal beliefs). While the relevance of the 
first condition is quite self-evident (containing violence as uncontested public “mo-
nopoly of violence” in an open access order) and directly related to the problem of 
violence, the other two need a bit more elaboration. The second condition is crucial 
because it not only opens the way to extend rule-of-law in a society to the general 
public, but also because it is the only way to establish credibility of the order. As 
long as there is no rule-based impartial conflict-management in a society, all actors 
with violence potential will regularly use violence in case of conflict. Only if there 
are predictable violence-free procedures to regulate conflicts while recognizing the 
interests of the conflict parties, can we expect that people will abstain from using 
violence to enforce their interests. Finally, the third condition does not only refer to 
the necessary separation between politics and the economy in an open access order, 
but also to the question of control and – again – of credibility. A perpetually lived 
organisation is an organisation which exists independently from any persons associ-
ated to it or identified with it. It survives the death of its founder or leader and is thus 
able to commit to agreements independently of any personal charisma or credibility. 
In fragile stages this opens the door for sustainable (political) agreements and in more 
stable stages this paves the path to anonymous (economic) exchange. Further, only 
political organisations independent of the ruling elite are able to provide meaningful 
control for it, i.e. monitoring whether the dominant coalition is actually keeping its 
agreements. Without such control, the dominant coalition cannot credibly commit 
itself and hence will not really be trusted by the people. But the more developed a 
limited access order is (and the more so in case of an open access order), the more 
                                                 
 12 This paragraph is taken from Exenberger (2014). 
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is at risk even for elites. Hence the question of credibility becomes more and more 
important, while regressions into less stable types are still possible, especially in the 
case of conflict and the more so if induced by an external shock like the discovery of 
valuable resources. 
Overall, open access orders are characterised by the rule of law (formalised 
and strictly non-discriminatory), perpetuated political and economic organisations 
with low entry barriers (resulting in democracy and free markets) and a public mo-
nopoly of violence (state-controlled army and police). It is obvious that the three 
doorstep conditions are not met neither in the international order (which is some-
times even referred to as “anarchy”13) nor in any country on the African mainland. 
So let us discuss these issues and the consequences from it in more detail. 
Post-colonial conflicts and regimes transformation in Africa 
Actually, all Sub-Sahara African states are to some degree limited access orders and at 
the same time many have a history of conflict. While this is nothing unique to Africa, 
it points to the connections between poverty and governance on the one hand and 
conflict on the other, and it raises the question about the interplay of these national 
limited access orders with the international order. 
In an attempt to operationalise the limited access order (LAO) framework, 
Sophia Gollwitzer-Franke and Marc Quintyn calculated a “doorstep index” in 2012. 
This was the first and is – at least to the knowledge of the author – also a unique 
quantitative assessment of the degree of openness of the respective social order of 
countries. To produce the index, the authors gathered data about 31 indicators 
grouped in three categories for 108 countries over the 1990s and 2000s. They con-
structed three sub-indices representative of the three doorstep conditions, each as 
the arithmetic mean of the standardised values (ranging from 0 to 1) of the respective 
indicators, rescaled for the sample average (so that a value of 1 in any sub-index re-
presents the sample average, while higher values point to above-average and lower 
to below-average performance). While the authors aggregate the three sub-indices 
by simply taking their unweighted arithmetic mean, in table 1 aggregation is done by 
multiplication of the three sub-indices, which does give higher value to a balanced 
                                                 
 13 Following Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. See Waltz (1979). 
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performance and hence does less allow compensating for deficits in one category by 
advances in another.14 
Table 1: Doorstep index, selected countries15 
Rank Country D1 D2 D3 Index 
 TOP 5 WORLDWIDE     
1 Denmark 1.58 1.40 1.31 2.898 
2 Finland 1.57 1.39 1.31 2.859 
3 Australia 1.55 1.36 1.31 2.761 
4 Netherlands 1.57 1.33 1.31 2.735 
5 Sweden 1.59 1.30 1.30 2.687 
 SELECTED NON-AFRICAN     
9 Austria 1.57 1.27 1.27 2.532 
16 USA 1.32 1.32 1.18 2.056 
33 Brazil 1.20 1.03 1.16 1.434 
50 India 0.91 0.99 1.06 0.955 
53 Mexico 0.97 1.05 0.89 0.906 
73 Russia 0.75 0.81 1.11 0.674 
90 China 0.70 0.89 0.80 0.498 
 TOP 5 AFRICAN     
32 Mauritius 1.25 1.13 1.03 1.455 
37 Botswana 1.05 1.13 1.12 1.329 
39 South Africa 1.15 1.11 1.01 1.289 
43 Ghana 1.05 1.13 1.04 1.234 
47 Namibia 0.94 1.00 1.05 0.987 
 BOTTOM 5 AFRICAN     
104 Cote d'Ivoire 0.35 0.78 0.72 0.197 
105 Chad 0.68 0.64 0.43 0.187 
106 Zimbabwe 0.40 0.72 0.56 0.161 
107 Central African Republic 0.61 0.81 0.25 0.124 
108 Mauritania 0.48 0.68 0.36 0.118 
                                                 
 14 Overall, this composite index has a larger band-with than the original one, while values around 1 representing 
around average performance anyway. Theoretically, the minimum level of this composite index is 0 (in case one 
or more sub-indices are equal to 0), while the maximum level is dependent on the sample averages of the sub-
indices (taking the maximum values in the categories in the actual sample, is could be as high as 2.92). 
 15 Based on the data of Gollwitzer-Franke/Quintyn (2012), 54-56, but with modified index calculation (see text). 
The three sub-indices refer to variables about the rule of law for elites (D1), perpetuated political and economic 
organisations (D2) and the public monopoly of violence (D3). Actual index values for these categories are varying 
between 0.35 and 1.59 (D1), 0.64 and 1.4 (D2) and 0.25 and 1.31 (D3) with three African countries exhibiting 
the respective minimum values. 
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A window of transition between limited and open access may be located in the 
band between 1.5 and 1.7 of the index value. Not surprisingly, most of the 33 African 
countries in the sample are far from this threshold and hardly any does perform 
particularly well. Only Mauritius, Botswana, South Africa and Ghana have values 
above 1, while 15 African countries are to be found among the bottom 18 countries 
with values of below 0.4. 
While there is no historical assessment of this doorstep data so far, it is rather 
clear that not many African countries have the chance of an open access historical 
record. Post-colonial rearrangements usually produced paternalistic single-party 
states engaged in various combinations of nation-building and clientilism. As a con-
sequence, most African countries were typologised as “authoritarian” by the polity-
IV-project over most of their post-colonial history. The respective database16 contains 
data of all African countries from independence on, but not before. In their metho-
dology, authoritarianism is associated with closed and selective recruitment of of-
ficials, unlimited authority of the chief executive and restricted and repressed political 
participation (or in other words: limited access to the political arena). On the other 
hand, democracy is associated with electoral systems, control of chief executives and 
political competition (or in other words: open access to the political arena). In both 
categories, a country can earn up to 10 points, with the “polity-score” as difference 
between the democracy and the authoritarianism score and hence between –10 
and +10.17 
Most common are authoritarianism scores of about 7, particularly in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Between 1960 and 1989 usually more than 70% of all African countries 
with principally stable regimes had authoritarianism scores above 5, while at the 
same time only around 10% had democracy scores above 5. Hence, in this Cold War 
period of post-colonial politics, most African countries were quite stable autocracies 
and hence could very probably be associated with basic limited access orders, at 
least in its political dimension. 
But as figure 2 shows something considerably changed in around 1990, when 
the Soviet bloc collapsed and hence a new political dynamic was unleashed. Regime 
                                                 
 16 Center for Systemic Peace (2016a). 
 17 However, extreme values are rare exceptions in Africa: there is only one country (Swaziland from 1973 to 
1992) which had an authoritarianism score of 10 and thus the minimum polity-score of –10, but also only two 
(Mauritius since 1982 and Cape Verde since 2001) which have a democracy score of 10 and hence the 
maximum polity-score of +10. 
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transition, which was an exception before with only 31 post-colonial instances in-
creased to 39 instances between 1991 and 1995 alone in about 50 African states. 
Correspondingly, the average regime duration decreased from 21.7 years in 1989 to 
less than 10 in the 1990s (and has reached only 13.9 years again in 2010). As a rule, 
authoritarian regimes collapsed in these years and gave way to gradual democrati-
sation. However, this was not necessarily good for all countries concerned, because 
a seeming improvement of “scores” can easily hide that many regimes were simply 
destabilised by the loss of external strategic rents. While this usually results in less 
organised repression, it could also lead to collapse and warlordism, which could result 
in a general deterioration of living conditions. Hence an improvement in overall scores 
could lead to either progress towards a more mature order (like Ghana or Kenya, for 
example) as well as regression into a more fragile one (like in the extreme cases of 
Somalia or the DRC, for example), at least in the political dimension. 
Figure 2: A quantitative bird’s view on post-colonial African political regimes18 
 
                                                 
 18 Center for Systemic Peace (2016a). 
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Figure 3: A quantitative overview on (post-)colonial conflicts in Africa19 
 
 
A quantitative assessment of what they call “major episodes of political violence” is 
provided by the International Network of Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) in their 
corresponding database,20 which mainly covers the post-colonial period for African 
states. In their methodology, they define conflicts of various kinds (international, civil, 
ethnic) and various intensities (from 1, sporadic and expressive political violence, to 
10, extermination and annihilation). Figure 3 shows two kinds of information: the 
number of African countries affected by some kind of conflict and additional infor-
mation on their intensities. Here we see a rise in the number of countries affected 
to up to 20 (out of 51) in 1993 as well, but on the other hand also that the average 
intensity of the actual conflicts (which is shown by the dotted line referring to the 
right hand scale), which also existed before, did not considerably change over the 
                                                 
 19 Center for Systemic Peace (2016b). 
 20 Center for Systemic Peace (2016b). 
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1970s, 1980s and 1990s, but fluctuating between 3 and 4. While the original score 
varies between 0 and 10, data in figure 3 is categorised in four types: low intensity 
conflicts (from sporadic to limited and serious political violence), medium intensity 
conflicts (from serious to substantial-prolonged and extensive warfare), high intensity 
conflicts (from pervasive to technological and total warfare to extermination and 
annihilation) and wars of independence (which usually were of “medium” violence). 
High-intensity conflicts did only take place very rarely in Africa, not the least be-
cause of the limited potentials of the conflict parties. The only cases are the Rwandan 
genocide of 1994, the Biafra War in 1966, the Congo War in 1996 (only), the Angolan 
War from 1975 to 2002, as well as Ethiopia 1977-79 and Uganda in 1978. However, 
it must not be overlooked that also medium intensity conflicts can result in very 
serious casualties: according to INSCR data,21 the various Congo Wars are associated 
with 2.5 million deaths, the various conflicts in Sudan add up to at least 1.7 million, 
warfare in Ethiopia and between Ethiopia and Eritrea to more than 1 million, the 
Mozambique War to 500,000, and Burundi alone has two violent episodes with more 
than 100,000 deaths each, not to mention further mass killings in Somalia, Uganda 
and Algeria. 
Hence, one may see vicious circles at work in many African countries. There is a 
group of countries with a history of recurring conflict with nine having more than 20 
conflict years since independence and ten more have at least more than 10. The good 
news is that there is also a group of countries where conflicts are virtually absent: 13 
had none at all and another 13 not more than five conflicts years since independence. 
Regime transition did not always help (like it did in the case of Mozambique), but 
sometimes made the situation even worse (like in Somalia). But still there is a correla-
tion between the political and economic openness of countries and average conflict 
intensity with a (provisional but significant) correlation coefficient of –0.42.22 How-
ever, the connection is far from complete: the most prominent exceptions to the 
general rule are South Africa and Mozambique as rather open orders with a distinct 
history of violence, as well as Togo, Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville as rather closed 
countries without a corresponding history of conflict. 
                                                 
 21 Center for Systemic Peace (2016c). Larger estimates exist, especially for the Congo Wars, but this is also a much 
contested field of research; see Spagat et al. (2009) for a general discussion of the estimation of war deaths. 
 22 This number refers to the correlation coefficient between the multiplicative doorstep index (as presented in 
table 1) and the cumulative conflict intensity divided by the number of country-years in the dataset (Center 
for Systemic Peace 2016b) for the 31 countries, for which data on both is available. 
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In sum, internal conflict remains a constant threat for many Africa countries, 
particularly those with rather fragile orders. In many cases, external actors and 
interests (not the least economic) interfere with local affairs and mess it up even 
more. However, one of the problems of conflict resolution in Africa may also be that 
no matter how limited the access to power may be on the country-level, the access 
to power on the international level is still much more limited, especially for African 
states. So let us take a look at this. 
International institutionalisation: limited access on a global scale 
There has hardly been any attempt so far to apply the framework of limited and open 
access orders to the global arena. In a 2014 working paper, Stephan Panther traced 
the “contours of a research program” for analysing world system’s institutions,23 
which includes an explorative discussion of limited access on a global scale. Indirectly, 
it points to the central methodological challenge associated to that task, which is 
the question of who the actual actors are. While it may be plausible (and certainly 
much easier to handle analytically) to understand the hierarchical relationship be-
tween elites and masses on a global scale as a power relationship between countries, 
it would be strongly preferable to apply the concept to people and their networks (or 
the lack of it). In a globalised world, especially the role of transnational corporations 
is increasingly crucial and the role of international organisations has become relevant 
and hence deserves consideration in the analysis. To quote Panther at length: 
“It would be interesting to look at similar mechanisms around a new highly 
educated, mobile and connected class of executives relatively high up in the 
decision-making hierarchy of this government-transnational complex. NGOs 
could be seen as a global counter elite, torn between being a true challenge to 
the established powers and being co-opted. To analyse all this, network and 
Bourdieu-type of analyses of economic and cultural capital of these elites may 
be very interesting, particularly to assess the degree to which these institutions 
have become more like perpetually lived organisations than purely personal 
connections. Around this narrow core elite we then have those who have been 
‘bribed’ into the elite, who have something to lose from a change in the domi-
nant coalition or indeed the global hierarchy as such. Skilled workers in the 
                                                 
 23 World system’s research originated in the works of Immanuel Wallerstein, see for a summary Wallerstein (2004). 
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Global North are a case in point. So are the current state elites in the Global 
South.”24 
While I do disapprove of the role of NGOs as portrayed by Panther, I especially 
share his view how trans-national networks work in this context. But the challenge 
to extend the application to a truly trans-national (and hence more realistic) approach 
is left here for further research. Thus, primarily for the matter of convenience, the 
following actual discussion will be limited to countries (and their representatives). 
Already at that level, relevant insights can be gained from applying the doorstep 
conditions on the international system, which reveals the crucial difference between 
rules and their enforcement. However, before we proceed, we should consider the 
following questions: what are the rents in the international system, who are the 
relevant groups with violence potential and who is the dominant coalition on global 
scale. 
A provisional clarification of terms 
The delimitation of rents on a global scale is a crucial but tricky question. It depends 
on the underlying assumption about the relevance of the international system for 
national and local economic activities. At one end of the spectrum (with the as-
sumption of very limited to absent relevance) rents do only consist of the value 
created in international economic exchange and not necessarily all of them. At the 
other end of the spectrum (with the assumption of strong relevance), rents do also 
include all economic rents created in national arenas, because at least in principle it 
is the international order allowing and occasionally even enforcing the rent-creating 
activities also at that level. For the moment, I will broadly follow the second under-
standing, because it allows more space for trans-national interactions. However, 
this is another central point for future research. 
Further, what are the relevant groups with violence potential on a global 
scale? In principal, all official state armies and all international organisations with 
access to armed groups, but also all politically relevant regional or local armed groups 
have to be considered as possible groups with violence potential (in an extended 
framework maybe also the private armies of some corporations or criminal organi-
sations). But when it comes to influence on global affairs, many of these actors (no 
                                                 
 24 Panther (2014), 33. 
Andreas Exenberger 165 
  
matter if public or private) become negligible. As a rule of thumb, only those armed 
groups which can be expected to be able to challenge a weaker competitor without 
fear of relevant retaliation or punishment by others or which are able to credibly 
deter others from actions should be considered, which limits the number to those 
rather few states with well-equipped armies and the interesting question how to 
consider international organisations in this context, which usually have military means 
only if provided by member states. 
And what is the dominant coalition? While some of these states may also go on 
their own, most of them maintain hierarchical patron-client-networks on the level 
of countries by the use of multilateral treaties or bilateral agreements and possibly 
also by the use of force. At least in the case of the most powerful international 
actor, the United States, this network even includes other powerful actors. In this 
context, only those powerful states are not part of the dominant coalition which are 
either fundamentally challenging the rules of the existing international order or which 
are actively excluded from meaningful participation. While it is difficult to judge 
exactly who is part of the coalition with only the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council being safe bets at the moment, it is clear that most countries in the 
world supportive of the international system are this as clients of much more 
powerful political and economic partners. 
First doorstep condition: Is there some kind of societal control over the means 
of violence? 
The condensed answer is: hardly. There are international rules, particularly the law 
of nations, under which conditions the use of violence is legitimate, but in the end 
the inequality of violence potential between the groups possessing it is so high that 
sanctioning violations of these rules is not regularly possible. Further, there is the 
comparably strong principle of non-intervention into what is considered as the 
“internal” affairs of states, while only the most powerful actors usually able to ignore 
this principle. This holds for the Cold War period when the United States and the 
Soviet Union defined their spheres of influence, and also for the consecutive period 
when “coalitions of the willing” acted usually less than more in accordance with inter-
national rules (but sometimes eager to get some formal backing by them). Further, 
also international military forces are very small compared to national ones. This even 
holds for international military alliances like the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), but certainly for the United Nations peace-keeping forces, which are some-
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times substantial compared to local groups, but usually negligible in numbers as well 
as equipment compared to the official armies of stable states. 
Second doorstep condition: Is there some kind of rule-of-law at least between 
elites? 
Here the condensed answer is: yes, but rather limited. Today, there are a lot of inter-
national agreements and contracts and there are rule-based international organi-
sations, and the developments in this sphere in the last decades are truly astonishing 
compared to earlier centuries, but the actual relevance of these rules is often still 
subject to power relationships. However, between strong states conflict management 
has developed into forms practically free from direct violence (despite everyday 
hostilities in undeclared propaganda wars, the most severe instances usually come in 
form of economic sanctions). Further, there are rule-based international organisations 
with partially strong influence on international (and sometimes even national) affairs 
although their influence is often contested in cases of conflicts and sometimes they 
are also misused for power politics of strong states. 
Third doorstep condition: Are there perpetually lived organisations in the politi-
cal or economic sphere existing without close ties to the dominant coalition? 
Also the answer to this question is: Yes – but here the problem of perspective is most 
crucial. While there is a rather low degree of connection between actual economic 
and political power in case of corporations based in open access societies (contrary 
to those based in limited access societies), there is usually a stronger connection to 
the states than to the international system in all these cases. However, at the same 
time there is also a misbalance of power on a global scale: large international eco-
nomic organisations (like trans-national corporations) have developed into more rele-
vant actors – at least economically – than international political organisations. At the 
same time, international organisations are perpetually lived ones, at least to a large 
degree. Their life is usually not limited by the existence of certain persons or certain 
states, but by the common will of those who are participating. Their functioning and 
dissolution is usually following certain predefined rules, although these rules are fluid 
in the sense that they are normally adapted in a discretionary way in case of problems 
regarded as sufficiently relevant by a sufficient number of willing actors. Hence, there 
is still a lot of vagueness in here as in most other parts of this largely undiscovered 
country. 
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Preliminary assessment 
Besides the serious limitations of these discussions, overall, the international system 
does certainly not qualify as an open access order, neither at the country-level nor at 
the individual. But it is also far from pure anarchy and hence should be seen as some 
kind of limited access order. On the level of countries, relations are relatively rule-
based and basically free of violence within the elite. Organisations are in principle 
perpetually lived although the rules they follow are constantly subject to challenge. 
Additionally, the distinction between economic and political interests and hence 
also activities is not clear on the level of countries, and the distinction between public 
and private does hardly make any sense because – while several states are strong 
entities – there is only in a very rudimentary sense a comparable global public. Taken 
together with the characterisation in North et al. (2013, 14) it is reasonable to charac-
terise the international system as a basic limited access order: violence potential is 
not totally controlled but significantly contained by the dominant actors and it is 
hardly possible to act internationally (in the economic as well as the political sphere) 
against the interests of the dominant coalition. 
Referring to Panther (2014), some more factors should be considered in a more 
ambitious analysis. The access to external finance (which is limited for poor countries) 
and unequal exchange in world trade (which is aggravated by considerable differen-
ces in spill-over effects from specialisation) are relevant factors, as is the access to citi-
zenship (providing strong restrictions of participation) and the access to education 
(with higher education being a practical prerequisite of membership in the global 
elite). While the two former factors work on the country level, the latter two work on 
the individual level. In the form of foreign direct investment and banking systems, 
however, both levels are even connected. At the end of this analysis, we may finally 
hope for a better understanding of the global network and its functions, as well as 
of some of the means how the limitation of access to it is done. 
Final outlook 
Conclusions can only be preliminary. Basically, they are limited to pointing at the rele-
vance of further research on the interplay between national and international limited 
access orders, which deserves more in-depth analysis and especially so in the case 
of conflict-prone and economically disadvantaged regions in Africa and elsewhere. 
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Hence, let us take a final look at how the national limited access orders of 
Africa interact with the global. They do this in multiple ways. The most obvious is 
that external actors are themselves part of the political or economic constellation in 
a country and act as rent-seeking groups with violence potential themselves. Foreign 
armies may protect the strategic interest of their home countries also on foreign 
soil and transnational corporations may employ armed forces to protect their 
property or promote their profit abroad. But also international organisations deploy 
armed forces, especially in Africa: UN Peace Keeping Missions were carried out in 
several of the mentioned transition conflicts, many of them among the best equipped 
missions in history (at least with respect to manpower). More than 10,000 personnel 
each were deployed in the Congo (MONUSCO from 1999), in Liberia (UNMIL from 
2003), in Ivory Coast (UNOCI from 2004), in Sudan (UNAMID from 2007), in South 
Sudan (UNMISS from 2011) and in Mali (MINUSMA from 2013), with additional, 
slightly smaller missions in the Sudan border region (UNISFA from 2011) and the 
Central African Republic (MINUSCA from 2014). However, international interventions 
of this and other kinds often play a rather ambiguous role. They provide protection 
not only for the civil population (at least to some degree) but also for the strategic 
interest of some external powers and maybe even for economic interest of certain 
actors. The recent rise of UN Missions in Africa has therefore to be interpreted with 
great caution. While their containment efforts should not be underestimated, more 
case studies are certainly needed on the actual impacts of these missions on the 
ground. A connected direction of research, more directly related to international 
organisations, is also an analysis of the effects of Security Council membership of 
certain states. 
Further, institutional analysis points at two different roles of the global system, 
more specifically, of organisations based in open access orders. One is the progressive 
influence that these organisations may act as safe-guards for national commitments, 
i.e. that they lend credibility to local actors by guaranteeing contract enforcement. 
People with violence potential may not easily trust each other, but they may trust 
(or at least may be willing to trust) some external power, even if only because it 
possesses superior violence potential. The other role is the conservative influence 
that as long as open access institutions exist somewhere in the system, it is only 
necessary to secure elite access to them, but not to implement these institutions at 
home. Neither transnational corporations nor national elites have incentives to im-
prove the rule of law or the organisational quality in a certain country or establish 
security there as long as they have access to high-quality rule-of-law-based organi-
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sations or violence-free environments abroad or simply to the military means to 
protect their interests. Hence, while incorporation into the global order may stabilise 
existing national orders at least to some degree, it also provides disincentives to 
develop workable institutions and organisations at home, which is certainly a serious 
obstacle to development in the long run. And while external third-party-enforcement 
may be rather powerful to provide credibility to otherwise not trustworthy local 
actors, this has similar moral-hazard-like effects on their behaviour, but even more: 
if these institutions replace indigenous institutions of third-party-enforcement (real 
or proposed), there may even provide more poison than medicine, again at least in 
the long run. 
The logic of limited access orders also limits the developmental prospects of 
societies, in the case of African countries as anywhere else in the world. Endemic 
violence and conflicts further aggravate the problem. Especially in this context, the 
international arena is an often undervalued layer of conflict regulation. International 
actors may provide an external anchor of credibility to internal actors, but they may 
also inject additional conflict-promoting interests and resources and act as conflict 
parties themselves. Hence, an application of the concept of limited access orders on 
a global scale and its interplay with local orders is certainly promising. Methodological 
challenges still to be tackled in the future include the necessary shift from a country-
based analysis to an actors-based analysis, which shifts the focus to trans-national 
networks instead of a system of states, and a conceptualisation of what rents are on 
a global scale. Further, a more detailed characterisation of the global system (under-
stood as inter-personal and inter-organisational network) as basic limited access 
order is needed. Then, finally, we can analyse the interplay of the global level with 
national orders and regional conflict systems and operationalise the resulting complex 
to allow for an empirical application to actual historical and recent conflict dynamics 
in Africa, but also elsewhere. The challenges are great, so have to be the efforts. 
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Starting an outlook with a glance at the past is not so untypical for a historian – from a 
professional point of view the past feels more familiar than the future. But the an-
nounced journey back in time will not stretch very far. First brief stopover: late 2012 
when the idea arose to found a network in Austria interlinking researchers who are 
focusing on Africa.  
At first glance Africa seems like a strange field of interest in a country that 
apparently has no historic links to the huge continent south of the Mediterranean. 
Even though the Habsburg-Monarchy had no colonial bonds with Africa there is a 
number of Austrians that achieved some prominence in their specific fields. Amongst 
these are the geographer Oscar Baumann and the officer Rudolf Freiherr von Slatin.  
Within the Austrian university scene Africa became an institutionalised field of 
interest in 1903 when the chair for Ägyptische Altertumskunde (Egyptian Archaeo-
logical Research) was founded at the University of Vienna. Twenty years later the 
Institut für Ägyptologie und Afrikanistik (Institute of Egyptology and African Studies) 
was founded which eventually became today’s Institut für Afrikawissenschaften 
(Department of African Studies). Although academic research on Africa seemed to be 
harboured at the University of Vienna, Africa used to be a field of interest at other 
universities and non-university institutions, too. But there were very limited ties 
within the Austrian research landscape. Of course, there have been some successful 
attempts to establish interdisciplinary networks e. g. the Austrian Study Centre for 
Peace and Conflict Resolution in Stadtschlaining or the Innsbrucker Forum für Ent-
wicklungsforschung (Innsbruck Forum on Development Studies) to name just two of 
them. Both establishments do not exclusively focus on Africa. This seemed to remain 
a privilege of the Department of African Studies. So research on Africa remained a 
field with poor intra-Austrian structures outside Vienna. 
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Against this background the idea was born to create an Africa-Network inter-
linking the Austrian research community. The initial meeting took place in January 
2013 in Salzburg. Around a dozen colleagues from Innsbruck, Linz, Salzburg and 
Vienna agreed on a loose common platform that should be open for everyone in 
Austria who is focusing on Africa. Primary aims of the idea were bringing people 
together, learning about each other’s field of interest, and providing a structure of 
co-operation. It was agreed to host a First Network-Conference, organised at the 
Department of African Studies. 
This conference took place in January 2014 and when colleagues from Graz, 
Innsbruck, Linz, Salzburg and Vienna gathered for two inspiring days at the University 
of Vienna, two things became visible: Africa-research is broad-based in Austria. The 
panels covered Language & Cultural Contact, Economy & Development, Decolonisa-
tion & Literature, Governance & Security, and Dimensions of Social and Spatial Mobility. 
But on the other hand this broad thematic base made visible a very narrow coverage 
of academic disciplines. The network was restricted to the Humanities and Social 
Sciences. Nonetheless it was a great success bringing together a large part of the 
research-community focusing on Africa. 
To make sure the conference in Vienna had not been a single incident a plan 
was forged to meet again in Innsbruck. This Second Network-Conference was 
scheduled for March 2015. In accordance with the fields of interest in Innsbruck the 
topics of the presentations differed slightly from those in Vienna. Panels on Literature 
and Media, History and Politics, and Education and Development formed the range 
of topics, partly represented in this conference volume. But the network could not 
expand itself beyond the Humanities and Social Sciences.  
The participants in Innsbruck widely agreed on the benefit of being introduced 
to other academic fields, but this otherness only covered a specific part of academia 
as a whole. Thinking in traditional faculties the network remained in philosophical 
spheres without real contact to Natural or Legal Sciences, Theology, Engineering, Art, 
or Medical Science. 
In November 2016 the Third Network-Conference takes place in Linz providing 
a new chance for the idea to grow. But is there a need to spread within the Humani-
ties and Social Sciences or even expand to other faculties? When the network was 
launched in 2013 the idea was to create an open platform to interlink research on 
Africa in Austria. What has been achieved so far is a great success. For the first time 
there is a loose, informal structure bringing together people with similar interests. 
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And there are concrete projects developing like the idea of conflict-monitoring brin-
ging together economists, experts on international law, historians, political scientists, 
and experts on security studies. This project will be introduced in Linz, too.  
Despite such developments there is plenty of room to enhance the network. 
Artists working on African paintings or geographers focusing on municipal develop-
ment would enrich the platform. Architects, e.g. involved in refugee-projects, could 
be part of the network, as well as engineers, legal scholars, theologians, or software-
developers. There is no need to argue on the obvious in depth: everybody within a 
network can profit from the knowledge, experiences, contacts or ideas represented 
in the linkage. The challenge is to convince people to become part of the network.  
At the very beginning in Salzburg the concept of the Africa-Network outlined 
a very loose platform for possible contacts or co-operations. No formal structures 
should be set up since nobody wanted to be trapped in administrative work for a 
vague idea of co-operation without any guarantee of essential realisation. Of course 
there is never a guarantee for success but in the meantime the substance for an 
Africa-Network in Austria has been confirmed. Maybe we should think about some 
formal structures again to make the idea attractable to more faculties and disciplines. 
Then the Fourth Network-Conference will probably be hosted by a faculty that is not 
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to the second workshop of the research group, which was held in Innsbruck, 
19-20 March 2015. The topics covered span from pan-Africanism and popu-
lar culture, the use of research films in African studies, and reflections on the 
Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie to students’ exchange between 
Tanzania and the two German states, the role of the UN in the Congo Crisis, and 
post-colonial conflicts and limited access orders in Africa. It contains contri-
butions by Eric Burton (Vienna), Birgit Englert (Vienna), Andreas Exenberger 
(Innsbruck), Maximilian Feldner (Graz), Thomas Lechner (Graz), Silvia Lercher 
(Innsbruck), Ulrich Pallua (Innsbruck), Arno Sonderegger (Vienna) and Thomas 
Spielbüchler (Linz).
